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Community Collateral Damage:
A Question of Priorities
Andrea J. Boyack*
Today's soaring mortgage default rate and the uncertainty and delay
associated with mortgage foreclosure proceedings threaten to cause
financial tragedies of the commons in condominiums and homeowner
associations across the country. Assessment defaults in privately
governed communities result in an inequitable allocation of upkeep
costs-a phenomenon that current law has failed to prevent. But the
collateral damage caused by delayed foreclosures and insufficient
recoveries can be minimized by increasing the payment priority of the
association lien.
In a majority of states, association liens are completely subordinate
to the first mortgage lien. At foreclosure of the mortgage lien, the
junior priority assessment lien will be extinguished whether or not there
are sufficient proceeds to reimburse for community charges.
Assessment delinquencies grow over time, so the longer it takes to
complete foreclosure, the greater the costs to the neighborhood.
Although several states have adopted a limited lien priority for up to six
months' worth of unpaid assessments, foreclosures today take far
longer than six months, and the amount ultimately owed to a community
can be significant and far exceed that cap. Federal housing policy
affects the resolution of the issue because the Federal Housing
Administration ("FHA'), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac only permit
qualifying mortgages to be subject to a six-month assessment lien
priority. The decelerating pace of foreclosure further exacerbates the
already unjustifiable financial impact borne by non-defaulting
neighbors. The lien priority status quo fails to adequately protect
communities in today 's context of widespread, delayed foreclosures and
* Visiting Professor of Law at Fordham University Law School and former Visiting Professor
of Law at George Washington University Law School; J.D., University of Virginia School of
Law; M.A.L.D., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University; B.A., Brigham Young
University. I am deeply indebted to both Robert M. Diamond and Professor Dale Whitman for
their insight and invaluable input.
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under-collateralized mortgage loans. Decreasing the first mortgage
lien's priority during a foreclosure delay would mitigate the harm.
Lien priority statutory changes could protect association finances in
the future, and such provisions might be applied retroactively as well.
In other contexts, states have held that changes to a lien priority regime
could apply to existing associations and existing mortgages without
unconstitutionally impairing contract or property rights. This has been
particularly true where the association's lien was deemed to have been
created on the date the community's organizational documents were
recorded (prior to any unit's mortgage). Historically, bank lobbyists
have opposed any enhanced assessment lien priority. However,
supporting property upkeep and making assessments more predictable
and collectible would actually benefit lenders by shoring up the value of
their collateral. Moreover, increased certainty with respect to
homeowner payment obligations would enable more responsible credit
underwriting and contribute to economic recovery. Shoring up
assessment lien priority would not only ensure a fair allocation of
community costs, but also would help to contain the current housing
market decline.
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INTRODUCTION
Culpable parties in today's housing crisis are legion,' but innocent
bystanders are directly and tangibly harmed by the fallout. Nonpayment
of upkeep charges by financially strapped owners forces guiltless
neighbors to fund the community budget revenue gap. The problem is
exacerbated by foreclosure delay, since a property conveyance would
replace an insolvent owner with a solvent one. Whether a foreclosure
delay results from mortgage lenders' strategic behavior 2 or from
procedural missteps by servicers, 3 the result is the same-hard-working,
I . Mortgage brokers pushed unrealistic loans. Steven Krystofiak, President, Mortgage
Brokers Ass'n for Responsible Lending, Statement at the Federal Reserve (Aug. 1, 2006),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/secrs/2006/august/20060801/op-1253/op-1253_3_1
.pdf. Appraisers validated unrealistic prices. See Jonathan R. Laing, The Bubble's New Home,
BARRON'S ONLINE (June 20, 2005), http://online.barrons.com/article/SBl1l905372884363176.
html (discussing economist Robert Shiller's forecast of the housing market). Homeowners
borrowed money they could not repay, and lenders lent funds while ignoring credit and market
risks. Ben Steverman & David Bogoslaw, The Financial Crisis Blame Game, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 18, 2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/
oct2008/pi20081017_950382.htm. Secondary market purchasers and investors overly relied on
securitization, and regulators and credit rating agencies blessed the entire system in error,
negligence, or both. See, e.g., Carol Ann Frost, Credit Rating Agencies in Capital Markets: A
Review ofResearch Evidence on Selected Criticisms of the Agencies, J. ACCT., AUDITING, & FIN.
(forthcoming 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-941861 (analyzing the criticism of the
credit rating agencies); John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the "Worldwide Credit
Crisis": The Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for Improvement,
1 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 109, 114 (2009) ("It is not plausible to argue that rating agencies have a
valuable reputation for rating instruments they have never rated before."); Robert T. Miller,
Morals in a Market Bubble, 35 U. DAYTON L. REv. 113, 136 (2009) ("Alan Greenspan and his
colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee made some mistakes in the early years of this
decade by keeping interest rates very low for a very long time."); Randolph C. Thompson,
Mortgage Backed Securities, Wall Street, and the Making of a Global Financial Crisis, 5 AM. U.
Bus. L. BRIEF 51, 53 (2008) (providing an overview of the "misguided confidence in these debt
instruments."); Jeff Madrick, How We Were Ruined & What We Can Do, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS,
Feb. 12, 2009, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/feb/12/how-we-were-
ruined-what-we-can-do/ (providing an overview of the securitization and the financial crisis);
Ronald Colombo, A Crisis of Character, HUFFINGTON POST (May 12, 2009, 4:58 PM),
www.huffingtonpost.com/ronald-j-colombo/a-crisis-of-character_b_202562.html (lamenting the
erosion of morals in the modem economy).
2. In a normal housing market, pushing foreclosures through quickly is in a lender's best
interest. But in a depressed market, lenders have discovered that a foreclosure with a low
prospect of a quick resale actually causes them to lose money. In 2009, lenders canceled up to
50% of foreclosure sales in some parts of the country, and many of these delays were inspired by
the desire to avoid upkeep costs (maintenance, community assessments, and property taxes) while
awaiting a market rebound. Todd Ruger, Lenders' Latest Foreclosure Strategy: Waiting,
HERALD TRIB., July 12, 2009, at Al.
3. In early October 2010, three of the largest mortgage lenders in the United States-Bank of
America, J.P. Morgan Chase, and Ally Financial-announced moratoriums in the twenty-three
states that require court-ordered sales to foreclose on mortgages. This was in reaction to
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financially responsible homeowners are forced to pay significant,
additional amounts of money merely because of their neighbors'
payment defaults, and in the many cases where foreclosure sale
proceeds do not even cover the loan,4 such amounts may never be
recovered. The additional burden on the non-defaulting neighbors
possibly forces such homeowners into their own financial distress.
Allocating the cost of a delinquent owner's upkeep share to the paying
neighbors is inefficient and unfair. 5  Furthermore, inequitable cost
allocation will ultimately lead to additional owner defaults and further
impairment of collateral value for every lender.
increased judicial scrutiny of sloppy-or even fraudulent-servicer foreclosure procedures. See
Ariana Eunjung Cha & Brady Dennis, Judges Revisiting Foreclosure Cases May Help Owners
but Clog Market, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2010, at A9 (referencing a Florida case). Within a week
of the initial announcements of these servicer-initiated moratoriums, Bank of America expanded
its freeze on foreclosures nationwide, and attorneys general in all fifty states begun investigative
probes into the extent of servicer misconduct in foreclosure procedures. See Ariana Eunjung Cha,
Steven Mufson & Jia Lynn Yang, Momentum Builds for Full Moratorium on Foreclosures,
WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2010, at All (reporting that national civil rights groups had called for a
government-mandated national moratorium on foreclosures); Jia Lynn Yang & Ariana Eunjung
Cha, Obama Vetoes Foreclosure Bill as Anger Grows, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2010, at Al
(reporting that federal legislation intended to streamline foreclosure proceedings had been vetoed
by President Obama, further lengthening the foreclosure process). While moratoriums have now
been lifted, the concern that prompted them hangs over foreclosure proceedings, and the
increased servicer scrutiny operates to lengthen the foreclosure timeline. See Carrie Bay, Self-
Evident Truth in Market Variables: Longer Foreclosure Timelines, DSNNEWS.COM (Apr. 12,
2011), http://www.dsnews.com/articles/self-evident-truth-in-market-variables-longer-foreclosure-
timelines-2011-04-12 (stating that the time period from default to foreclosure continues to
increase across the country).
4. According to the Rasmussen Report, 31% of U.S. homeowners with a mortgage owed more
on their homes than their homes were worth at the end of 2010. Peter Schroeder, Poll: Nearly
One-Third ofHomeowners Underwater on Mortgage, THE HILL (Mar. 21, 2011, 1:29 PM), http://
thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/80 1-economy/i 51039-poll-nearly-one-third-of-homeowners-
underwater-on-mortgages. Deutsche Bank predicts that 48% of American homes could have
negative equity by the end of 2011. Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Housing Crisis Represents the
Greatest Threat to Recovery, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.usnews
.com/opinion/mzuckerman/articles/2011/01/27/housing-crisis-represents-the-greatest-threat-to-
the-recovery.
5. The concept that an unfair enjoyment of benefits by parties not bearing associated costs
(free-riding) is inequitable and "wrong" was articulated by H.L.A. Hart in 1955 and was termed
the "principle of fairness." H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175,
185-86 (1955). This concept has been favorably cited by John Rawls. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE 96 (rev. ed. 1971). Fair allocation of cost demands that all beneficiaries of a
cooperative enterprise bear pro rata responsibility for the costs of such enterprise. This
formulation of fair allocation is well-suited to the case of upkeep expenses of a common interest
community such as a homeowner association or condominium. Unfair cost allocation in
communities creates neighborhood contention and lowers quality of life for members of an
association. Michelle Conlin & Tamara Lush, Neighbor vs. Neighbor as Homeowner Fights Get
Ugly, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 10, 2011, available at http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Neighbor-
vs-neighbor-as-apf-2524543580.html?x=0.
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Today, defaulting neighbors cause millions of blameless homeowners
around the country to face such inequitable and unexpected financial
burdens. 6 An increasing number of new developments nationwide have
adopted a private governance model. Approximately 62,000,000
people in the United States (20% of the country's population) live in
one of the 309,600 privately governed common interest communities
("CICs").8 Nationally, home loan delinquency rates are now between
10% and 13% of all mortgages. 9 Mortgage defaults are concentrated in
certain geographic areas, however, so the mortgage delinquency rate in
6. Numerous media accounts have highlighted the stories of suffering by such non-delinquent
neighbors. See, e.g., Christine Dunn, 'Nightmare' Condo Fees After Foreclosure, PROVIDENCE
J., July 6, 2008, at GI (discussing a Rhode Island foreclosure); Christine Haughney, Collateral
Foreclosure Damage, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2008, at C1 (examining the plight of a Miami
woman); Sarah Ryley, New Manhattan Condos See Rise in Foreclosures, THEREALDEAL.COM
(Mar. 8, 2010, 11:00 AM), http://therealdeal.com/newyork/articles/new-manhattan-condos-see-
rise-in-foreclosures--2 (reporting on New York foreclosures); David Sutta, Condos Demanding
Foreclosure On Abandoned Units, MFI-MIAMi (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.mfi-miami.com/
2010/04/condos-demanding-foreclosure-on-abandoned-units/ (discussing the predicament of a
Florida woman).
7. More than 80% of newly built homes across the country are in a CIC. Conlin & Lush,
supra note 5. The prevalence of condominiums increased markedly over the decade ending in
2005. However, since the housing crisis began, the percentage of occupied housing stock within
a condominium has notably declined. See JENNIFER COMNEY, CHRIS NARDuCI & PETER
TATIAN, URBAN INST., STATE OF WASHINGTON, D.C.'s NEIGHBORHOOD 2010 26-29 (Nov.
2010) (showing how Washington, D.C.'s housing stock has followed the national trend).
8. "Common interest community" is defined by the Restatement (Third) of Property to be a
"development or neighborhood in which individually owned lots or units are burdened by a
servitude" that cannot be avoided by nonuse or withdrawal. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
SERVITUDES § 6.2 (2000). Common interest communities include condominiums and
homeowner associations-also known as planned unit developments ("P.U.D.s"). Data regarding
the number of U.S. common interest communities and their residents is tracked by the
Community Associations Institute ("CAI"). Industry Data, CMTY. ASS'NS INST., http://www.
caionline.org/info/research/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Aug. 16, 2011) [hereinafter CAI
Industry Data]. CAI's data indicate that the number of residents of common interest communities
has increased from 2.1 million in 1970 to 62.0 million in 2010. This figure represents 20.2% of
the population of the United States, estimated by the U.S. Census Bureau to be 307 million in
2009. Population Finder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/
SAFFPopulation (last visited Aug. 16, 2011).
9. Based on figures provided by Lender Processing Services, as reported at PR Newswire,
Press Release, Lending Process Services, Inc., LPS September 'First Look' Mortgage Report:
August Month-End Data Shows More Delinquent Loans Entering Foreclosure Process (Sept. 15,
2010), available at www.reuters.com/article/idUS224331+15-Sep-2010+PRN20100915.
Another article reporting these figures calculates that this rate indicates more than 7.2 million
mortgage loans are behind on their payments. Carrie Bay, Residential Mortgage Delinquency
Rate Surpasses 10%: LPS, DSNEWS.COM (Feb. 4, 2010), http://www.dsnews.com/articles/
mortgage-delinquency-rate-surpasses-10-lps-2010-02-04. The foreclosure rate is ten times pre-
crisis levels, and the aggregate number of foreclosure sales in one month (around 100,000
nationwide) is now similar to the number of pre-crisis foreclosure sales for an entire year. Alex
Viega, Foreclosure Rate: Americans on Pace for 1 Million Foreclosures in 2010, HUFFINGTON
POST (July 15, 2010, 5:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/15/foreclosure-rate-
american n_647130.html.
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those areas is much higher.' 0 The states with recent growth booms are
the ones dealing with the steepest mortgage default rate. 11 Notably,
these states also have the highest percentage of citizens residing in
privately governed CICs. 12 People who have stopped paying their
mortgages have, almost invariably, previously stopped paying their
community association assessments. 13 The precipitous rise in mortgage
10. See Shayna M. Olesiuk & Kathy R. Kalser, The 2009 Economic Landscape, The Sand
States: Anatomy of a Perfect Housing-Market Storm, 3 FDIC Q., no. 3, 2009 at 26, available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2009_vol3_1/QuarterlyVol3Nolentire-issueFI
NAL.pdf (discussing the acute nature of the housing downturn in Arizona, California, Nevada,
and Florida); see also Dina ElBoghdady, Foreclosure Activity Rises in Most Major Metropolitan
Areas, WASH. POST, July 30, 2010, at A14 ("The 20 regions with the worst foreclosure rates were
in the four states-Florida, California, Nevada and Arizona."); Brad Heath, Most Foreclosures
Pack into Few Counties, USA TODAY (Mar. 6, 2009, 7:13 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
money/economy/housing/2009-03-05-foreclosure N.htm (explaining that properties concentrated
in a mere thirty-five counties accounted for half of the country's foreclosure actions, and eight
counties in Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada were the source of a quarter of the nation's
foreclosures in 2008). As of July 2010, 1 in 200 households in California were in foreclosure; I
in 171 households in Florida were in foreclosure; I in 167 households in Arizona were in
foreclosure; and 1 in 82 households in Nevada were in foreclosure. States with Highest
Foreclosure Rates, CNBC.COM, http://www.cnbc.com/id/29655038/States_withthe Highest
Foreclosure Rates (last visited Aug. 16, 2011) (citing data from RealtyTrac's U.S. Foreclosure
Market Report).
11. In the last decade, many cities in Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada have
experienced both a double-digit rise in prices as well as a double-digit decline in prices. See
House Price Index, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=87 (last
visited Aug. 16, 2011) (providing an index of housing transactions by state); S&P/CASE-SHILLER,
HOME PRICE INDICES 2009, A YEAR IN REVIEW 5 (Jan. 2010), available at http://www.
standardandpoors.com/ (follow "S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices" hyperlink; then follow
"S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices: 2009 A Year In Review" hyperlink) (reporting on 2009).
Conversely, cities such as Boston, Charlotte, Cleveland, Dallas, and Denver never experienced
double-digit price rises nor have they experienced double-digit declines. See Heath, supra note
10 (explaining that in some parts of the country, "the foreclosure wave was barely a ripple").
12. For example, an estimated 25% or more of Californians reside in a condominium or
homeowner association. See Carol Lloyd, Condominium Homeowners Face Rising Condo Fees
and Special Assessments, SFGATE.COM (Aug. 3, 2007), http://articles.sfgate.com/2007-08-03/
entertainment/i 7255445_I affordable-housing-new-homeownership-inclusionary (reporting on
increases in special assessments). Tomas Musil, director of the Shenehon Center for Real Estate
at the Opus College of Business at the University of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minnesota, explains
that while "the problem is national in scope, it is more pronounced in Florida, California, Texas,
and Colorado," where CIC developments were more popular. Tom Bayles, After Foreclosure,
It's Time for Neighbors to Pay, HERALD TRIB. (Sept. 23, 2008, 1:26 AM), http://www.herald
tribune.com/article/20080923/ARTICLE/809230372/2055/NEWS?Title=When foreclosure is fi
nished it s time for neighbors tojpay (quoting Musil). The Policy Institute of California
asserts that 38% of the housing units in California's "Inland Empire" exist in homeowner
association communities. Jim Wasserman, HOAs Struggle with Gotchas, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
http://www.calhomelaw.org/doc.asp?id-463 (last visited Aug. 16, 2011). Wasserman also points
out that more than half of the nation's CIC housing is in five states (California, Florida, Texas,
Arizona, and Nevada). Jim Wasserman, California Eyes HOA Changes, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
(July 8, 2004), available at http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=
viewall&address=14lx2045calhomelaw.org/doc.asp?id=646.
13. Trevor G. Pinkerton, Escaping the Death Spiral of Dues and Debt: Bankruptcy and
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default rates therefore indicates an even steeper rise in assessment
delinquencies, which will continue until solvent owners replace
delinquent owners. 14
All types of CICs, from high-rise residential condominiums to
multiple-zip-code single-home developments, share the same essential
service and payment structure: homeowner-elected directors manage
common upkeep, and all homeowners contribute their pro rata portion
of the common costs.15  The CIC structure enables more community
amenities and upkeep, permitting neighborhoods to self-fund and
allowing local governments to avoid raising taxes in response to more
housing developments.16
Owners in condominiums and homeowner associations expect to be
financially independent of their neighbors.17  Architects of CIC-
enabling legislation did not intend to create financial co-dependence nor
cause significant financial entanglement because default in a well-
functioning market would lead expeditiously to foreclosure and title
transfer to a successive solvent homeowner. If a credit-worthy party
quickly takes over a defaulting owner's share of upkeep obligations and
begins to pay allocated assessments, the community would suffer only
limited financial loss due to a member's mortgage default. But it often
does not work that way in today's market. Now, contrary to original
Condominium Association Debtors, 26 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 125, 142-43 (2009); Monica
Hatcher, Mediators Foresee Gloom, Doom in Condo Industry, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 4, 2009, at
1H; Press Release, PR.com, Concerned Homeowners Association Members Coalition Forms
(Feb. 18, 2011), available at http://www.pr.com/press-release/299084; Donna Gehrke-White,
Homeowner Associations Step Up Foreclosure Filings, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 20, 2011),
http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/02/20/2062656/homeowner-associations-step-up.html; Daniel
Vasquez, Should Delinquent Condo Owners Lose Internet, TV Service?, SUN SENTINEL, Mar. 1,
2011, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2011-03-01/business/fl-cable-tv-condocol-20110301 1
delinquent-condo-owners-associations-maintenance-fees.
14. See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (illustrating that because assessments are the
primary source of funding for community associations, delinquent payments usually cause
increases in the assessments of all other homeowners to offset this financial imbalance).
15. See WAYNE S. HYATT & SUSAN F. FRENCH, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS ON COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES 11 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing the power
of an elected board of directors); WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER
ASSOCIATION PRACTICE: COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW 105, 121 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing
assessments and other collection devices).
16. See generally CLIFFORD TREESE, ROBERT DIAMOND & KATHERINE ROSENBERRY,
RESEARCH INST. FOR HOUS. AM., CHANGING PERSPECTIVES ON COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION
MORTGAGE UNDERWRITING AND CREDIT ANALYSIS 3 (Nov. 2001), available at http://
www.housingamerica.org/RIHA/RIHA/Publications/48502_ChangingPerspectivesonCommunity
AssociationMortgageUnderwriting.pdf (discussing methods that communities utilize to minimize
taxes); CAI Industry Data, supra note 8 (indicating the number of residents of common interest
communities).
17. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (discussing the negative aspects of
economic entanglement).
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intent and expectations, foreclosure is slow in coming and sometimes
deliberately or negligently delayed, and community assessments can
accrue and remain unpaid for months or years.18 Furthermore, the sheer
number of owners who are currently in default on their payment
obligations-some ten times higher than pre-crisis-means that an
association could be suffering from widespread assessment
delinquency, both increasing its budgetary shortfall and decreasing the
number of owners shouldering the burden of bridging that gap. 19
Paying additional upkeep costs harms homeowners. Furthermore,
uncertainty in association funding threatens the viability of the
community itself.
In the context of today's lengthy mortgage foreclosure timelines,
neighbors in CICs have become truly financially interdependent, and
the failure of some owners to pay their fair share of common costs
requires a greater financial contribution by the others.20 During the
months or years that mortgage foreclosure on a unit is threatened or
pending, the association still must pay for upkeep, utilities and
necessary repairs; its only source of revenue is increased assessment
payments by those owners who are still able to pay.21  Increased
assessments, triggered by chronic non-payments, essentially result in
forced inter-neighbor loans. Because foreclosure of the first mortgage
wipes away the association's junior lien for assessments, 22 these forced
loans typically end up being forced inter-neighbor permanent subsidies.
Requiring owners to pay their neighbors' debts is wrong, inefficient,
and destabilizing for the hundreds of thousands of CICs in the United
18. Shuang Zhu & R. Kelley Pace, The Influence of Foreclosure Delays on Borrower's
Default Behavior 3 (Apr. 19, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=1717127; see also Brent Ambrose, Richard Buttimer, Jr. & Charles Capone, Pricing
Mortgage Default and Foreclosure Delay, 29 J. OF MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 314, 319-20
(1997) (providing an overview of foreclosure delay).
19. RealtyTrac's Year-End 2010 U.S. Foreclosure Market Report shows a total of 3,825,637
foreclosure filings (including default notices, scheduled auctions, and bank repossessions)
reported on a record 2,871,891 U.S. properties in 2010, an increase of nearly 2% from 2009 and
an increase of 23% from 2008. Press Release, RealtyTrac, Record 2.9 Million U.S. Properties
Receive Foreclosure Filings in 2010 Despite 30-Month Low in December (Jan. 12, 2011),
available at http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/2010-year-end-foreclosure-report-
6309. The report also shows that nearly 2.23% of all U.S. housing units (I in 45) received at least
one foreclosure filing during the year, up from 2.21% in 2009, 1.84% in 2008, 1.03% in 2007,
and 0.58% in 2006. Id Today, at least 8 million Americans are behind on their mortgage
payments, and the threat of further housing price decline (the so-called "double dip") has been
called the "greatest strategic threat to the recovery of the economy." Zuckerman, supra note 4.
20. See infra Part I.B.2 (discussing the communal burden of assessment default in a CIC).
21. See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of assessment
payments to meet an association's budgetary needs).
22. See infra notes 187-97 and accompanying text (explaining the treatment of an assessment
lien during first mortgage foreclosure).
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States and the millions of homeowners who live in them.23 The current
system forces people who completely lacked the ability to foresee,
control, or avoid their neighbors' defaults to bear increasing costs due to
irresponsible mortgage lending. These same owners end up effectively
subsidizing their neighbors' mortgage lenders whose collateral they pay
to maintain, insure, and protect through association expenditures.
Current laws fail to protect innocent, non-defaulting owners from being
forced to provide their own private mortgage lender and neighbor
bailouts. These bailouts are not ultimately reimbursed by the federal
government or paid back by the home's foreclosing lender or
foreclosure buyer. If neighbors refuse to privately fund deficiencies,
lack of association funding for maintenance, insurance, and
management of common property will eventually lead to a deterioration
of the housing stock.24
Several states have responded to the dual problem of under-funded
associations and inequitable cost allocation by providing for a capped
amount of assessment deficiency (typically six months of unpaid
assessments) to be repaid at or after foreclosure of the first mortgage on
defaulting homes.25 Often, this is not enough. Such limited obligations
fail to adequately protect associations and their paying members from
the costs of neighbor delinquency, in terms of both short-term
uncertainty and ultimate association recoveries. 2 6  Changing the lien
priority regime-to allow the first mortgagee's priority to decrease as
foreclosure is delayed-is a better solution. Freeing post-foreclosure
assessment claims from a dollar-capped limit would permit an
association to ultimately recover the lenders' share of upkeep costs.
Decreasing a lender's priority based on the interval between
mortgage default and foreclosure would likely incentivize more
expeditious foreclosure sales. At first glance, this seems to run against
conventional wisdom and current politics. Although lenders could
choose to delay foreclosure and pay collateral carrying costs, increased
lender costs pre-foreclosure could lead to faster foreclosures and faster
home loss for defaulting borrowers. Even so, making lenders bear the
costs of maintaining their collateral and encouraging transfer of title to
23. Hart, supra note 5, at 185-86; CAI Industry Data, supra note 8; see also infra Parts I.B &
II.B. 1 (illustrating how assessement deliquencies can lead to housing devaluation).
24. For example, one Florida CIC was a "dreamy little spot" with affordable amenities before
the foreclosure crisis and before "the rats started chewing through the toilet seats in vacant units
and sewage started seeping from the ceiling." Conlin & Lush, supra note 5; see also infra Parts
I.B.2-3 (discussing how some states have adopted the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act,
which gives assessment liens a limited priority upon foreclosure).
25. See infra Part IIA.I.a (describing the six-month limited priority lien).
26. See infra Part II.A.I.d (discussing the inadequacy of limited priority liens).
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solvent owners is the only way to contain a community's financial
distress. 27 Whether foreclosure delays are caused by default volume,
inadequate lender documentation, faulty procedure, predictions
regarding resale, or the lender's desire to retain the defaulted loans as
performing on the balance sheet, equity demands that the
procrastination costs be allocated to the mortgagee rather than to the
community as a whole. Lender funding of the upkeep of their own
collateral avoids unjust enrichment and places costs on the parties who
could have reasonably foreseen and prevented the assessment
delinquencies in the first place-the lenders who should have been
underwriting their potential borrowers.28  Creating a legal means for
ultimate recovery and reimbursement of neighbor-funded budget
deficiencies will shore up the finances of communities and non-
defaulting homeowners and help stabilize the housing market.
Part I of this Article explains the negative externalities of
foreclosures and defaults in the context of CICs, as well as the limited
remedies currently available to community associations under disparate
state statutes. Part II.A discusses some attempted and proposed
solutions to the problem of assessment nonpayment and foreclosure
delay, including judicial attempts to resolve the issue through
application of equity and legislative efforts to increase limited lien
priority coverage. Finally, Part I.B advocates a more nuanced and
targeted approach to solving the problem: capping the community's
losses by allowing the first mortgage lien's priority to gradually erode
during the assessment default period.
While foreclosure procedure must be closely monitored and
stringently followed to protect mortgage borrowers, promoting
foreclosure sales within such procedural limits helps combat negative
externalities created by defaulting community members. Laws that
incentivize prompt, procedurally perfect foreclosures and allow for
open-ended assessment lien priority would ultimately benefit
homeowners, communities, and mortgage lenders. Systematic erosion
27. See infra Part II.B.2 (explaing how a community stands to benefit from an expedited
foreclosure process). Furthermore, foreclosure delays result in a "free ride" for mortgagors and
their lenders during the time that assessment obligations are not paid on behalf of the defaulted
property. See Hart, supra note 5, at 182 (articulating the idea of "moral property"). While public
policy might justify giving defaulting homeowners reasonable time to relocate, economically and
philosophically, there is no justification for substantial foreclosure delays that create "collateral
damage" on the surrounding community, due to upkeep costs being allocated inequitably. There
is no equitable reason to give either cost-free occupancy to borrowers or cost-free collateral
preservation to their lenders. In fact, the very definition of "fair allocation" would demand
otherwise. See RAWLS, supra note 5, at 96 (articulating moral principles).
28. See infra notes 378-79 and accompanying text (discussing why shifting the financial
burden to the lender would be beneficial to individuals and the economy as a whole).
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of mortgage priority during foreclosure delay promotes equitable
allocation of upkeep costs and efficient property transfers, and keeps
lenders from getting a free ride. Compared to other potential solutions,
first mortgage lien priority erosion is the best way to remedy the
inequitable and community-destabilizing status quo.
I. THE PROBLEM OF PRIVATE GOVERNANCE AND MEMBER DEFAULTS
A. Negative Externalities ofDefault
A property owner's failure to meet assessment payment obligations
creates significant negative externalities. 29  Widespread payment
defaults destabilize communities, depress property values, lower local
property tax revenue, and impose additional costs on public agencies
that provide municipal services.30 Although the problem of contagious
declines in property values and neighborhood upkeep is often couched
in terms of the spillover effect of foreclosures, 31 the most significant
external harm arises not from the foreclosure sale itself, but from the
default in homeowner payment obligations that preceded it.32 Below-
market foreclosure sales may temporarily reduce real estate market
pricing of real estate in the immediate vicinity of the foreclosed
parcel.33 But the adverse neighborhood effect of a property in limbo
(foreclosure is pending while upkeep is lacking) is both more tangible
and longer-lasting. 34 The true risk of contagion, therefore, comes from
default and delay rather than from the ultimate property transfer.
29. See, e.g., ALLAN MALLACH, BROOKINGS INST., METRO. POL'Y PROGRAM, ADDRESSING
OHIO'S FORECLOSURE CRISIS: TAKING THE NEXT STEPS 35 (June 2009), available at
http://www2.safeguardproperties.com/pub/AlanMallach.pdf (reporting on the consequences of
Ohio foreclosures).
30. See City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 513, 536 (N.D.
Ohio 2009) (involving a lawsuit brought by the City of Cleveland against several lending
institutions), aff'den banc, 615 F.3d 496 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1685 (2011); see
also JOINT CTR. FOR Hous. STUDIES HARv. U., AMERICA'S RENTAL HOUSING: THE KEY TO A
BALANCED NATIONAL POLICY 3 (2008), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/
rental/rh08_americasrentalhousing/rhO8 americas-rental housing.pdf (describing the
destabilization of certain communities).
31. In a May 5, 2008 speech, for example, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke
warned that "high rates of delinquency and foreclosure can have substantial spillover effects on
the housing market, the financial markets, and the broader economy." Ben S. Bernanke,
Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at Columbia Business School 32nd Annual Dinner (May 5,
2008) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Bemanke
20080505a.htm).
32. See infra Part I.A.2 (discussing constructive abandonment).
33. See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
34. See infra Part II.A.2 (describing the effects of a prolonged foreclosure).
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1. Lower Comparable Sales Valuation
In general, property sells at foreclosure for a significant amount
below an arm's-length market transaction. 35  Because the market
traditionally prices homes based on comparable sales within the same
community, any below-market sale creates a drag on neighboring values
and sale prices. 36  In addition, mortgage default and foreclosure
increases the supply of homes for sale in the given neighborhood, and
increasing supply with static demand lowers market prices as well.
Research published by Fannie Mae in 2006, focusing on the effect of
subprime foreclosures, estimated that 41 million properties in the
United States faced declining property values due to foreclosure of
nearby parcels, resulting in an aggregate loss of $200 billion in value. 37
The study found that homes within one-eighth of a mile of a foreclosed
property experience a 0.9% decline in value after the foreclosure sale. 38
More recent empirical studies have questioned this figure-particularly
in terms of the geographic scope and duration of the foreclosure
effect-arguing that the depreciation is closer to 0.5%, can quickly
rebound, and that the farther away a "good standing" home resides from
a foreclosed home, the smaller the psychological and market pricing
impact of the foreclosure sale. 39
Interestingly, while neighboring homeowners may decry falling
property values, the downward price pressure of foreclosure sales may
actually help rather than hurt the housing market as a whole. Housing
prices in this country are likely still inflated above market
35. See John Y. Campbell, Stefano Giglio & Parag Pathak, Forced Sales and House Prices 2
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14866, 2009), available at http://econ-
www.mit.edu/files/3914 (showing that foreclosure sales prices averaged 27% lower than the
appraised value for the home). The depressed purchase price at foreclosure, however, is almost
never cause to avoid the sale. See, e.g., B.F.P. v. Resolution Trust, 511 U.S. 531, 545 (1994)
("We deem, as the law has always deemed, that a fair and proper price, or a 'reasonably
equivalent value,' for foreclosed property, is the price in fact received at the foreclosure sale, so
long as all the requirements of the State's foreclosure law have been complied with.").
36. See John Harding, Eric Rosenblatt & Vincent Yao, The Contagion Effect of Foreclosed
Properties, 66 J. URB. EcoN. 164, 172 (2009) (providing statistics). For a description of
comparative sales methodology, see James Kimmons, The Sales Comparison Method of Real
Estate Appraisal and Valuation, ABOUT.COM, http://realestate.about.com/od/appraisaland
valuation/p/compare_method.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2011) (discussing factors to consider in
comparing properties).
37. Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The External Costs ofForeclosure: The Impact ofSingle
Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values, 17 HouS. POL'Y DEBATE 57, 57 (2006).
38. Id.; see also Chart of the Day: Foreclosure Contagion, PORTFOLIO.COM (Jul. 18, 2008,
12:00 AM), http://www.portfolio.com/views/blogs/odd-numbers/2008/07/18/chart-of-the-day-
foreclosure-contagion/#ixzzl0133 (discussing the effects of foreclosure on neighboring property
values).
39. Harding et al., supra note 36, at 164-65.
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"equilibrium"-meaning that the ratio of a home's value based on rental
income is well below the comparable sale value of a given home.40
Even though rents have gone up and prices have gone down, in many
cases rents still cannot cover purchase-money mortgage payments,
suggesting that real property prices have not yet decreased sufficiently
to reach a stable, rent-neutral level.4 1 There is, therefore, a systemic
(market stability-based) upside to this particular aspect of foreclosure
"contagion."
2. Constructive Abandonment
Comparable sales values of homes are notoriously finicky and fragile,
and the foreclosure-related value losses likely represent unsustainable
prior gains due to housing speculation. 4 2  Far more long-lasting and
tangible costs arise from homeowners defaulting on their property
upkeep obligations. Our system of homeownership involves both rights
and responsibilities of homeowners, 43 and when owners abandon their
homes, either literally, by ceasing to reside there, or figuratively, by
ceasing to maintain the property, the community suffers tangible and
permanent losses in value,44 homes and neighborhoods deteriorate, and
40. See Suzanne Stewart & Ike Brannon, A Collapsing Housing Bubble?, 29 REG. 15, 16
(2006) ("A reading well below or above 100 indicates a market that is out of equilibrium: if the
reading is below 100, renting is a bargain."). In 2005, the average rental value of homes was only
70% of the purchase price nationwide and was the lowest since the Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight ("OFHEO") began the index in 1985-with the next-lowest annual ratio
(1989) being roughly 91%. Id. The rental-sale price disequilibrium was far more pronounced in
certain areas of the country, such as California, Nevada, Arizona, and Florida, where home prices
in the prior decade had increased by over 99%. See OLESIUK & KALSER, supra note 10
(providing statistics); see also Anthony Sanders, The Subprime Crisis and its Role in the
Financial Crisis, 17 J. HOUS. ECON. 254, 254 (2008) (providing statistics).
41. See, e.g., Emma L. Carew, To Woo A Renter: Homeowners Who Punt on Selling Face
Challenge as Tenants Get Choosier, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2009, at El (providing an example
from the Washington, D.C. area); see also Stewart & Brannon, supra note 40, at 16.
42. See Andrea J. Boyack, Lessons in Price Stability from the U.S. Real Estate Market
Collapse, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REv. 925, 933-34 (2010) (discussing speculation and overpricing).
43. Owners of real property are obligated to pay property taxes, are required to protect against
hazards and nuisance on their properties, and face liabilities related to environmental hazards
thereon. Real property cannot be abandoned. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 504 cmt. a
(1944) (explaining why easements may be abandoned more easily than other land interests); see
also, e.g., Pocono Springs Civic Ass'n v. MacKenzie, 667 A.2d 233, 235 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)
(discussing the law of abandonment in Pennsylvania). Property law requires that some entity
always hold seisin, because the holder of seisin is the gatekeeper, or responsible party, with
respect to that parcel of realty. See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 201 (2007) (discussing the role of gatekeeper as it relates to adverse
possession).
44. See Ivana Kottasova, A House Dies and a Block Sinks, BROOK. INK (Mar. 9, 2011), http://
thebrooklynink.com/2011/03/09/23899-a-house-dies-and-a-block-sinks/ ("Vacant properties are
often not maintained properly and show signs of physical distress . . . . That itself causes property
values to go down-and then the area becomes less attractive for residents." (quoting Josiah
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the absence of a vigilant gatekeeper for the property allows vandalism
and other crime to increase.45  A defaulting homeowner facing
imminent or even eventual mortgage foreclosure has little incentive to
invest anything in the home and, thus, will forego many socially
desirable activities: painting shutters, cleaning gutters, mowing the
lawn, or fixing broken appliances or cabinets. 46
The mere drop in home value itself can start the trend toward owner
constructive abandonment because once a property is "upside-down" or
"underwater" (more is owed on a mortgage loan than the property is
worth), any improvements or maintenance made on a home effectively
becomes "sweat debt" (value created for the lender) rather than "sweat
equity" (value created for the owner). Some commentators have
suggested that a typical borrower will consider walking away from a
mortgage when the home value falls below 75% of the amount owed on
the mortgage. 47 More than 5 million homeowners in the United States
Madar)). The negative externalities caused by failure of an owner to exercise adequate property
oversight are among the many justifications for the doctrine of adverse possession. See John G.
Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 816, 816
(1994) (advocating an environmental reform of the adverse possession doctrine).
45. See, e.g., John Cutts, Neighborhood Cleanup Might Improve Cheap Houses for Sale
Numbers, REAL ESTATE PRO ARTICLES (July 7, 2010, 10:15 AM), http://www.realestate
proarticles.com/Art/19024/278/Neighborhood-Cleanup-Might-Improve-Cheap-Houses-for-Sale-
Numbers.html (discussing foreclosures in San Antonio); Seth Slabaugh, High Vacancy Rates in
Inner-City Muncie, STAR PRESS (Feb. 26, 2011), http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/thestarpress/
access/2276988201.html?FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=Feb+26%2C+2011 (reporting on
the numerous vacancies in Muncie, Indiana); Yepoka Yeebo, Coping With Chicago's
Foreclosure 'War Zones,' HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (Mar. 2, 2011, 9:49 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/02/chicago-vacant-reo-propertyn_829343.html
(lamenting vacancies in Chicago).
46. See Steve Vitali, HOA's are Important to Our Valley Communities, LAS VEGAS REV. J.
(Mar. 12, 2011), http://www.1vrj.com/real estate/hoas-are-important-to-our-valley-communities-
11 7848853.html?ref-853 (describing efforts by the Nevada legislature); Tammy Leonard, Home
Appreciation, Default Risk and Neighborhood Upkeep 3 (June 10, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.utdallas.edu/~murdoch/NeighborhoodChange/Tammy/
AppreciationDefaultUpkeepv 1 .pdf (examining the relationship between houshold
maintenance expenditures and default risk). Some homeowners who have defaulted on their
mortgages and know that they will ultimately lose their home in foreclosure affirmatively and
permissively create waste-some homeowners rip out fixtures and actively destroy improvements
on the real property. See Report: Owners of Foreclosed Homes Steal Appliances, Leave Houses
in Disarray, FOXNEWS.COM (Feb. 4, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,487884,00
.html (reporting that some homeowners retaliate against lenders by damaging and looting their
homes prior to foreclosure sales); James Thorner, In home foreclosure, if it's not nailed down...,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Feb. 19, 2008), http://www.sptimes.com/2008/02/19/Business/In home
foreclosure_.shtml (reporting that, in Florida, 20% of owners strip their houses prior to
foreclosure); James Walsh, Monsey, NY-House Demolished Just Before Auction for Mortgage
Default, VOS lz NEIAS? (Feb. 4, 2009, 8:41 AM), http://www.vosizneias.com/26875/2009/02/04/
monsey-ny-house-demolished-just-before-auction-for-mortgage-default/ (reporting a situation
where homeowners destroyed their entire house before a foreclosure sale).
47. David Streitfeld, No Aid or Rebound in Sight: More Homeowners Just Walk Away, N.Y.
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reached this "tipping point" of underwater valuation by the third quarter
of 2009.48
According to the Rassmussen Report, 31% of U.S. homeowners with
a mortgage owed more on their homes than their homes were worth as
of the end of 2010.49 Deutsche Bank predicted that 48% of American
homes could have negative equity by the end of 2011.50 Along with the
numerous defaults on home mortgages caused by the inability to pay,
more and more borrowers who are financially able to pay are
strategically defaulting on their mortgages. 51  When the lender holds
100% (or more) of the current value of a home, many homeowners feel
that there is no financial incentive to continue to pay the mortgage or,
for that matter, the community association assessments. 52
3. Government Rescue Efforts
The negative externalities of homeowner constructive abandonment
have been cited to justify policies and programs aimed at helping
homeowners facing foreclosure. 53  Many of these programs create
additional incentives for lenders to pursue loan modifications or permit
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2010, at Al.
48. Id.; see also Thompson, supra note 1, at 55 ("Housing prices peaked in the United States
in early 2005 and began declining in 2007. Foreclosures then increased in the United States at
record levels throughout 2006, continuing throughout 2008."); Negative Equity Report for Q3,
CALCULATED RISK (Nov. 24, 2009, 4:00 PM), http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2009/11/
negative-equity-report-for-q3.html ("Nearly 10.7 million, or 23 percent, of all residential
properties with mortgages were in negative equity as of September, 2009.").
49. Peter Schroeder, Poll: Nearly One-Third of Homeowners Underwater on Mortgage, THE
HILL (Mar. 21, 2011, 1:29 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/80 1-economy/ 151039-
poll-nearly-one-third-of-homeowners-underwater-on-mortgages. Previously, in the first quarter
of 2010, Zillow.com had estimated that 23% of homes in the United States were worth less than
mortgage loan amounts secured by the property. Brian Louis, U.S. Mortgage Holders Owing
More Than Homes Are Worth Rise to 23% of Total, BLOOMBERG (May 10, 2010, 3:31 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-10/u-s-mortgage-holders-owing-more-than-homes-are
-worth-rise-to-23-of-total.html.
50. Zuckerman, supra note 4.
51. See Gail Marks-Jarvis, Ethics of Strategic Default are Really Hitting Home, CHI. TRIB.,
Oct. 7, 2010, at 7.1 ("Morgan Stanley recently estimated that about 18 percent of defaults will be
strategic.").
52. Underwater homeowners have no incentive to pay property taxes either, but counties are
always first in line to collect unpaid tax amounts from foreclosure proceeds. There is no cap on
the amount of unpaid property taxes that a county can collect from the purchase price at a
foreclosure sale.
53. See CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, EVALUATING PROGRESS ON TARP
FORECLOSURE MITIGATION PROGRAMS, APRIL OVERSIGHT REPORT (2010) [hereinafter APRIL
OVERSIGHT REPORT] (discussing the Home Affordable Modification Program ("HAMP") and its
successes and failures over the first year); see also David Streitfeld, Program to Pay
Homeowners to Sell at a Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2010, at Al (stating that the Obama
Administration's latest program "will allow owners to sell for less than they owe and will give
them a little cash to speed them on their way").
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short sales in lieu of foreclosure. 54 To the extent that loan modifications
create true incentives for owners to remain invested in their property by
reassuming the gatekeeper role and paying upkeep costs and the like,
such modifications would help eliminate the property value losses
discussed above and should be promoted as sound policy. To the extent
that short sales would streamline the process of replacing insolvent
owners with financially capable "gatekeepers," short sale incentives
would also benefit the community and deserve to be encouraged.55
Unfortunately, however, these government efforts have mostly failed to
create viable mortgages and ensure homes are held by owners able to
meet their assessment obligations. Even with payment reductions and
government assistance, more than three-quarters of the mortgage loans
that were modified under the Home Affordable Modification Program
("HAMP") remained underwater in April 2010.56 The initiative for
expedited short sales likewise has been mostly unsuccessful.57
One obstacle to greater success through loan modifications and/or
short sales is the problem of junior liens. 58  Not only do many
financially imperiled homes today have subordinate liens from second
mortgages and home equity lines, but the community association in any
CIC will have a lien securing its rights to recover unpaid assessments.59
Junior lienors, including community associations, can stymie
modification plans by withholding consent to proposed changes to the
senior loan.60  A community association's board might lack the
54. Short sales are tri-party agreements amongst a defaulting mortgage borrower, the
mortgage lender, and a third-party purchaser, whereby the purchaser agrees to buy the property
for less than the outstanding loan amount, and the lender agrees to accept payment of the buyer's
purchase price in full satisfaction of the borrower's mortgage loan.
55. Streitfeld, supra note 53, at Al.
56. APRIL OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 53, at 39.
57. Andrew Jeffrey, Housing Market: Foreclosure Relief Programs Under Fire,
MINYANVILLE (Mar. 14, 2011, 10:00 AM), http://www.minyanville.com/businessmarkets/
articles/foreclosure-forelcosure-relief-program-homeowners-loan/3/14/201 1/id/33322.
58. Loan modifications without junior lienor consent can result in a complete loss of priority
for the senior lienholder. Short sales are made subject to all junior liens, if these are not paid off
or voluntarily released, as part of the sale. See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL
ESTATE FINANCE LAW 871-76 (5th ed. 2007) (discussing the relationship between junior and
senior liens); see also Robert Kratovil & Raymond J. Werner, Mortgage Extensions &
Modifications, 8 CREIGHTON L. REV. 595, 610 (1975) (stating that an original clause in the record
granting the senior lienor the ability to increase the interest rate on the giving of any extension
will not be sufficient for priority for that increased interest over junior lienors, due to prejudice).
59. Many properties in default have other junior lienors as well, including second purchase
money mortgages or home equity lines of credit. In many, but not all, states, second mortgages
are junior in priority to the association's lien.
60. Loan modifications occurring without the consent of junior lienors are vulnerable to
priority loss should a court determine that the modification adversely impacts the secured position
of the junior lienor. Many loan modifications, however, have been upheld as non-prejudicial to a
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authority to engage in debt forgiveness with respect to delinquent
assessments, since this effectively imposes more costs on the remainder
of the community and violates the payment allocation provisions of the
CIC's governing documents. 6 1 The argument that in a bad mortgage
debt situation, both a borrower and a lender should compromise by
giving up value (in terms of lost equity and lost loan proceeds) is
compelling. 62  But no similar logic supports a claim that non-party
neighbors should be forced to bear losses due to other people's poorly
conceived loans. This is one reason the "Helping Families Save their
Homes Act of 2009" was voted down in the U.S. Senate: the proposed
law would have given bankruptcy judges the ability to mandate massive
write-downs on unpaid assessment liens, essentially blocking the
already limited ability of associations to collect delinquent assessments
and continue to perform their essential functions. 63 If the government
truly wants to encourage short sales or modifications in privately
governed communities, it must ensure that the workout (a) ultimately
stabilizes the community and (b) is not forcibly financed by the non-
delinquent neighbors.
Government programs that encourage property to be efficiently
conveyed to solvent and responsible owners ameliorate the harm caused
community association. See, e.g., Dime Say. Bank of N.Y., F.S.B. v. Levy, 615 N.Y.S.2d 218,
220 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (holding that a modification extending the first mortgage loan term remained
a first priority lien, and short sales required cooperation of junior lienors (or full repayment of
such obligations) to transfer unencumbered title to the proposed buyer).
61. See ROBERT G. NATELSON, LAW OF PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS 437 (1989)
(discussing the impact of association conduct on the value individual condominium units); see
also HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 15, at 319, 567-68 (stating that homemakers of a community
generally rely on uniform enforcement of covenants that are in furtherance of the original
developmental scheme).
62. This argument is often used to promote modifications and short sales. See David Benoit,
Bank OfAmerica Begins Mortgage Principal Reduction Program in Arizona, Fox BUS. (Mar. 2,
2011), http://www.foxbusiness.com/industries/2011/03/02/bank-america-begins-mortgage
principal-reduction-program-arizonal (discussing Arizona's program "using federal money to get
Bank of America to lower the amount borrowers owe on their mortgages"); Dave Clarke, US.
Regulators Strike Deal on Mortgage Risk Rule, REUTERS, Mar. 1, 2011, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/01/financial-regulation-qrm-idUSN0 113980220110301
(examining banking regulator's provision forcing services to modify loans if it would save the
lenders and borrowers money); Abigail Field, What the Mortgage Mess Settlement Proposal
Really Means, DAILY FIN. (Mar. 9, 2011, 12:20 AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/
credit/what-the-mortgage-mess-settlement-proposal-really-means/19872233/ ("Servicers have to
show their math when announcing if a modification is denied."); David McLaughlin & Lorraine
Woellert, Attorney Generals Push for Loan Reductions, Seek Bank Accord, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 8,
2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-07/foreclosure-settlement-said-to-
be-sought-by-states-u-s-within-two-months.html (discussing how state attorneys general are
pushing for reduced balance settlements between lenders and borrowers).
63. H.R. 1106, 11Ith Cong. §§ 202-03, 532 (2009) (defeated in a Senate vote on April 30,
2009).
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by owner payment defaults.64  But most government attempts to
mitigate the damage caused by mortgage defaults have failed to
adequately address the problems caused by upkeep reduction, and, in
fact, some have exacerbated the spillover effects of default. For
example, although purporting to help homeowners, foreclosure
moratoriums can perpetuate the constructive abandonment maintenance
problem.65  Forced loan modifications-to the extent they merely
postpone the inevitable and leave a borrower unable (or unwilling) to
pay assessments-do the same.66  Any government interference that
slows foreclosure may (at least in the short-run) help an individual
defaulting mortgagor and might, in a temporarily "down" market, even
help the mortgage holder ultimately recover more on its loan, but in
CICs, these benefits are funded by the neighbors. Keeping an
ultimately doomed mortgage loan on this sort of life support increases
current and carrying costs borne by neighboring owners, increases CIC
assessment levels, and drives down property values.
64. Unlike HAMP and the initiative promoting short sales, the Neighborhood Stabilization
Program of the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") has focused on
infusing money into communities directly, buying abandoned homes, renovating them, and
contributing to the community's upkeep and property values. This HUD program is effectively
the antithesis of foreclosure moratoriums: it encourages sales of constructively abandoned
properties to prevent communities from bearing the negative externalities such properties cause.
HUD provided $6 billion in two rounds of Neighborhood Stabilization Program funding, some of
which was supplemented by state funds to create successful and effective localized programs.
For example, $5.6 million in federal funds combined with $30 million in resources from the Twin
Cities Community Land Bank created an entity able to buy up 250 blighted and defaulting
properties in targeted neighborhoods. These properties were rehabilitated (updated to green
standards) and sold to "responsible homeowners." Shaun Donovan, Fighting Foreclosures and
Strengthening Neighborhoods, U.S. DEP'T OF HouS. AND URBAN DEV. BLOG (Sept. 3, 2010),
http://portal.Hud.gov/portal/page/portal/HUD/press/blog/ (discussing the effectiveness of The
Neighborhood Stabilization Program as an example of a fairer and more forward-looking
approach to the contagion effects of mortgage defaults in communities).
65. Moratoriums can perpetuate the tenure of owners who are unwilling or unable to bear the
costs of ownership, including paying community assessments, property taxes, and basic property
upkeep costs, delaying the conveyance of property owning responsibilities to an owner willing to
assume such responsibilities. See, e.g., Jennifer Slosar, Chicago Coupe Deals with Toxic Mold,
Unresponsive Bank, CHI. J. (Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.chicagojoumal.com/News/10-06-2010/
Chicago couple-deals_with toxic mold, unresponsive bank ("As the foreclosure process
stretches past the two-year mark, they are struggling to maintain the empty unit and stanch the
bleeding in their homeowners association fund from lost assessments."); see also Zhu & Pace,
supra note 18, at 12-17 (stating that foreclosure delays encourage mortgage default and lack of
owner upkeep and investment in the property, all of which drives down the value of homes and
drives up costs of financing and "may impede the recovery of the housing market").
66. This is because the longer a non-payment problem persists in a community, the more costs
are inequitably borne by paying neighbors. If a modification merely delays an ultimate,
inevitable foreclosure, it is unlikely that a neighbor will bring his or her association assessments
current in the interim, and the threat of permissive and affirmative waste remains.
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Foreclosure rescue efforts have mostly failed to create viable long-
term mortgage loans, and the most worrisome contagious effects of
homeowner defaults remain, since true losses arise not from foreclosure
sales themselves, but from a chronic reduction in neighborhood upkeep
and inequitable upkeep costs.67 This fact reinforces the main contention
of this Article: delaying foreclosure and allowing property to deteriorate
is a lose-lose scenario, avoidable only by ensuring that properties are
owned by people who are able and willing to maintain the property and
pay association assessments. This is particularly true in CICs where
there are additional, direct and compelling cost externalities with
respect to payment defaults, so the contagion effect is more
pronounced. 68
B. Financial Entanglement
1. The CIC Ownership, Assessment, and Services Model
The CIC structure is a privatized governance solution to the
collective action and free-rider problems often termed the "tragedy of
the commons." 69 Widespread private property ownership in the United
States has minimized the number of publicly maintained "commons," 70
and until recently, federal, state, or local governments maintained most
of those areas that could not be divided and privatized.7 1 In the past
67. Harding et al., supra note 36, at 165, 172, 178; see also supra Part I.A.2 (discussing the
notion of constructive abandonment).
68. See infra notes 83-88 and accompanying text (describing why delayed foreclosure is
particularly harmful in CICs).
69. Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sc. 1243, 1244-45 (1968); see also
Thrainn Eggertsson, Open Access versus Common Property, in TERRY L. ANDERSON & FRED S.
MCCHESNEY, PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT AND LAW, 74-82, 84-85 (2003)
(discussing the tragedy of subsequent empirical studies as a result of Garret Hardin's The Tragedy
of the Commons); James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part II, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 325, 325 (1992) (acknowledging Garret Hardin as having addressed the problem of
coordinating human behavior as it affects environmental quality); Mark A. Lemley, Property,
Intellectual Property and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1031, 1037 (2005) ("The tragedy of the
commons is a specific example of the more general preoccupation of the economic literature on
real property with the internalization of externalities and with the use of property law to achieve
that end.").
70. Throughout U.S. history, the government has aggressively sought to sell land to private
owners. This was the impetus behind Thomas Jefferson's Land Ordinance Act, for example.
Land Ordinance of 1785, in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 123-24 (Henry S. Commager
ed., 1940); see Richard P. McCormick, The "Ordinance" of 1784?, 50 WM. & MARY Q. 112,
116-17 (1993) (discussing the scheme for selling and disposing of land acquired under the
Ordinance as a reason why it was not adopted in its original form).
71. See, e.g., 39 AM. JUR. 2D Highways, Streets, and Bridges § 212 (2011) (discussing usage
rights for public property adjacent to private property); 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parks, Squares, and
Playgrounds § 23 (2011) (discussing the proper use of property such as parks and squares); see
also Lemley, supra note 69, at 1038 (discussing government regulation of property rights due to
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century, courts began to routinely hold that community covenants
creating payment obligations for common area upkeep were servitudes
running with the land. 72 This judicial interpretation enabled the rise of
private governance and assessment systems across the United States. In
privately governed neighborhoods, common space and amenities are
maintained by an association, which assesses each owner a share of the
upkeep costs.73 The association provides sufficient governance to solve
the tragedy of the commons by controlling overuse and creating a
mechanism for maintenance and shared costs, 74 which in turn permits
communities to avoid the economic downside of public goods, meaning
that a neighborhood can enjoy better amenities at lower prices. 75  The
association is essentially a mini-government, performing public
functions: upkeep of common areas and amenities, rule-making, and
dispute resolution. 76 Association assessments are therefore, to some
extent, the equivalent of property taxes, a mechanism to fund common
negative externalities).
72. Neponsit Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793, 797
(N.Y. 1938). Prior to Neponsit, covenants to pay money were viewed as personal, not running
with the land because they did not adequately "touch and concern" real property. The Neponsit
characterization of this covenant as creating a real property servitude, however, spurred the
growth of suburban communities across the country. Enforcing payment obligations as
servitudes on real property is now de rigueur. See, e.g., Regency Homes Ass'n v. Egermayer,
498 N.W.2d 783, 788-93 (Neb. 1993) (holding that a covenant to pay dues to a community
association to maintain recreational facilities is a real covenant that runs with the land).
73. Most associations' governing documents explicitly provide for assessment funding of
association obligations. HYATT, supra note 15, at 108 ("Generally, covenants in the declaration
provide authority for the association to collect assessments from each owner."). Even in
situations where governing documents for community associations have failed to provide for
assessments, courts find the power to assess implicit in the structure of a CIC. See, e.g., Fogarty
v. Hemlock Farms Cmty. Ass'n, 685 A.2d 241, 244 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996) ("[A]bsent language
in the deed covenant prohibiting HFCA from levying special assessments for capital
improvements, the [property owners] may be assessed their proportionate costs to construct the
new improvements."); Meadow Run & Mountain Lane Park Ass'n v. Berkel, 598 A.2d 1024,
1027 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (finding that inherent in the duty to provide maintenance is the power
to assess costs to property owners). But see, e.g., Bd. of Dirs. of Carriage Way Prop. Owners
Ass'n v. W. Nat'l Bank of Cicero, 487 N.E.2d 974, 978-79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) ("[T]he
[association] cho[o]s[ing] to continue to maintain the common areas does not render the [property
owners] unjustly enriched."); Wendover Road Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Kornicks, 502 N.E.2d 226,
231 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (declining to apply quasi-contract or unjust enrichment theories to
require a property owner to pay assessments when the deed conveying the property did not
provide for such an assessment).
74. See HYATT, supra note 15, at 29-32 ("The community association allows innovation,
provides for responsibility and obligation, and provides the necessary power to meet these
responsibilities.").
75. CAI INDUSTRY DATA, supra note 7; see TREESE ET AL., supra note 16, at 6 (noting that
common upkeep also allows a community to take advantage of cost savings from economies of
scale).
76. See TREESE ET AL., supra note 16, at 6 (discussing the municipal responsibilities the
associations now assume).
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costs, and are treated as such by the income tax laws of at least two
states.77
For condominiums, a private governance and assessment system is
not only beneficial, it is essential. Once states passed statutes allowing
fee simple ownership of a three-dimensional "box" of space, 78 multiple
individuals could become owners of distinct units within one building.
But having many owners within one building mandates certain jointly-
held property: the roof, lobby, elevators, hallways, laundry rooms and,
in some buildings, water, sewer, trash, electricity, and gas, as well as
hazard insurance on the building itself. The mechanism of private
community governance provides and pays for all such commons
equitably and efficiently. 79
Typically, CIC governing documents explicitly vest the association
with broad authority to assess members according to budgetary needs,80
and courts have found that even when an association's documents lack
explicit authorization, assessment power is implied.81  As long as the
assessments are authorized, it is clear that the obligation to pay
assessments is both an in personam obligation of a homeowner and an
in rem affirmative covenant that runs with the land and is binding on all
successor owners of the property. 82 The obligation to pay assessments
is the most vital obligation in a privately governed community because
77. In New Jersey, the correlation of community assessments and property taxes has been
acknowledged by the legislature, which now pernits a portion of community assessment
payments to offset local property tax assessments. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:67-23.2-23.3 (West
1993); see also K. Kennedy & B. Lambert, New Developments in Municipal Services
Equalization, 3 J. CMTY. ASS'N L. 1 (2000) (illustrating that the New Jersey Municipal Services
Act, which requires a municipality to provide certain public services to private communities,
provides a framework for the eradication of the double taxation of these communities). Recently,
Pennsylvania's legislature followed suit, passing a law that allows a unit owner in a CIC to
deduct 75% of association assessments from state income taxes. H.R. 675, 2009 Gen. Assemb.
Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2009). On the other hand, many of the community-provided services supplement
local governmental functions rather than replace them and instead operate to replace individual
upkeep costs. The trend toward municipal services equalization legislation-refunding members
of a CIC local government taxes for items paid for by the association-is discussed in TREESE ET
AL., supra note 16, at 3.
78. Under the common law, real property is owned in a column of space defined with respect
to a two-dimensional real property mapping description, indicating a closed figure on the face of
the earth.
79. See Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowner Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1519,
1522-23 (1982) (discussing the method of assessments and distribution of costs amongst property
owners).
80. Associations meet their budget requirements through a combination of regular
assessments, special assessments, and transfer fees.
81. HYATT, supra note 15, at 105-09. See, e.g., supra note 73 (discussing whether an
association has the authority to demand assessments from its members).
82. HYATT, supra note 15, at 105-17.
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assessments are a community's "lifeblood" and its primary (and
sometimes only) funding source.83 As Wayne Hyatt, author of the
seminal treatise on CICs, explains, "when one member of the
community chooses not to pay the assessments, everyone in the
community pays the price through increased assessments, decreased
services, and declining community appearance and quality of living."84
Two aspects of association assessments are important for purposes of
this discussion: their collectability and their durability. The ability to
collect delinquent assessments is of crucial importance in a context-
such as today-where increasing mortgage defaults indicate an even
steeper increase in assessment delinquency. 85 In addition to the ability
to assess charges, associations have the power to place a lien on a
member's real property to secure the assessment payment obligation.86
In some states, such liens arise and are perfected on the date the
association's documents are recorded in the land records. 87  In other
states, the lien arises and is perfected automatically at the time an
assessment comes due.88  Still, in other states, perfection of an
assessment lien requires filing a notice of the lien in the appropriate
land records.89 Whether this lien has payment priority over a first
mortgage can determine whether an association will be able to
ultimately collect. Assessment liens are generally junior in priority to
first mortgage liens on the units, 90 and junior interests are extinguished
upon the foreclosure of a senior priority lien. 9 1
83. Id. at 105, 121.
84. Id. at 121.
85. Association assessment defaults are usually well in advance of loan payment
delinquencies. See Pinkerton, supra note 12, at 142-43 (discussing how dues and debts create a
"death spiral").
86. HYATr, supra note 15, at 120-21.
87. For example, in Colorado, a perfected association lien exists as of the date of filing the
declaration. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-33.3-316 (2009). Although this perfected lien could be
essentially an "empty bucket" securing no indebtedness, it has statutory priority relating back to
the date the community was created. First mortgages on units in such states, however, enjoy a
special statutory super-priority over the pre-existing association lien.
88. Under the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act § 3-116 (1994) (amended 2008),
recording of the declaration creating a common interest community constitutes record notice and
perfection of the lien for all future assessments. See also infra note 190 and accompanying text
(explaining that the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act takes the position that assessment
liens are considered automatically perfected with the date of perfection relating back to the date
the association was formed).
89. See, e.g., F.N. Realty Servs., Inc. v. Or. Shores Recreational Club, Inc., 891 P.2d 671, 674
(Or. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that an association lien arises only upon recordation of notice of
lien).
90. See infra Part I.C.2 (noting that liens on real property enjoy a priority based on the order
in which they were perfected).
91. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 58, at 872-73 ("[I]f a junior lienor is forced to satisfy
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CICs are contractually bound to maintain the property and provide
other services mandated by the documents creating the servitude
regime. 92  State and local laws may mandate the provision of other
services and/or a certain level of association reserves, in addition to
document-based requirements. 93  The FHA will only insure loans
secured by units in communities with sufficient reserve funding. 94
Although reserve requirements support an association's future financial
health, increasing the required reserves means that the association must
collect additional funds today. Raising the reserve requirement can
exacerbate the problem of increasing assessments for paying members
in an environment of widespread payment defaults. 95 The upkeep and
reserve funding obligations of the association are not contingent on the
condition of the economy or the payment participation of all members,
and assessments are the association's sole source of income. 96
2. Tragedy of the Financial Commons
The legal structure of CICs was an attempt to solve the tragedy of the
commons by establishing a government that could manage common
resources, preventing overuse and under-maintenance. 97 Such a private
consortium democracy with governance obligations and powers
theoretically can create a better neighborhood for all. But since the
homeowners in CICs jointly bear funding responsibilities for essential
the senior mortgage in order to protect his or her position, the amount required for such
satisfaction will be more than could have been contemplated at the time the junior interest was
acquired.").
92. HYATT, supra note 14, at 43.
93. States require reserve studies by condominiums and homeowner associations to ensure
adequate reserves are collected. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 55-514.1 (2002) and § 55-79.83.1
(1993) (requiring a condominium's executive organ or a homeowner association's board of
directors to conduct a study to determine the necessity and amount of reserves required at least
once every five years and review the results of that study at least annually).
94. Reserve requirements are 60% of the annual budget for established condominiums and
100% of the budget for new projects. Letter from Brian D. Montgomery, Assistant Sec'y for
Hous., Fed. Hous. Comm'r, to All Appr. Mortgagees and All FHA Roster Appraisers (June 12,
2009) (on file with author).
95. See, e.g., Josh Brown, Condo Assessments are the Breaking Point for Some, VA. PILOT
(Sept. 20, 2009), http://hamptonroads.com/2009/09/condo-assessments-are-breaking-point-some
(explaining that a homeowner faced loss of home through association foreclosure because of an
inability to pay an assessment increase to fund the increased reserve requirement mandated by
statute).
96. Some associations charge user fees, but most association costs are covered exclusively by
assessments paid by unit owners. See HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 14, at 319 (stating that the
most common approach to financing the operations of community associations is the assessment
of a share of common expense); HYATT, supra note 14, at 121 (noting that assessments are
generally the primary funding source).
97. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 43, at 772.
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commons upkeep, the fiscal fortunes of the members of a community
are intertwined. A change in the economic fortunes of one owner can
therefore impact the other owners. Defaults of members on payment
obligations cause a direct and devastating impact on the other members
of the community who must fund the difference. Sam Chandan, chief
economist at the real estate research firm Reis, explained the connection
between the upside of joint maintenance and the downside of economic
entanglement:
What motivated people to go into the condo market in a way that led
to overbuilding was the expectation that it would be easier than
owning a home on a maintenance basis. The downside is that your
fate is tied to 50 to 100 other people who may stop making their condo
payments.98
Although the possibility of member assessment default had long been
understood, before 2006, no one anticipated that so many highly
leveraged mortgages taking so long to foreclose would eventually put a
huge strain on community associations.99 But today's delinquency rate
for assessments has caused many of these associations to fail.o10 Their
failure leaves the community without its expected amenities and upkeep
and leaves the commons to its natural economic "tragedy" because local
municipalities need not provide public services that were previously left
to private associations to fund and provide.
Most courts have held that CIC associations cannot declare
bankruptcy as long as they retain the power to assess for budgetary
shortfalls. 101  Thus, solvent owners must fund their delinquent
neighbors' deficiencies. Delinquency levels in some parts of the
country have seen astronomical increases since 2005. One management
firm in the Boston area reported a 150% increase in delinquent
assessments from 2006 to 2007.102 Vulnerability to increased
assessments to fund neighbor shortfalls and the inability of an
98. Haughney, supra note 6, at Cl (quoting Chandan).
99. The closest precedent is New England in the late 1980s and early 1990s when many
associations were left with debilitating budgetary shortfalls as many owners defaulted on their
mortgages and other payment obligations. It was this regional crisis among CICs that led
Massachusetts to adopt a six-month lien priority for CIC association liens. See infra note 213
(explaining that the six-month super priority in UCIOA was meant to solve this same issue, but
the authors of that model legislation did not foresee that in today's climate of extensive and long-
delayed foreclosure, six months would generally be inadequate).
100. See Pinkerton, supra note 12, at 125 (discussing the "crushing" nature of association
debt).
101. See infra Part I.B.4 (explaining why it is unfeasible for condominium associations to file
for bankruptcy).
102. Sacha Pfeiffer, Delinquencies at Condos Can Cost Neighbors, Bos. GLOBE, Oct. 16,
2007, at Cl.
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association to perform contractually required maintenance in the face of
member default causes a significant adverse impact on the value of
properties within a CIC.103
Where available, statistics regarding the problem of assessment
delinquencies underscore the magnitude of the problem. According to a
study cited by The Miami Herald, more than 60% of Florida
condominiums and homeowner associations reported in March 2010
that at least half of their units were at least two months behind in paying
their assessments. 104 Losing half of the required revenue completely
hamstrings the operation of these associations. For example, Parkview
Point Condominium in Miami Beach suffered a large enough loss of
assessment revenue that it was unable to pay water bills for the building,
and the unit owners nearly had their water cut off before solvent owners
were able to raise funds to pay the arrearage. 05  The lobby ceiling
repairs, however, were stopped mid-repair, leaving wiring and ducts
exposed. 106 On the nation's other coast, Gas Lamp City Square in
downtown San Diego awaits pending foreclosure sales on multiple units
in the building while the association struggles with a $115,000
budgetary shortfall because of unpaid dues. 10 7  In Union City,
California, a special assessment for roof repairs in Alvarado Village
ended up costing each paying owner $18,494.27.108 A couple in San
Francisco reports that over the past three years, their special
assessments have exceeded $100,000.109
Pervasive assessment default unfairly impacts the paying neighbors
financially and psychologically, and anecdotal evidence underscores the
reality behind the troubling statistics of unpaid community dues. Ana
Martinez, for example, reported that she no longer felt safe living in her
own home-a unit within a South Florida condominium that was
deteriorating in the face of the association's inability to pay for
103. See, e.g., Bd. of Dirs v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 581 S.E.2d 201, 206 (Va. 2003) (Lacy, J.,
dissenting) ("Part of the value of a condominium unit comes from the ability of the condominium
association to maintain the common areas of the development . . . . The ability to maintain these
elements is directly related to the association's ability to secure payment of assessments from the
individual unit owners.").
104. Rachael Lee Coleman, Desperate Condos Thrown a Lifeline, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 7,
2010, at lA.
105. Haughney, supra note 6, at C8.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. James Temple, Neighborhood Fees Go Through the Roof CONTRA COSTA TIMES (May
29, 2006), http://www.calhomelaw.org/doc.asp?id-487. The Alvarado Village association also
blamed the large special assessment on the property developer who they claim failed to
adequately fund reserves. Id.
109. Lloyd, supra note 11.
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maintenance.11o Some of Ana's neighbors had literally abandoned their
units, leaving behind not only unpaid and underwater mortgage loans,
but also months of unpaid condominium assessments.111  Ana's
monthly assessment tripled in response to the condominium's budget
shortfall, and her property's value fell and continues to plummet in the
face of lower occupancy, higher crime, and substandard common area
maintenance.l 12
In a modest, low-income area of Providence, Rhode Island, Debra
McGarry was forced to take out a $4800 personal credit card loan to
keep water, gas, and electricity from being cut off in the eight-unit
condominium building in which she lives. 113 Two of the owners in the
building stopped paying dues and abandoned their homes, nearly
bankrupting the small condominium. 114  Even doubling the
condominium fees that the remaining six paying owners were assessed
failed to generate enough capital to keep the building afloat."s The
"affordable" unit Debra and her husband Bernard, a disabled veteran,
bought in 2006 ended up being their financial "nightmare" since Debra
and her solvent neighbors were left to personally pick up the tab left by
lenders who failed to foreclose on strategically defaulted mortgages.' 16
The problem of assessment delinquencies is not confined to lower
income owners. Many owners of ritzy Manhattan condominiums that
come with. top-flight amenities (gym membership, butler and maid
service, billiards room, and library) can no longer afford the cost of
such services because of a rash of unit owner assessment defaults.11 7 In
the past year, foreclosure filings for Manhattan condominiums doubled,
and now, one in every thirteen units are in some stage of foreclosure.118
Foreclosures in New York take longer than in any other state, and at the
current pace, it would take lenders sixty-two years to complete
foreclosure on the 213,000 homes now in severe default. 119 During the
110. Sutta, supra note 6.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Dunn, supra note 6, at G1.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Ryley, supra note 6.
118. Id.
119. David Streitfeld, Backlog of Cases Gives a Reprieve on Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, June
19, 2011, at Al (citing calculations by LPS Applied Analytics, a real estate data firm). Even
before the housing crisis, it took up to two years for property to be sold at a foreclosure sale under
New York law. In the first half of 2011, the average time to complete a foreclosure in New York
was 966 days, and the average time to foreclose in Florida was 676 days. While the number of
foreclosure sales dropped dramatically in the first half of 2011, this does not indicate a market
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several years foreclosure is pending in the current market, the non-
defaulting owners in these glamorous buildings will see their own
assessments increase to close the association's budgetary gap while the
building services and amenities simultaneously disappear. In one
Manhattan condominium, the nonpayment of just one investor-who
held title to a dozen units in the building-caused the remaining
members' monthly charges to jump by 15%.120
3. Barriers to Market Recovery
The housing market continues to implode in many localities.
Sustainable home pricing and the expeditious placement of owners
willing and able to meet a property's upkeep obligations are the only
way out. 12 1  But predictable credit costs and upkeep charges are a
prerequisite to stable home pricing and residential real estate
investment. 122 Volatile CIC assessments stymie economic recovery.
Would-be buyers, faced with uncertain future assessment increases due
to financial entanglement in a CIC, are unwilling and unable to manage
certain risks. Loan modifications for overburdened borrowers do not
recovery, but is rather further testament to rampant processing delays and lender strategic delays.
Les Christie, Foreclosures Plunge in First Half of 2011, CNN MONEY (July 14, 2011),
http://money.cnn.com/2011/07/14/realestate/housing marketforeclosures/index.htm.
120. Ryley, supra note 6. The situation is different for cooperative buildings because
assessment payments are characterized as rent. Thus, the cooperative can evict a defaulting
owner and need not wait for the owner's lender to foreclose. In condominiums, however, the
association lien is subordinate to the first mortgage lien, and typically, the association's
assessment will not be paid upon foreclosure.
121. See BEN BERNANKE, CHAIRMAN, U.S. FED. RESERVE, SEMIANNUAL MONETARY
POLICY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 2 (July 13, 2011), available at http://www.federal
reserve.gov/newsevents/testimonylbernanke20110713al.pdf (opining that one key roadblock to
economic recovery is "the continuing depressed condition of the housing sector"); Steven
Pearlstein, To Sort this Mess, Both Banks and Borrowers Must Own Their Mistakes, WASH.
POST, Oct. 10, 2010, at A09 (explaining that "the longer the foreclosure process goes on, the
longer it will take for the excess supply of houses to be absorbed, for prices to stabilize and for
the real estate market to return to something closer to a normal equilibrium"); Alexander Eichler,
Foreclosure Processing Time Has Doubled Since 2007, Backlogging Housing Market,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 1, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/01/home-foreclosure-
backlog_n_888655.html (citing The Atlantic's Daniel Indiviglio's opinion that "the more
foreclosures pile up, the longer it will take for the housing market to hit bottom and begin
recovering").
122. While the costs of real estate investment are usually cited as high transaction costs and
illiquidity, predictability of future costs and returns is often cited as one of the benefits of real
estate investment. It therefore stands to reason that eroding this benefit will decrease the
attractiveness of investment in the real property sector. See Christian Rehring, Real Estate in a
Mixed-Asset Portfolio: The Role of the Investment Horizon, REAL ESTATE EcON., June 30, 2011,
at 22 (finding that return predictability is very important to attracting real estate investors); cf
JOINT CTR. FOR Hous. STUDIES HARv. U., THE STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING 4-5 (2011)
(chronicling the declining confidence and investment in the housing sector of the economy as
prices remain uncertain).
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work when assessments rise so quickly that borrowers still cannot meet
their reduced mortgage debt obligations while also paying association
assessments. Lenders resist financing and refinancing in communities
where assessment levels and the fiscal health of the association are both
uncertain. 123 The possibility (or reality) of steeply rising assessments
makes investors hesitant to purchase a unit when rents may not cover
additional increases. As one example: the common charge for a 601
square foot studio in one Manhattan CIC is now $1095 per month, and
this substantial cost has discouraged investor purchasers and financiers,
even when the purchase price for the unit is set at a tremendous
discount. 124 When rents will not cover assessments, ownership of a unit
generates a monthly financial loss.
Lenders are as wary of the uncertain financial future of CIC
properties as are would-be buyers. Mortgage financing or refinancing
of a unit in a condominium or a house in a privately governed
community has become vastly more difficult as banks seek information
not only about the creditworthiness of their borrower, but the credit of
the other members of the financially linked community. 125  Lenders
have started to scrutinize a community's reserve amounts and
assessment delinquency levels in an attempt to quantify the risk of
assessments materially increasing. 126 A buyer of a new condominium
unit in New York reported that Bank of America denied her application
to refinance because the condominium association's reserve account
was depleted, and 17% of the owners in her building were delinquent in
paying their assessments. 127  Most lenders require that reserves be
sufficiently funded and that no more than 15% of homeowners be more
than thirty days delinquent on homeowner assessments before they will
agree to lend on any property located in the community. 128
123. See Dina ElBoghdady, New Condo Loan Rules Put More Scrutiny on Neighbors, WASH.
POST, Apr. 25, 2009, at A01 (noting that financing availability depends on the credit of
neighboring owners in a condominium); infra Part II.A. .b (discussing lending policies and risk
assessment).
124. Ryley, supra note 6. Ryley also gives the example of a Manhattan studio that rents for
$3000 a month costing $5750 a month in mortgage payments, taxes, and common charges.
125. See, e.g., Lorraine Ash, People Facing Foreclosure Should Seek Help Early, DAILY
RECORD (Mar. 19, 2011, 6:35 PM), http://www.dailyrecord.com/article/CN/20110319/NJNEWS/
103190343/People-facing-foreclosure-should-seek-help-early (noting that banks look at the
association finances); Matt Tomsic, Homeowners Associations Stepping Up Legal Pressures with
Foreclosures, STARNEWS (Mar. 5, 2011, 5:01 PM), http://www.stamewsonline.com/article/
20110305/ARTICLES/ 110309754 (noting that lenders look at the financial help of associations).
126. Ryley, supra note 6.
127. Id
128. HOA Delinquinces in Condos, FREE ADVICE (Apr. 14, 2010), http://forum.freeadvice.
con/buying-selling-home-40/hoa-delinquencies-condos-512763.html. See also infra notes 129-
32 and accompanying text.
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The two giants of the secondary residential mortgage market-the
government-sponsored enterprises ("GSEs") Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac-likewise demand certain thresholds of reserves and non-
delinquencies for CICs in which their prospective mortgage loan
purchases are located. 129  For example, Freddie Mac's Condominium
Unit Mortgages Project Analysis requires a budget and certification of a
working capital fund, appropriate assessments levied with a minimum
of 10% of the budget designated for replacement reserves and deferred
maintenance, a working capital fund in an amount consistent with the
remaining life of the common elements, and no more than 15% of
assessments delinquent more than thirty days. 130  Freddie Mac also
mandates that common elements be consistent with the nature of the
project and competitive with the local market, and it requires the
community to be in good financial and physical condition. 131
The lack of financing alternatives and the threat of instability that
would result if assessment delinquencies reach 15% have chilled
investment in condominium properties.132  Some investors report that
they will pay only cents on the dollar because of the possibility that
neighboring owners will default in paying their pro rata share of
maintenance costs, rendering all units in the CIC unfinanceable. 133
Before he would agree to buy, one investor from Italy reportedly
demanded a "written guarantee" from the association that he would not
129. Fannie Mae (formerly the Federal National Mortgage Association) and Freddie Mac (the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation) were chartered by Congress and regulated by federal
agencies. Although technically still owned by private shareholders, in September 2008, the
Treasury Department placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship, reorganizing the
enterprises and infusing them with new capital. At the time, this was the largest state rescue in
history, to the tune of $100 billion. See Herbert M. Allison, Jr., President and CEO, Fannie Mae,
Oversight Hearing to Examine Recent Treasury and FHFA Actions Regarding the GSEs (Sept.
25, 2008) (addressing how Freddie Mac pursued its mission to support the mortgage market,
provide liquidity, and prevent foreclosures since the conservatorship began); James Lockhardt,
Acting Dir., Office of Fed. Hous. Enter. Oversight (OFHEO), Testimony Before the Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission (Apr. 9, 2010), available at http://fcic-
static.law.stanford.edulcdn medialfcic-testimony/2010-0409-Lockhart.pdf (explaining the
Freddie Mac remediation process). See generally Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency,
Questions and Answers on Conservatorship, http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/35/
FHFACONSERVQA.pdf (explaining conservatorship and how it will affect the Federal Housing
Finance Agency).
130. FREDDIE MAC, FREDDIE MAC CONDOMINIUM UNIT MORTGAGES 1, 3 (Apr. 2011),
available at http://www.freddiemac.com/learn/pdfs/uw/condo.pdf.
131. Id
132. Some areas of the country-New England and Manhattan in particular-faced a
breakdown in the early 1990s. There is anecdotal evidence of New Yorkers during that crisis
"handing over their Fifth Avenue apartments for $1 because they could not afford the
maintenance fees." Haughney, supra note 6, at Cl.
133. Id.
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have to pay larger fees in the future (although such a guarantee is likely
not enforceable against the association).134  The fact that no one-
neither banks nor buyers-willingly takes on this uncontrollable risk is
more evidence that the current system is broken.135
Some associations have responded to their community's budgetary
crisis by in-sourcing all possible costs. 136 For example, homeowners
may be required to take turns mowing common area lawns, caring for
common area maintenance, or even staying up all night to serve as a
doorman or security guard. While these efforts may reduce the dollar
contributions associations need to function, in-sourced upkeep actually
replicates the very same collective action and free-rider problems that
community governance was designed to eliminate: some people will
contribute more than others, and others will be unjustly enriched by
their efforts. In-sourcing just replaces the problem of increased
assessments of money with the problem of increased "assessments"
made in kind, and it is equally inequitable. Either way, the non-
defaulting homeowners pick up the costs of the defaulting owners
mortgage lenders' free ride. 137
As an alternative to increasing assessments, associations may reduce
the level of services offered to members of the community by
decreasing maintenance, closing amenities, or starting to charge
amenity user fees. In 2008, the Community Associations Institute
conducted an informal poll and found that nearly 40% of the
associations nationwide had delayed capital expenditures, and nearly
35% had raised assessments-in each case because of an increase in
delinquent assessments. 38 Three years later, these numbers are likely
even higher. The end result of the efforts to cut services and impose
134. Id. Associations cannot guarantee limitations on future assessments unless the
documents so permit because any limitation to one unit owner's obligations necessarily burdens
other owners with greater costs should the association's revenue requirements increase.
135. Condominiums as a real estate product type have incurred the biggest losses in terms of
market value and transactional volume. CLIFFORD TREESE, METRICS FOR THE DEPRESSED (May
2011), available at https://spreadsheets.google.com/spreadsheet/pub?hl=en_US&hl=en_US&key
=OApvOsovB8cSdGpwVTd4TEwybGJFd2J3QUQ2ZnRFbXc&output-html. According to
statistics compiled by LM Funding from the Hillsborough Property Appraiser's Office and
Zillow.com, average values for condominiums have dropped 34% from the peak in 2005 to 2009.
Id.
136. Housing Associations, DUE NORTH, http://www.due-north.com/Jndustries/housing-
associations.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2011); Michelle Rindels, Nevada Legislators Considering
Reform for HOAs, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 25, 2011, available at http://www.kolotv.com/
home/headlines/NevadaLegislators_ConsideringReform forHOAs_116980213.html; Vitali,
supra note 46.
137. See Lemley, supra note 69, at 1057 (discussing the consequences of free riding); infra
Part II.B. 1 (discussing how lenders benefit from upkeep pre-foreclosure).
138. Bayles, supra note 11.
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more costs on owners is the same: significant decline in a community's
property values and a community government that ceases to function
effectively. 139
4. Association Bankruptcy
Community associations cannot seek relief from their financial
obligations in bankruptcy, even if their obligations outpace their
revenues. Condominium associations typically have no assets of their
own, 140 and homeowner associations are prohibited by their governing
documents from selling their assets or otherwise seeking to raise
revenues in ways not foreseen and explicitly authorized in their
covenants. 14 1  These entities perform primarily (or exclusively)
governance and maintenance roles. Although it is nearly impossible to
file bankruptcy as a pass-through entity, it is also practically impossible
for an association to function if a significant amount of the units are in
arrears. Once more than 15% of unit owners are delinquent in their
assessment payments, FHA insurance and Fannie Mae loan
qualification becomes unavailable for purchaser mortgages on units in
that community. 142  At that level of delinquency, neither associations
nor their member owners can obtain financing.
Bankruptcy law currently offers no good solution. 143  Courts
generally disallow bankruptcy filings by community associations
139. See HYATT, supra note 14, at 121 (stating that cutting services and charging user fees for
amenities may cause disrepair of the common and recreational facilities, resulting in a decline in
property values within the community). A similar fate befell Alaskan condominiums when
workers abandoned their units and moved away after the completion of the Alaska pipeline. See
MIN DIXON, WHAT HAPPENED TO FAIRBANKS? THE EFFECTS OF THE TRANS-ALASKA OIL
PIPELINE ON THE COMMUNITY OF FAIRBANKS, ALASKA 295-96 (1980) (explaining that a
housing shortage resulted from a lack of certainty regarding the housing that an industry was to
supply its employees and the disposition of that housing after the construction period had
terminated).
140. In condominium ownership, the unit owners hold title to all common areas as tenants-in-
common, and the association's role is purely one of governance.
141. HYATT, supra note 14, at 109-12.
142. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., MORTGAGEE LETTER 2009-19, CONDOMINIUM
APPROVAL PROCESSS-SINGLE FAMILY HOUSING (June 12, 2009), available at http://www.hud
.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/letters/mortgagee/files/09-19ml.doc; U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN
DEV., MORTGAGEE LETTER 2009-46 A, TEMPORARY GUIDANCE FOR CONDOMINIUM POLICY
(Nov. 6, 2009), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/letters/mortgagee/files/09-
46aml.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., MORTGAGEE LETTER 2009-46 B,
CONDOMINIUM APPROVAL PROCESS FOR SINGLE FAMILY HOUSING (Nov. 6, 2009), available at
http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/letters/mortgagee/files/09-46bml.pdf.
143. Professor Evan McKenzie calls association bankruptcy attempts "disaster[s]" that
accomplish nothing. Joseph Dobrian, Condominium Associations Hard Hit by Foreclosures
Consider Bankruptcy, J. PROP. MGMT., May/June 2010, at 32 (quoting McKenzie). Recently,
scholars have called for reformation of the Bankruptcy Code to offer some relief to beleaguered
condominium associations. Pinkerton, supra note 13, at 142-46 (citing the inescapable "death
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because the associations have assessment powers, and courts can force
associations to levy assessments on unit owners to pay for association
debt.144 Because an association can theoretically make special
assessments to make up any budgetary shortfall, an association's
inability to pay its obligations is seen as a revenue problem rather than
as a debt or asset problem. Only if all the members of the association
are themselves insolvent does the actual ability of an association to meet
its debts become imperiled.145
There have been very few exceptions to this general rule, and each
has presented an atypical case. For example, in the recent bankruptcy
case filed in Florida by Maison Grande Condominium, the association
entered into a long-term recreation lease with an escalation clause and
faced inability to meet this obligation when 25% of its units becamhe
delinquent while lease fees rose astronomically. 14 6  The association
filed a petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy seeking to reject the lease,
and the bankruptcy judge in that case permitted the lease rejection.147
The court noted that the board of directors had concluded that further
increases of assessments would be unavailing because unit owners had
advised the board that they lacked the ability or willingness to pay. 14 8
spiral" of association unpaid dues and debt).
144. See White v. Cox, 95 Cal. Rptr. 259, 263 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (stating that a
condomium owner may satisfy his portion of any liability arising from the association by the
payment of his proportionate share of the liability); HYATT & FRENCH, supra note 14, at 591;
NATELSON, supra note 61, at 328-31; Donald L. Schreifer, Judicial Action and Condominium
Unit Owner Liability: Public Interest Considerations, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 255, 262-65 (1986)
(explaining that at least a share of the debt may be collected from any member who has been
named and served in the absence of a statute to the contrary); Jessica Meyers, HOA Bills Start to
Get Spotlight, DALL. NEWS (Mar. 7, 2011, 10:05 AM), http://trailblazersblog.dallasnews.com/
archives/2011/03/hoa-bills-start-to-get-spotlig.html; cf In re Rivera, 256 B.R. 828, 830-36
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000) (denying as moot and unnecessary a homeowner association's "Motion
for Reconsideration of Order denying Motion to Compel Debtor to Reaffirm, to Redeem, or to
Surrender, and to Withhold Entry of the Discharge Pending Consideration of this Motion or
Alternately to Dismiss," because post-petition homeowner association assessments survived a
Chapter 7 discharge as a condition of continued ownership of a lot subject to such assessment),
superseded by statute, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1 6) (2006).
145. See Pinkerton, supra note 13, at 147-64 (discussing the insolvency and condominium
association debtors).
146. In re Maison Grande Condo. Ass'n, 425 B.R. 684, 687-88 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010).
147. Id at 689, 707.
148. Id at 688 ("Some owners advised members of the Board that they lacked the financial
resources to pay additional assessments. Others advised the Board that they would refuse to pay
additional assessments that were only necessitated by other owners not paying their fair share.
The Board also took into consideration the demographics of the unit owners, including the fact
that many [were] elderly and on fixed incomes." (citation omitted)). Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
offers an association the only hope of bankruptcy relief, but even that avenue is uncertain and
perilous. See Pinkerton, supra note 12, at 155-65 (asserting that Chapter 7 is "not a good option
for condominium associations" and that while Chapter 11 "might work," the association faces
many problems with that route as well); see also Kristen L. Davidson, Bankruptcy Protection for
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This case, however, is an anomaly and upon closer reading, seems to be
predicated on a finding that the subject lease's escalation clause was
unenforceable in Florida as against public policy.149
More typical is the approach of another Florida bankruptcy case, in
which the court adamantly rejected the association's proposed Chapter 7
bankruptcy. 150  In this case, the association sought to dissolve and
reform to avoid payment obligations to a roofing vender that it could
not meet without significant increases to assessments.151  The court
rejected this plan, calling the association's attempt to avail itself of
bankruptcy protection bad faith. 152  Carla Barrow, counsel to the
roofing company, noted that at least eight other condominiums had also
filed for some sort of bankruptcy protection in South Florida, attempting
to avoid paying for roof repairs,153 but such attempts are unlikely to be
successful. In 2010, Florida passed the Distressed Condominium Relief
Act, which, among other things, specifically empowers associations to
take stronger measures to recover revenues from non-paying owners
and permits "bulk assignees" and "bulk buyers" to take over unsold
developer condominium inventory, assuming assessment obligations but
not other liabilities of the original developer. 154
Without bankruptcy as a potential escape from financial obligations
in excess of collected funds, associations with assessment delinquencies
are left with only one alternative: increase assessment amounts and
hope the paying members will make up the shortfall. Charging paying
members more to make up for neighbor defaults is not only unfair, 155
but it is unlikely to actually save the community from de facto
insolvency. As the court in Maison Grande noted, increased
assessments will likely increase delinquencies. 156  Increased
delinquencies lead to increased assessments that can further increase
delinquencies, requiring still greater increases of assessments (ad
infinitum). Barring some ability to actually recover from non-paying
Community Associations as Debtors, 20 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 583, 616-25 (2004) (discussing
the difficulty that courts have in applying bankruptcy laws to community associations).
149. In re Maison Grande, 425 B.R. at 702.
150. In re Boca Village Ass'n, 422 B.R. 318, 327 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009).
151. Id at 325.
152. Id at 321-25.
153. Dobrian, supra note 143, at 33.
154. S.B. 1196, 2010 Sess. (Fla. 2010) (adding new Sections 718.701-708 to the Florida
Statutes through the "Distressed Condominium Relief Act").
155. See Hart, supra note 5, at 185 ("[W]hen a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise
according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions
when required have a right to a similar submission from those who have benefited by their
submission.").
156. In re Maison Grande Condo. Ass'n, 425 B.R. 684, 688 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010).
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owners or properties, the only remaining solution is to have a public
(state, local, federal) government step in and bail out communities that
are unable to collect sufficient revenues from their members.157 Private
government failure mirrors local government failure (when tax revenues
are insufficient to maintain the community), but unlike community
associations, municipalities can, in fact, declare bankruptcy. 158
C. Payment Collection and Lien Priority
1. Association Collection Efforts
Because of the difficulty of enforcing payment obligations in
privately governed communities, conventional wisdom holds that an
association board should act quickly in response to nonpayment of
assessments. An association with delinquent members has the ability to
enforce its payment obligation in several ways. Associations may be
able to use self-help by denying a delinquent owner the right to use
common elements or by suspending the owner's voting rights.159  For
example, a nonpaying unit owner may be barred from using a
community amenity such as a swimming pool or health club. The
157. See Dobrian, supra note 143, at 34 ("The main burden of dealing with troubled condo
associations will fall on local governments, which are seldom experienced in such matters.")
(quoting Professor Evan McKenzie).
158. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(1) (2006). Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code provides for
reorganization of municipalities, which includes cities, towns, villages, counties, taxing districts,
municipal utilities, and school districts. E.g., Municipality Bankruptcy, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/federalcourts/bankruptcy/bankruptcybasics/chapter9.aspx (last visited
Aug. 16, 2011). It does not, however, cover common interest communities. Municipal
bankruptcy legislation has a history of constitutional fragility. See, e.g., Ashton v. Cameron
Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 530-32 (1936) (striking down as
incompatible with the Tenth Amendment the initial attempt by Congress to craft bankruptcy
protection for local governments). According to the federal government, in the more than sixty
years since Congress established a constitutionally viable municipal bankruptcy procedure, there
have been less than 500 governmental bankruptcy petitions filed. Municipality Bankruptcy,
supra. Those filings that do occur, however, are typically extreme cases in large municipalities
(e.g., Orange County, CA) and can involve many millions of dollars in municipal debt. MARK
BALDASSARE, WHEN GOVERNMENT FAILS: THE ORANGE COUNTY BANKRUPTCY 7 (1998).
159. HYATT, supra note 14, at 121-22; see also How v. Mars, 513 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Neb.
1994) (holding that both the association bylaws and Nebraska's nonprofit corporations code
permitted the association to deny delinquent owners the right to vote in the community). But see
Mountain Home Props. v. Pine Mountain Lake Ass'n, 185 Cal. Rptr. 623, 630 (Cal. Ct. App.
1982) (holding that California law bars a community association from denying membership
privileges to a new member because of the unpaid association debts of the new member's
predecessors in interest). In most cases, private governments are able to suspend voting rights of
members due to non-payment of assessments even though public governments may not suspend
the right to vote based on non-payment of taxes. For example, a Florida law passed in July 2010
clarifies the availability of this type of self-help in that state. S.B. 1196, 2010 Sess. (Fla. 2010).
For further discussion of how assessments in communities are similar to and yet distinct from
taxes, see infra Part II.A.3.
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extent to which services may be denied, however, depends on state law.
For example, a Texas court permitted an association to turn off the
utilities of a delinquent owner, 160  but few states permit the
discontinuance of essential services, such as heat, water or electricity. 16 1
If such efforts fail, an association can commence an action to collect
a debt against the non-paying owner. Federal case law is split on the
issue of whether association assessments are debts for the purposes of
the 1966 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2006),
which would require certain explicit warnings and notices to be served
prior to collection efforts.162 To the extent an association complies with
any such applicable laws, it can thereafter bring lawsuits against
delinquent owners personally, claiming breach of contract and seeking
damages equal to the unpaid assessment amounts. 163 Collection based
on a judgment against the owner can proceed like any other debt
collection (garnishing wages, seizing assets, enforcing a judgment lien,
etc.). 164 Bringing a lawsuit, however, can be costly to the association in
terms of time and attorney fees, and the paying owners-those who are
already bearing the costs of their neighbors' delinquencies-will have
to foot that bill unless the delinquent owner or responsible party can
160. San Antonio Villa Del Sol Homeowners Ass'n v. Miller, 761 S.W.2d 460, 465 (Tex.
App. 1988) ("Clearly, a condominium dweller who does not pay his share of the maintenance fee,
admits that the other owners are in essence paying his way, and fails to respond to notice of
disconnection is in violation of the meaning and intent of the [by-laws]. The Association took
appropriate action to abate this condition.").
161. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eee(4) (McKinney 2011) (prohibiting a property
owner who wishes to convert a building to cooperative or condominium ownership from the
"interruption or discontinuance of essential services, which substantially interferes with or
disturbs the comfort, repose, peace or quiet of any tenant in his use or occupancy of his dwelling
unit or the facilities related thereto."). Among property managers, the belief is that the most
efficient way to collect unpaid assessments is to turn off community-provided cable or satellite
television services where law permits. See Polyana da Costa, Associations Get Creative in
Punishing Delinquencies, MIAMI DAILY Bus. REV., Nov. 23, 2010, at Al (discussing legal and
prohibited methods of encouraging assessment compliance); see also Mark Leen, Condo Utilities
May Be At Mercy of Assessments, KING CNTY. BAR Ass'N BAR BULLETIN, 2009, available at
http://www.kcba.org/newsevents/barbulletin/archive/2009/09-07/articlel8.aspx (discussing why
cutting services off to a unit is "particularly effective").
162. Compare, e.g., Bryan v. Clayton, 698 So. 2d 1236, 1237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
(assessments are not covered by the Act) with Newman v. Boehm, Pearlstein & Bright, Ltd., 119
F.3d 477, 479 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that a past due assessment is a "debt" under the Act).
163. See HYATT, supra note 14, at 119 (discussing a typical collection process for an
association against a delinquent owner, including filing a lawsuit against the delinquent owner
personally, in addition to filing a lien on the delinquent owner's unit).
164. See infra Part I.C.1 (discussing association collection efforts). The priority of any such
judgment lien, however, will be subordinate to any mortgages or other obligations currently
secured by the property, and thus, perfecting the association's assessment lien likely offers a
better chance for ultimate recovery.
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obtain the costs of collection. 165 Nevertheless, these sorts of collection
actions are how the bulk of unpaid assessments are eventually
collected. 166
The lien on the defaulting owner's property that association
covenants create for delinquent assessments is another tool for
delinquency recovery. 167 The lien guarantees that the association will
be paid out the proceeds of any resale, after all senior interests are
satisfied. Furthermore, a lien for unpaid assessments clouds the
owner's title and can be used as leverage to convince an owner who is
seeking clear title (for sale or financing) to pay up. A last resort for
associations is to foreclose on the property lien securing the assessment
obligation.168
165. See HYATT, supra note 14, at 121 (discussing the substantial amount of time it takes to
foreclose on a lien and collect a judgment, the low price a sheriff s sale may generate, and that the
availability of wage garnishment is dependent on the delinquent owner having an income).
166. See, e.g., KATZMAN GARFINKEL & BERGER, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION ASSESSMENT
COLLECTION AND FORECLOSURE 14-15 (2011), available at http://www.canfl.com/pdfs/
KGBcollFAQssm.pdf (explaining the benefits of collection actions).
167. See Pinkerton, supra note 13, at 143 ("Functionally, condominium associations only
possess one remedy to recover their expenses from delinquent unit owners. They can obtain a
lien on the unit for the amount owed to the association by that unit owner. The association can
then foreclose on its lien if the debt remains unpaid. However, this remedy is not very useful in
the face of many states' laws concerning the relative priority of mortgages."). The association
lien has always been used as a practical means to induce voluntary compliance with assessment
obligations rather than as a means to collect from the asset's value directly via foreclosure
(although the viable threat of foreclosure can motivate payment). The problem arises in
situations where a homeowner is already facing foreclosure (under the mortgage) and the owner's
equity is gone. The association in such cases loses its power to motivate compliance. At this
point, the only other interest holder of the property who still has a stake in its value is the first
mortgagee, which is why eroding that priority position may incentivize a lender to pay, or cause a
borrower to pay, assessments. A lender would be motivated to pay to preserve its own collateral
value if its claim on the property would diminish should assessments remain delinquent.
168. See, e.g., UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-116 (amended 2008) (outlining
enforcement of lien for sums due the association, including foreclosure); Societe Generale v.
Charles & Co. Acquisition, Inc., 597 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) ("[A]
condominium's lien for unpaid common charges may be foreclosed in the same manner as a
mortgage on real property . . . ."). Some state laws limit recovery for debt repayment from
foreclosure of a homestead. Homestead exemptions protect a certain amount of equity from sale
to satisfy a debt. In Missouri, for example, the first $15,000 of debt is exempted as the owner's
homestead. MO. REV. STAT. § 513.475 (2002). Florida, Texas, Oklahoma and Colorado have
virtually unlimited homestead exemptions. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (West
2010) (providing that a homestead is "exempt from seizure for the claims of creditors except for
encumbrances properly fixed on homestead property," which include: (1) purchase money; (2)
taxes on the property; (3) work and material used in constructing improvements on the property;
(4) an owelty of partition; (5) the refinance of a lien against the homestead; (6) an extension of
credit subject to certain conditions including security by a voluntary lien; and (7) a reverse
mortgage which meets certain requirements); Id § 52.001 (attaching judgment liens to real
property except that property exempt from seizure or forced sale under Chapter 41, the Texas
Constitution, or any other law). Mortgage lenders typically require an explicit waiver of this
statutory protection of borrower equity.
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How useful association foreclosure is as an enforcement tool depends
greatly on the perfection and priority regime of the applicable state. 169
A first mortgage loan on a particular unit in a CIC enjoys senior priority
to the association's assessment lien in all states, although the first
mortgage priority is subject to a capped payment priority association
lien in several states. 170 In those states lacking a six-month super-
priority for assessment liens, the association will only be able to recover
from the sale if foreclosure proceeds exceed the senior loan amount. 17 1
Depending on the jurisdiction, lien foreclosures are effected either by
a sale in a court action in equity or by private power of sale granted in
the security instrument. 172 Judicial foreclosure is the exclusive method
of foreclosure in over one-third of the states, 173 and it is available in
Similarly, association declarations may purport to waive application of the homestead
exemption for foreclosure of the association lien. Many states have passed statutes explicitly
carving out CIC associations from the applicability of such limitations. The Colorado statute
expressly authorizes an association to ignore the homestead exemption otherwise applicable in
that state. BA Mortg., LLC v. Quail Creek Condo. Ass'n, 192 P.3d 447, 451 (Colo. App. 2008).
Texas, a state with a very broad homestead exemption, allows association foreclosure to
circumvent this limitation. Inwood N. Homeowners' Ass'n v. Harris, 736 S.W.2d 632, 637 (Tex.
1987). In other states, the applicability of the homestead exemption to association lien
foreclosure proceedings is less clear. See, e.g., Andres v. Indian Creek Phase Ill-B Homeowner's
Ass'n, 901 So.2d 182, 182-83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (expressing, in dicta, doubt that
covenants purporting to waive the state's homestead exception would be effective); Knolls
Condo. Ass'n v. Harms, 781 N.E.2d 261, 267-69 (111. 2002) (holding that the homestead
exemption did not preclude the association suing for possession of a defaulting unit but not
reaching the question of whether it would preclude foreclosure of the association's lien).
169. See HYATT, supra note 14, at 120-21 (discussing the practical value of an association's
lien rights as dependent upon the state law authority for the lien, procedures for perfection and
enforcement, and lien priority). In some states, perfection of the lien is automatic. In other states,
a filing is required to perfect the lien. State law may require re-filing to maintain perfection. For
example, in New Hampshire, a notice of an association's lien must be re-filed every six months to
retain perfection. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 356-B:46, III (LexisNexis 2010). States specifically
prescribe the method of foreclosure and the process required in order to legally foreclose on real
property. In addition, certain states have attempted to limit the power of associations to foreclose
based on unpaid assessment liens. For example, in 2004, a bill in California that would have set a
threshold of $2500 of unpaid assessments before an association could pursue foreclosure was
vetoed by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. See Jim Wasserman, Schwarzenegger Rejects Ban
on Foreclosures, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 1, 2004, available at http://www.calhomelaw.org/
doc.asp?id-462 (discussing Governor Schwarzenegger's veto of a bill that would have required
associations to use small claims courts, instead of nonjudicial foreclosure, to collect unpaid debts
under $2500).
170. See infra Part I.C.2 (discussing assessment lien priority).
171. See, e.g., Bd. of Dirs. of Olde Salem Homeowners Ass'n v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs,
589 N.E.2d 761, 764 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (finding that a buyer at a mortgage foreclosure took the
property free of assessments accruing prior to recording of the deed, which were extinguished by
the foreclosure action); Long Island Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. Gomez, 568 N.Y.S.2d 536, 537 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1991) (finding that an association's junior lien was extinguished by foreclosure of the
senior priority mortgage).
172. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 58, at 600-01, 633.
173. Id at 601 n. 1. Judicial foreclosure is the exclusive or generally used method in
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every jurisdiction. 174 Judicial foreclosures are complicated, costly, and
time-consuming compared with non-judicial foreclosures pursuant to a
power of sale. 175  Some states that permit a mortgage containing an
explicit power of sale to be non-judicially foreclosed will likewise
permit non-judicial foreclosure of association liens. Such states have a
separate foreclosure statutory provision dealing solely with association
liens. 176
Most associations, as well as owners and legislatures, view the
foreclosure of an assessment lien as "a last resort" for two reasons. 177
First, foreclosure proceedings-even in states permitting non-judicial
foreclosure of association liens-involve significant upfront costs such
as advertising, auction, and legal fees. These costs would have to be
borne by the neighborhood as a whole, unless they can be recovered
from the delinquent owner. Second, a buyer who purchases at an
association foreclosure would take the property subject to a first priority
mortgage lien unless that loan amount is paid off.178 This vastly
Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Montana,
Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, and Wisconsin. In two other states, Connecticut and Vermont, foreclosure is judicial
but is not a public sale; rather, it is a transfer of ownership to the lienor (called strict foreclosure).
174. In some states, an explicit statutory right to foreclose through the court exists. In others,
judicial foreclosure is available as an incident to the jurisdiction of courts of equity. See Lansing
v. Goelet, 9 Cow. 346, 366, 403 (N.Y. 1827) (holding that the decree for the sale of mortgaged
premises was within the inherent powers of a court of equity, in addition to a statutory right to
foreclose through the court).
175. STEVEN W. BENDER ET AL., MODERN REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND LAND TRANSFER
419-21 (4th ed. 2008); NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 58, at 601-02.
176. E.g., Property Owners' Association Act, VA. CODE. ANN. tit. 55 § 516 (2007) (titled
"Lien for Assessments"); Maryland Condominium Act, MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 11-110
(West 2003), amended by Act of May 10, 2011, ch. 387, H.B. 1246 (effective Oct. 1, 2011).
177. Benny L. Kass, Condo Board Can Foreclose for Delinquent Fees, WASH. POST, Feb. 14,
2009, at F4; see also Baker v. Monga, 590 N.E.2d 1162, 1164-65 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (holding
that a unit valued at $350,000 could be foreclosed for the owner's nonpayment of assessments
totaling less than $3000). A recent unsuccessful bill in California attempted to place a significant
cost threshold on when an association could pursue foreclosure to enforce its lien for unpaid
assessments. S.B. 1682, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004).
178. Junior priority liens are wiped out by foreclosure and, after paying amounts owed to the
association, are distributed to such lienors in order of priority, but buyers at the foreclosure of a
junior lien take subject to senior liens. Most courts have held, and scholars have opined, that this
"subject to" means that a junior lien foreclosure transfers the property with the senior liens intact
but unpaid. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 58, at 611-14; see also, e.g., Shaikh v. Burwell,
412 S.E.2d 924, 926 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) ("If the trustee is only foreclosing on the junior deed of
trust, the senior lien continues with the property and the trustee must sell subject to the senior
lien."). In a puzzling recent Virginia decision, however, foreclosure of an association's junior
lien was misinterpreted to mandate payment of the first mortgage, rather than as a sale of property
subject to a first mortgage lien. Bd. of Dirs. of the Colchester Towne Condo. Council of Co-
Owners v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 581 S.E.2d 201, 206 (Va. 2003). The Supreme Court of
Virginia, over a vigorous dissent, interpreted the statutory authority to foreclose the unit "subject
to prior liens" to mean that proceeds of the association's foreclosure sale must be used first to
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decreases the ability of the association to find a third-party buyer at
such a sale. In fact, in today's environment of underwater properties,
finding an interested third-party buyer at a junior lien foreclosure would
be unlikely at best.
In the absence of a third-party buyer, the association in an assessment
foreclosure would be forced to take title to the unit itself. While this
strategy might allow an association to rent out a unit and pay rental
proceeds toward association costs, this approach is risky.17 9  Once an
association takes title to a unit, it becomes responsible for the
assessments on that unit, which means that the unit's assessment
obligations will continue to be spread among the paying owners in the
community-precisely the unsatisfactory result that collection efforts
against the prior owner were trying to avoid in the first place. As the
owner, the association also becomes liable for property taxes, meaning
that yet another cost is passed on to the community. Although the
association could theoretically mitigate these costs by renting out the
unit, this would entail the association becoming a landlord, exposing the
community to the various risks and liabilities of assuming that role. 180
Even if an association is willing to serve as a landlord, rental properties
satisfy the lien of the first deed of trust before any delinquent assessments are reimbursed. Id. at
203-04. The doctrinal basis of this holding seems misconstrued. The majority cites principles of
interpretation-that a statute should be read to be internally consistent-to support its conclusion.
Id. at 203. But the asserted inconsistency seems to arise from the court's complete
misunderstanding of secured transactions law. The court states that by granting first mortgage
liens super priority in Virginia Code section 55-79.84(A), the Virginia Legislature implicitly
required the judicial reformation of the statutory repayment waterfall in an association
foreclosure, as contained in Virginia Code section 55-79.84(I)(5)(c). Id. at 203-04. As the
dissent noted, this interpretation "is inconsistent with that phrase's well-understood and long
accepted meaning." Id at 205 (Lacy, J., dissenting). Justice Lacy also notes that there is nothing
ambiguous or inconsistent in the statute that requires judicial re-writing of the language to reach
the majority's result, chiding that "we generally do not engage in adding words to a statute." Id.
While this decision runs contrary to nearly every other interpretation of the term "subject to," the
Virginia General Assembly has thus far been unable to pass legislation correcting this judicial
precedent. See S.B. 411, 2010 Sess. (Va. 2010) (stricken Jan. 27, 2010) (attempting to clarify the
statute by adding language that states that the term "subject to" means that liens to which an
association's lien is subordinate "shall survive the sale and be binding upon the purchaser at such
sale").
179. See, e.g., Daniel Vasquez, Should Condo Associations Rent Units in Foreclosure?, SUN
SENTINEL (Mar. 18, 2009), http://articles.sun-sentinel.con2009-03-18/news/0903170451
1_rent-units-condo-associations-foreclosure-action (explaining the various costs and liabilities
that an association incurs when it becomes a landlord of units it acquires in assessment
foreclosure proceedings).
180. See, e.g., Matt Humphrey, HOA Foreclosing to Rent Units? First Know the Risks,
HOALEADER.COM (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.hoaleader.com/public/554.cfn (warning that an
association becoming a landlord of a unit acquired in foreclosure is "very dangerous" because it
"opens the association up to economic liability"). But see Gehrke-White, supra note 13
(explaining that in the context of long bank foreclosure delays, condominium association
foreclosure and renting of units is the only way to obtain assessment funds from defaulting units).
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that are subject to pending mortgage foreclosure-and therefore
potentially terminable with little advance notice-would likely fetch
rentals that are far below market. The depressed rental revenue may not
be enough to pay property taxes and assessment charges on the unit. 181
Generally, senior lienholders cannot be joined in a foreclosure action
involuntarily.182 Some dated case law supports the contention that a
junior lienor may join a senior lienor in a combined foreclosure
proceeding when the senior loan is also in default and is due and
payable. 183 In the unlikely event that this doctrine would gain new
traction, it could permit foreclosing associations to join a lender and
potentially safeguard its lien in a sufficient sale or, at least, speed the
process of senior lien foreclosure, giving associations the legal ability to
self-protect in an environment of lender foreclosure delays. Most courts
today, however, agree that a lienor has the right to choose the timing of
foreclosure of its lien. 184
2. Priority Baseline
As a general rule, liens on real property enjoy a priority based on the
order in which they were perfected.18  This first-in-time basic
presumption is usually subject to a handful of exceptions under state
law, including municipal real property taxes, which always enjoy the
highest lien priority.186 In addition, most states set the priority of a
mechanic's lien supporting payment obligations for work done to the
181. See Bruce Rogers, Collecting Delinquent Assessments: Why the Old Ways Won't Work
and How to Play the Association's Cards in the Great Recession, LM FUNDING LLC, 1,
http://www.1mfunding.com/assets/Collecting-Delinquent-Assessments-in-Todays-Market.pdf
(last visited Oct. 30, 2011) (explaining that current economic reality is why only 4% of
associations with delinquent assessments foreclose on their liens).
182. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 58, at 611; see also, e.g., Osage Oil & Ref. Co. v.
Mulber Oil Co., 43 F.2d 306, 308 (10th Cir. 1930) (holding that the junior lienor cannot enforce a
sale for more than its own equity of redemption without consent of the senior lienor).
183. See, e.g., Hefner v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 123 U.S. 747, 754 (1887) (holding that when
a first mortgagee's debt is due and payable, the first mortgagee may be made a party); Hagan v.
Walker, 55 U.S. 29, 37 (1852) (holding that a senior lienor may be a "necessary party" to a
foreclosure, when the senior lienor is also in default, so that "a sale may be made of the whole
title"); Masters v. Templeton, 92 Ind. 447, 451-52 (1883) (allowing a junior mortgagee to join a
senior mortgagee so that the "ultimate rights of the parties" may be determined in one action);
Peabody v. Roberts, 47 Barb. 91, 102 (N.Y. 1866) (allowing ajunior mortgagee to proceed with a
foreclosure action despite a prior foreclosure and sale under the senior mortgage). Even as late as
1992, the court in Shaikh v. Burwell cited six possible "special circumstances" that would enable
a junior lienor to join a senior lienor in a foreclosure action. Shaikh, 412 S.E.2d at 927-28.
184. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 58, at 612. This creative approach is similar to the
"mortgage terminator" approach that has recently been used on occasion in Florida. See infra
Part II.A.2 (discussing creative strategies used by attorneys in seeking recovery for their clients).
185. BENDER ET AL., supra note 175, at 123.
186. Id. at 271-73.
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real property itself as relating back to the date on which such work was
commenced.187  In the absence of a statutory directive to the contrary,
assessment liens follow the general first-in-time priority rule, and
because mortgage loans are typically funded prior to assessment
delinquencies, such first mortgage liens are senior to assessment
liens.188  The California Condominium Act, for example, explicitly
follows the first-in-time rule, setting lien priority according to the time a
separate "notice of delinquent assessment" is filed in the land
records. 189
In some states, assessment liens are considered automatically
perfected with the date of perfection relating back to the date on which
the association was formed (when the declaration was filed in the land
records). 190  However, statutes defining priority in such states
specifically make an exception for first mortgage liens on individual
units within the community, permitting the first mortgage to always
enjoy a priority senior to the association lien, even though the first-in-
time rule would otherwise deem the related-back perfected association
lien to be first. 191 For example, the Virginia Condominium Act
provides that the assessment lien is subordinate to "sums unpaid on any
first mortgages or first deeds of trust recorded prior to the perfection of
said lien for assessments and securing institutional lenders."1 92
187. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3134, 3137 (West 1993) (providing that liens for site
improvements have priority based on the commencement of site improvements); 770 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 60/16 (West 1989) (providing that no encumbrances placed upon land shall operate
before a lien in favor of work done or materials furnished has been satisfied).
188. An increasing number of states have statutorily created a limited priority for such liens.
See infra Part II.A (discussing some attempted and proposed solutions to the problem of
assessment nonpayment and foreclosure delay). Some states define the time of perfection for
association liens as relating back to the date on which the assessment was due. See infra note 190
and accompanying text.
189. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1367.1(b), (d) (West 2011).
190. The UCIOA takes this approach. See UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-
116 (1994), available at http://www.1aw.upenn.edulbll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ucioa94. htm
(stating that recording of the declaration constitutes record notice and perfection of the lien); see
also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.116(15)(a) (West 2011) (providing that the lien is effective dating
back to the recording of the original declaration); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 82.113 (West 1997)
(providing that the association's lien for assessments is created by recordation of the declaration,
which constitutes perfection); see also, e.g., American Holidays, Inc. v. Foxtail Owners Ass'n,
821 P.2d 577, 580 (Wyo. 1991) (deeming the date the declaration was recorded as the date of
perfection for assessment lien).
191. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-33.3-316 (LexisNexis 2010) (providing that any
security interest created before the assessment becomes delinquent has priority over the
assessment lien). This way of conceptualizing the priority of association liens likely originated
with the FHA Model Condominium Act of 1961. In some cases, the priority granted to first
mortgage liens is subject to a capped super-priority. See infra Part II.A (discussing capped "super
priority" liens).
192. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.84A (LexisNexis 2007).
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Arizona's Condominium Act protects first mortgage priority even
further, providing that such liens are always superior to assessment liens
regardless of when they arose. 193 Maryland and North Carolina also
deem an association lien completely subordinate to first mortgage liens
on units within the community. 194  In states where the statute is
arguably vague as to the priority position of the first mortgage, courts
have clarified that even an assertion of super-priority in the declaration
establishing the community will not create a priority superior to a first
mortgage lien.195 Thus, regardless of jurisdiction, first mortgages on
units within a community are senior in priority to association liens for
unpaid assessments. Legislatures and courts cite a policy of promoting
financing availability as the motivation for this priority scheme. 196
Holders of junior claims on the property (both liens and holders of
equity) must be joined in a foreclosure proceeding to terminate their
rights. 197 Because the association is a junior lienor, a foreclosing first
mortgage loan is required to name the association as a necessary party
to the foreclosure proceeding, and any excess sale proceeds beyond the
amount owed on the first mortgage will be applied to the association's
claim. However, where mortgages are under-collateralized, foreclosure
sales typically do not obtain sufficient proceeds to pay off the first
mortgage, let alone junior liens. Whether paid off or not, junior liens
are wiped out in foreclosure of the senior lien.
Courts and legislatures in some states have attempted to limit the
extent of association losses and protect community members against
non-payment of assessments, even those lacking any priority protection
with respect to first mortgages.198 In New York, for example, the
193. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1256B (West 2007) (effective through Jan. 1, 2012).
194. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 11-110 (LexisNexis 2010); N.C. GEN STAT. ANN. §
47C-3-116 (LexisNexis 2009). Maryland recently enacted a three-month capped priority for
unpaid assessments. See infra notes 290-92 and accompanying text.
195. See Holly Lake Ass'n v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass'n, 660 So. 2d 266, 269 (Fla. 1995)
(holding that an assessment lien relating back to the date of declaration would expose lenders to
unknown risks and therefore cannot have priority); Tally Arms Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Breland,
854 So. 2d 28, 30 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a subsequent assessment lien cannot have
priority over a mortgage lien); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Charleston v. Bailey, 450 S.E.2d
77, 81 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that assessments fixed or determined subsequent to a
mortgage lien are subordinate to the assessment lien).
196. See, e.g, Bd. of Dirs. of Colchester Towne Condo. Council of Co-Owners v. Wachovia
Bank, N.A., et al., 581 S.E.2d 201, 202 (Va. 2003) (explaining that "the realities of the
marketplace require that such lenders be encouraged to provide the desired financing for
individual condominium units by granting priority to the lien of their first mortgages or first
deeds of trust").
197. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 58, at 570-73, 602-08.
198. A limited priority lien for assessment liens has been proposed multiple times to the New
York legislature, but lenders have lobbied against the adoption of the measure. The first year it
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statutory lien securing all unpaid condominium assessments is junior in
priority to first mortgage liens, 199 and New York case law has
confirmed that all sums related to a first mortgage lien (including
collection costs, fees, etc.) on a unit within a community take priority
over an association lien.200 If a unit is delinquent on assessments in
New York, however, legislation provides that the association may
obtain a court-appointed receiver to pay regular assessments to the
association prior to making any mortgage payments, and collect rents
directly from a tenant.201 Case law clarified that this provision does not
apply to special assessments that are payable by a receiver only after
mortgage loan payments are made.202
Even without appointing a receiver or foreclosing its lien,
associations in Florida, like New York, can collect rents directly from
any tenants living in units owned by defaulting members.203 The 2010
amendment to the Florida Common Interest Community Act provides
that associations can collect rent payments directly from tenants when
the owner of a unit is delinquent and further provides that if tenants do
not pay rent to the association, the board can evict them.204 The revised
law also explicitly permits associations to suspend voting privileges for
owners who are ninety days delinquent in their assessments and clarifies
was proposed, the measure was allowed to die in committee. The next year, it was defeated on
the floor. See Ronald A. Sher, Esq., Habitat Board Leadership Conference Seminar: Condo
Collections, HIMMELFARB & SHER LLP, http://www.himmelfarb-sher.comloptions/condo
collections.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2011) (discussing a proposed law that would give
assessment liens a limited priority for six months).
199. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-z (McKinney 2006).
200. Bankers Trust Co. v. Bd. of Managers of Park 900 Condo., 616 N.E.2d 848, 849 (N.Y.
1993).
201. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS § 1325(2) (McKinney 2006).
202. See First N.Y. Bank for Bus. v. 155 E. 34 Realty Co., 158 Misc. 2d 658, 661 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1993) (holding that special assessments are generally for capital improvements well beyond
the period of receivership, and thus, obligation for the special assessments cannot be placed on
the receiver).
203. See S.B. 1196, 2010 Sess. (Fla. 2010) (effective July 1, 2010).
204. S.B. 1196, 2010 Sess. (Fla. 2010) (codified at Fla. Stat. § 718.116 (2011)). The newly
amended Florida provision attempts to permit associations to walk the fine line between incurring
landlord liability and having the authority to collect rents and evict tenants. Tenants in Florida
and New York, however, raise a valid complaint that they have no contractual or property
relationship with the association (except indirectly through their landlord) and that even though
the statute in question purports to immunize tenants who pay rents to the association against
eviction by the landlord, landlords can do much to lower a tenant's quality of life while still
acting within the strict "letter of the law" of a lease. See Kenric Ward, Condo Associations Put
'Hammer' Down on Renters, SUNSHINE STATE NEWS (June 2, 2010), http://www.
sunshinestatenews.com/story/condo-associations-put-hammer-down-renters (highlighting the
potential pitfalls of the new law for tenants).
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that associations can restrict delinquent owners' use of common
areas. 205
Bankruptcy of a delinquent owner may impact an association's
ability to collect delinquent assessments, particularly under Chapter 12,
which permits junior liens to be "stripped" of their collateral claims
when the collateral's value is less than the amount owed on a senior
debt.206 In a November 2010 decision, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia ordered that a community association be
stripped of its unpaid assessment lien in the amount of nearly $7000
because the property was subject to a first mortgage debt that exceeded
its current county-assessed value, which, the court opined, left no excess
security to which the association's lien could attach.207 Although the
association argued that the cited real estate value for the property was
"artificially low" because of a depressed housing market,208 the court
refused to preserve the lien "based solely on anticipated future increase
in the value of a secured creditor's collateral." 209 The court held that
while under-secured creditors' liens are generally valid, in the case of a
party whose secured claim has "inconsequential value," a bankruptcy
filing should cause the lien to disappear.2 10  The operation of the
Bankruptcy Code in this case further bolsters the argument that a junior
priority for association liens is inequitable, particularly in cases of
homes securing under-collateralized mortgages.
205. S.B. 1196, 2010 Sess. (Fla. 2010).
206. See In re Cook, No. 10-101 13-SSM, 2010 WL 4687953 at *1-2 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov.
10, 2010) (holding that Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code makes any junior lien void upon a
prior lien exhausting a creditor's collateral); see also 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) (2006). Although
Congress has specified that post-petition assessments are non-dischargeable in Chapter 7
bankruptcies, this carve-out specifically does not apply to pre-petition debts including
assessments. Id.
207. In re Cook, 2010 WL 4687953, at *2. Interestingly, county tax assessed value is not how
a property's value is typically determined. Market players typically price according to
comparable sales or stream-of-income value for a property, and even judicial review of
foreclosure sale prices admits that there is no precise benchmark for real property valuation. See
B.F.P. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 545 (1994) (mentioning that there are several
ways to determine a property's fair market value).
208. The association cites the "economic crisis that was triggered by the sub-prime mortgage
loan meltdown" as having caused the drop in property valuation. In re Cook, 2010 WL 4687953,
at *2.
209. Id.
210. The court also noted that "[a]lthough there may well be policy arguments favoring
preservation of liens for pre-petition assessments when debtors in reorganization cases propose to
retain the property, such arguments are properly addressed to Congress." Id.
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II. ALTERNATIVES TO FAILED PRIVATE GOVERNANCE
Under current laws, owners in a CIC face financial uncertainty
stemming from the ownership structure and assessment model of their
community. Linked fiscal fortunes means that owners face the threat of
ever-increasing assessments due to their neighbors' delinquencies, and
these unpaid assessments may never be recovered because of such
neighbors' mortgage defaults. The status quo in most states is not only
destabilizing, it is also inequitable. Association maintenance preserves
the value of a lender's collateral, and passing the pro rata share of
upkeep costs onto non-defaulting owners results in unjust enrichment of
the lenders. 211 Courts and legislatures have struggled to resolve such
unfairness, particularly now that the current crisis has highlighted this
deficiency in the CIC assessment system.
A. Other Attempted and Proposed Solutions
1. Limited Priority Liens
a. UCIOA and Six-Month Limited Priority Lien
The drafters of the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act
212("UCIOA"), recognizing that assessment liens would ordinarily be
junior in priority to individual first mortgage liens, crafted an
"innovative" solution to the problem of assessment nonpayment during
mortgage default: the six-month "limited priority lien." 2 13 The UCIOA
model, which has been adopted by eight states to date, 214 provides that
211. See generally RAWLS, supra note 5, at 96 (advocating that beneficiaries of a cooperative
venture should bear the costs of such a venture on a pro rata basis); Hart, supra note 5, at 185-86
(arguing that enjoyment of benefits by parties not bearing associated costs is inequitable).
212. See generally UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT (1994) [hereinafter UCIOA].
In 1977, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws began drafting the
Uniform Condominium Act based on the 1974 Virginia model. Subsequently, the Conference
prepared three uniform laws governing condominiums, cooperatives, and homeowners
associations-the three forms of privately governed communities with different ownership
structures. These were the Uniform Condominium Act, the Uniform Planned Community Act,
and the Model Real Estate Cooperative Act. The Conference then combined the three acts,
resulting in the UCIOA. This Act contains provisions governing condominiums, planned unit
development/homeowner associations, as well as cooperatives.
213. Carl Lisman, Chair of UCIOA's Drafting Comm., Presentation to the Maryland Task
Force on Common Ownership Communities-Maryland Dep't of Hous. and Cmty. Dev. at the
American Homeowners Resource Center: The Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (June 9,
2006) (transcript available at http://www.epohoa.org/index.php?option=com-content&view
=article&id= 104:formation-1975-a-birth-of-ucioa&catid=93:news&Itemid= 111). Lisman seems
to believe that the UCIOA limited priority lien solves the problem of non-payment of
assessments, noting that "we are now convinced that we are more brilliant than we thought we
were." Id.
214. See infra notes 221-28 (explaining that these eight states include Nevada, Alaska,
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an assessment lien, which is normally subordinate in priority to first
mortgages on units, is given limited priority upon foreclosure of the first
priority mortgage lien "to the extent the common expense assessments
based on the periodic budget adopted by the association . . . would have
become due in the absence of acceleration during the six months
immediately preceding institution of an action to enforce the lien." 215
Thus, an association under UCIOA would have a priority position
arising at a mortgage foreclosure sale for unpaid assessments up to an
amount equal to six months of regular-assessment assessments. 216
The six-month capped "super priority" portion of the association lien
does not have a true priority status under UCIOA since this six-month
assessment lien cannot be foreclosed as senior to a mortgage lien.
Rather, it either creates a payment priority for some portion of unpaid
assessments, 217 which would take the first position in the foreclosure
repayment "waterfall," or grants durability to some portion of unpaid
assessments,218 allowing the security for such debt to survive
foreclosure. 219
The UCIOA priority portion does not include costs incurred by the
association to collect delinquent assessments, such as attorney fees.
Some states, however, have enacted statutory variations that include
such costs. 220 According to Washington, D.C. lawyer Catherine Park,
Colorado, West Virginia, Connecticut, Vermont, Minnesota, and Delaware). Legislative
proposals to adopt UCIOA are pending in six more states: Utah, Indiana, New Jersey, South
Carolina, Kentucky, and Ohio.
215. UCIOA § 3-116.
216. Id. Under such a capped priority arrangement, the priority position of the association lien
is split: a super-priority position is given to up to six months of unpaid assessment amounts, and
the remainder of unpaid amounts is accorded the typical priority position of the association lien,
namely subordinate to the first mortgage lien. Id.
217. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 515A.3-115 (West 2002 & Supp. 2010), amended by H.F.
1023, ch. 116, 2011 M[NN. SESS. LAW SERV. (West) (providing that the lien does not have
priority over a senior mortgage lien, but allows for recovery of assessments for a period of six
months). Under this interpretation, six months of unpaid assessments are paid out of foreclosure
proceeds prior to repayment of the first mortgage.
218. Under this interpretation, alien securing six months of unpaid assessments would survive
the first mortgage foreclosure. One problem with this second interpretation of the super-priority
provision is that post-foreclosure, an association often still has to bring a lawsuit against the buyer
or lender to recover the six months of allowable unpaid assessments. This can be onerous for the
association. For example, in Georgia, an association cannot recover the costs of bringing an
action to recover the six months' worth of assessments against the lender. First Fed. Say. Bank of
Ga. v. Eaglewood Court Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 367 S.E.2d 876, 878 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (finding
that the statutory language limited recovery from the lender at six months of assessments, not
including the costs of collecting such assessments).
219. The effect depends on a state's interpretation of the provision.
220. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 183A, § 6 (LexisNexis 1996 & Supp. 2002); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-258 (West 2009 & Supp. 2011) (allowing for recovery of attorney's fees
within the priority portion).
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who specializes in condominium law and litigation, the failure of strict
UCIOA states to include attorney costs can be exploited by mortgage
lenders, which gamble that an association will not hire an attorney to
recover "a mere six months" of unpaid assessments. 22 1
The lien priority concept contained in UCIOA has gained traction
even in states that have not otherwise enacted these uniform acts.
Today, in the eight UCIOA states (Alaska,222 Colorado,223
Connecticut, 224 Delaware, 225 Minnesota,226 Nevada,227 Vermont, 228 and
West Virginia 229), in ten more states (Alabama,230  Florida,231
Illinois,232 Maryland,233 Massachusetts,234 New Jersey,235
Pennsylvania, 236  Rhode Island,237 and Washington 238), and in the
221. Catherine Park, "Super Lien" Legislation: How Super is it Really? And Why Isn't the
Mortgage Industry Complying with the Legislation?, LAW OFFICE OF CATHERINE PARK (July 10,
2010), http://cparklaw.com/condolaw/2010/07/10/super-lien-legislation-how-super-is-it-really-
and-why-isnt-the-mortgage-industry-complying-with-the-legislation. According to Park, the only
way for would-be homeowners to protect themselves in such jurisdictions is to "avoid buying in a
small community" and thereby hope to minimize the budgetary impact of assessment defaults.
Id.
222. ALASKA STAT. § 34.08.470 (2010).
223. Colorado Common Interest Ownership Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-33.3-316
(LexisNexis 2010); see infra notes 241-46 and accompanying text.
224. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-258.
225. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 81-316 (2009).
226. MINN STAT. ANN. § 515B.3-115(a), (e)(1)-(3), (f), (i) (West 2002 & Supp. 2010),
amended by State Agencies-Courts And Common Interest Ownership Act, ch. 116, sec. 16, §
515B.3-l15, 2011 MINN. SESS. LAW SERV. (West).
227. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.3116(2)(c) (LexisNexis 2010), amended by Uniform
Laws-Amendments-Common Interest Communities Act, ch. 389, sec. 49, § 116.3116, 2011 Nev.
Legis. Serv. (West); see infra notes 273-74 and accompanying text.
228. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 1323 (2006).
229. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 36B-3-116 (LexisNexis 2005).
230. ALA. CODE § 35-8A-316 (LexisNexis 1991).
231. FLA. STAT. ANN. (West 2011); see infra notes 280-86 and accompanying text.
232. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 605/9 (West 2009). Section 9(g) of the Illinois
Condominium Property Act requires the association board to have "taken action" to trigger the
requirement that subsequent purchasers of a foreclosed unit pay six months of unpaid
assessments. Id.
233. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 11-110 (LexisNexis 2010), amended by Condominiums
and Homeowners Associations-Priority of Liens Act, ch. 387, sec. 2, § 11-110, 2011 Md. Legis.
Serv. (West) (granting a mere four-month, $1200-capped priority to association assessment liens
at mortgage lender foreclosure).
234. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 183A, § 6 (LexisNexis 1996 & Supp. 2002). The Massachusetts
statute includes a provision for attorneys' fees together with a dollar-amount cap. Id.
235. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8B-21 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010).
236. 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3314 (West 2004).
237. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-36.1-3.16 (1956 & Supp. 2010).
238. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.34.364 (West 2005).
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District of Columbia, 239 community association liens enjoy a limited
priority, typically capped at six months or less. Legislatures in five
states (Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio, South Carolina, and Utah) have been
considering adopting a UCIOA-based statute that would include a six-
month lien priority for unpaid assessments.240  Even with these
progressive statutory developments in many states, more than thirty
states lack any lien priority for association assessments.
To illustrate the typical UCIOA lien priority approach, consider the
Colorado Common Interest Ownership Act ("CCIOA").24 1  Under the
Act, association liens, which include assessments and all collection
costs, are considered automatically perfected as of the date the
association was created. 242 This type of lien is subordinate to property
tax liens and to a first deed of trust on the property, but it is superior to
all other encumbrances of record, regardless of when such other lien is
filed.243  At foreclosure of a first deed of trust on a property, 244 the
association lien will be paid according to a limited priority position to
the extent of six months of budgeted assessment amounts. 245 Colorado
courts have held that the lien may be more than assessments alone, as it
also includes "attorney fees, interest & other allowable items." 246 in
239. D.C. CODE § 42-1903.13 (2001).
240. See MALLACH, supra note 29, at 12 (advising state policymakers to consider allowing
borrowers of mortgages in foreclosure a six month forbearance period).
241. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-33.3-316 (2011). The 1992 version of the Colorado Common
Interest Ownership Act ("CCIOA") automatically applies to associations created after 1992, but
any pre-1992 association can elect to avail itself of the protections and provisions of the Act. By
electing to come under the 1992 CCIOA, an association can effectively change the provisions in
its own governing documents, without filing an amendment, since application of the law is
deemed to change inconsistent declaration language in order to conform to the Act.
242. Id. The automatically perfected lien applies to "any assessment levied against that unit
or fines imposed against its unit owner," which includes fees, late charges, attorneys' fees, and
interest. Id. § 38-33.3-316 (1). There are no limits on late fees and interest, but it is arguably
unclear whether the statutory language includes attorney fees.
243. Id. § 38-33.3-316 (3). This is because the priority timing for the association lien relates
back to the recordation of the declaration. This applies only to liens for deeds of trust recorded
after 1992 when CCIOA was created. For all such provisions, the super-priority six-month lien
applies, regardless of language in the community documents or the deed of trust to the contrary.
Id.
244. A deed of trust is essentially a mortgage. The common foreclosure method for mortgage
liens in Colorado is non-judicial foreclosure through power of sale in a deed of trust. The only
way to foreclose an association lien, however, is through a judicial proceeding. See, e.g., ORTEN
CAVANAGH RICHMOND & HOLMES, LLC, COLO. FORECLOSURE LAWS 1-2, 8 (Mar. 2008),
available at http://www.ocrhlaw.com/library/Colorado_Foreclosure Laws.pdf (explaining the
non-judicial foreclosure procedure in Colorado and contrasting the non-judicial procedure to the
mandated judicial foreclosure procedure for association liens).
245. Id. at 8.
246. First Ati. Mortg., LLC v. Sunstone N. Homeowners Ass'n, 121 P.3d 254, 255 (Colo.
App. 2005) (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-33.3-316 (2)(b) (2010)).
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Colorado, the lien is not payable out of foreclosure proceeds, but rather
survives the foreclosure of the first deed of trust (a durability
interpretation of the UCIOA lien priority provision). 247
Within non-UCIOA states, some lien priority statutory provisions
originated in response to past housing crises imperiling community
associations in that jurisdiction. For example, Massachusetts' lien
priority law grew out of the state's real estate boom and bust of the late
1980s and early 1990s. 24 8  Two decades ago, associations in
Massachusetts struggled with massive budget shortfalls when
homeowners abandoned units they could no longer afford, forcing the
communities to increase assessments on the remaining owners to keep
the association afloat. The remaining owners often could not afford to
make up extra payments to bridge the budgetary gap, which led to a
domino effect of assessment and mortgage delinquencies. 24 9  Today,
CIC liens in Massachusetts have a capped super-priority because of
judicial and legislative efforts to protect communities during the
1990s. 250
247. This follows logically from the limitation on non-judicial foreclosure of association liens.
See supra notes 201-02 (explaining that New York case law provides that all sums related to a
first mortgage lien on a unit within a community, including collection fees and costs, take priority
over an association lien). However, New York legislation provides that if a unit is delinquent on
assessments, the association is able to obtain a court-approved receiver to pay regular assessments
to the association before making any mortgage payments. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 1325(2)
(McKinney 2006). The association may also collect rents directly from a tenant. Id.
248. MICHAEL GOODMAN & JAMES PALMA, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, UMASS DONAHUE
INST., WINNERS AND LOSERS IN THE MASSACHUSETTS HOUSING MARKET: A STUDY FOR
CITIZENS' HOUSING AND PLANNING ASSOCIATION AND THE MASSACHUSETTS HOUSING
PARTNERSHIP 2 (2004), available at http://www.massbenchmarks.org/publications/studies/pdf/
housingmarket04.pdf.
249. See Grahame K. Wells, The Use of Super-Liens to Promote Cooperation Between
Condominium Associations and Lenders, 13 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 477, 477-78 (1994) (citing
Henry L. Judy & Robert A. Wittie, Uniform Condominium Act: Selected Key Issues, 13 REAL
PROP., PROB., & TR. J. 437, 475 (1978)). The troublesome state of the economy during the late
1980s and early 1990s left many condominium owners with severe financial problems, which in
turn, led those owners to stop paying condo fees. Subsequently, the condos could no longer
afford to perform proper maintenance or pay utility bills, the utilities were shut off by their
providers, and local governments condemned the buildings. Id.; see also James Winokur,
Meaner Lienor Community Associations: The "Super Priority " Lien and Related Reforms Under
the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 353, 355 (1992)
(discussing the real estate economy of the 1990s as a catalyst for creating limited lien priorities in
several states).
250. Baker v. Monga, 590 N.E.2d 1162, 1164 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that owners had
an absolute obligation to pay assessments and that owners lack the right to withhold payments);
see also Trs. of Prince Condo. Trust v. Prosser, 592 N.E.2d 1301, 1302 (Mass. 1992) (reiterating
the Monga court's holding, stating that "[flor the same reason that tax payers may not lawfully
decline to pay lawfully assessed taxes because of some grievance or claim against the taxing
governmental unit, a condominium unit owner may not decline to pay lawful assessments"). The
Massachusetts legislature attempted to further mitigate the harm felt by associations losing their
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Rhode Island's lien priority law is one of the newest in the nation,
and it passed unanimously in the state's House and Senate in June
2008.251 This legislation increased the capped foreclosure and
collections cost amount to $5000 and $7500, respectively (inclusive of
legal fees), and provided for a six-month lien priority for assessment
liens upon foreclosure of the first mortgage. 252  Before the measure
came to a vote, and when seeking the governor's veto thereafter, the
Rhode Island Mortgage Bankers Association strenuously objected to the
new law's lien priority provisions, claiming that they would spell the
end of residential mortgage finance for community association housing
in Rhode Island.2 53 Legislative counsel to the Bankers Association
bemoaned the measure, claiming that "it's basically picking the lenders'
pockets, at the end of the day." 254 Rhode Island disagreed and passed
the measure.
By crafting legislation that creates a six-month limited lien priority
for assessments, state legislatures hope to motivate first mortgage
lenders to help pressure non-paying owners to pay their delinquent
obligations. If their borrowers make all their association payments,
lenders can avoid paying six months' worth of assessments out of their
foreclosure proceeds. If, however, the property is under-collateralized
and mortgage foreclosure takes vastly longer than six months, the six-
month priority cap actually may (perversely) induce a lender to further
delay foreclosure until there is a ready third-party purchaser on hand.
This is because a lender purchasing at foreclosure will be liable for all
subsequent assessments, and the foreclosure will also trigger the six-
month payment obligation, increasing the prospective lender costs of
foreclosing. Also, a lender is still likely to recover more in an upside-
down loan if a borrower makes payments on the mortgage rather than
association deficiencies because the lender will only have to reimburse
a six-month capped amount of association deficiencies at some future
time.
entire assessment lien by passing legislation that provides for a six-month lien priority arising at
closing. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 183A, § 6 (LexisNexis 2011).
251. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-36.1-3.16 (2010). The previous law not only failed to provide any
lien priority for assessment liens, but capped an association's reimbursement for foreclosure costs
at $2500, with any additional costs having to be paid by the community as a whole. Patricia
Antonelli, Changes to Rhode Island Law Affect Foreclosures, Priority of Condominium Liens for
Assessments, Mortgage Escrow Accounts and Reverse Mortgages, PARTRIDGE SNOW & HAHN
LLP (July 2008), http://www.psh.com/content345.
252. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-36.1-3.16 (2010).
253. Dunn, supra note 6, at GI (quoting Terrance Martiesian, a lawyer for the Rhode Island
Mortgage Bankers Association, who remarked that "[a] bank is not going to take second place ...
in the chain of liens against the property.. . . They want to be first.").
254. Id. (quoting James Hahn).
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b. Federal Housing Impacts on Association Fiscal Recovery
Federal agencies and GSEs, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
insure or guarantee more than nine out of every ten mortgages that have
been originated since the meltdown in credit markets in 2008.255 The
FHA now insures nearly 50% of all residential mortgages, up from
1.7% of the market in 2006.256 As the buyer or insurer of nearly every
currently originated mortgage loan, these federal policies regarding
lending risk have an enormous impact in terms of capital availability.
The policies of the FHA and the GSEs impact the resolution of the
community assessment issue in two ways: first, by requiring any super-
priority of assessment liens to be limited at six months' worth of
assessments and, second, by prohibiting loans secured by units located
in condominiums with high rates of neighborhood mortgage defaults.257
The GSE secondary market purchasers and the FHA insurers
specifically define qualifying mortgages as a mortgage subject to no
greater than a six-month capped assessment lien priority.258  This
effectively prevents association recovery beyond that threshold.25 9
255. DEP'T OF TREASURY & U.S. DEP'T OF HouS. & URBAN DEV., REFORMING AMERICA'S
HOUSING FINANCE MARKET: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 12 (2011), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/Reforming%20America%27s%20Housing%2OFi
nance%20Market.pdf [hereinafter TREASURY/HUD REPORT]; see also CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS,
A RESPONSIBLE MARKET FOR HOUSING FINANCE: A PROGRESSIVE PLAN TO REFORM THE U.S.
SECONDARY MARKET FOR RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES 2 (2011), available at http://www
.americanprogress.org/issues/201 1/01/pdf/responsiblemarketforhousingfinance.pdf (explaining
that "Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also now purchase more than 80 percent of all multifamily
mortgages, loans to owners, and developers of rental residential properties").
256. CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, supra note 255, at 44-45; see also Government Affairs
Update: FHA Condo. Recertification Requirements, NAT'L ASS'N OF REALTORS,
http://www.realtor.org/wps/wcm/connect/15f94c8044f67a04bl 12f35d6aeab3b5/FHA%2BCondo
%2BRecertification%2BRequirements%2Bl2.8.10.pdfMOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=15f94c80
44f67a04bll2f35d6aeab3b5 (last visited Aug. 16, 2011); Rick Newman, Kill Fannie and
Freddie? Not Likely, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Feb. 21, 2011, 12:12 PM), http://money.msn
.com/investing/kill-fannie-and-freddie-not-likely-usnews.aspx (explaining that most mortgages
issued are currently supported by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac or the FHA). In contrast, private
lenders handled twenty percent of mortgages during "normal" times. Id.
257. See infra notes 258-59 and accompanying text.
258. See FANNIE MAE, FORM 1054 (1208): WARRANTY OF CONDOMINIUM PROJECT LEGAL
DOCUMENTS, available at https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/formsdocs/forms/pdf/projectrevs/
1054.pdf (specifying that in order for a loan to be qualifying, "[a]ny first mortgagee who obtains
title to a condominium unit pursuant to the remedies in the mortgage or through foreclosure will
not be liable for more than six months of the unit's unpaid regularly budgeted dues or charges
accrued before acquisition of the title to the unit by the mortgagee"); see also Condominium Unit
Mortgages-Project Analysis, FREDDIE MAC (Apr. 2011), http://www.freddiemac.com/learn/
pdfs/uw/condoprojectanalysis.pdf (requiring that the first mortgagee obtaining title to the unit be
liable "for no more than six months of unpaid, regularly budgeted assessments or charges (for late
fees and collection costs) accrued before acquisition").
259. Financing for non-qualifying loans is increasingly hard to obtain in the current economic
climate. See Dunn, supra note 23, at GI (discussing Rhode Island foreclosure).
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These definitions of qualifying mortgages make it impossible for a state
to increase the priority of a community assessment. Such funding or
insuring requirements therefore indirectly, but effectively, limit a
community's ability to fully recover delinquent assessments at
foreclosure of an underwater unit. These federal guidelines drive the
bulk of all mortgage lending and unless the six-month limitation is
changed, will prevent state legislatures from acting to solve the
community assessment delinquency problem.
In addition to their priority requirements for qualifying mortgages,
policies of these entities significantly limit finance capital availability
for condominium units. The Department of Housing and Urban
Development ("HUD") maintains a list of "Approved Condominium
Projects," and FHA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac will not insure or
purchase mortgages to units in condominiums that are not on the
approved list.260 The new approval process implemented in the wake of
the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 now disallows "spot
loan" approvals-approvals based on applications for individual unit
mortgages rather than the condominium as a whole.261 Condominium
projects will not be approved unless, inter alia, no more than 15% of the
total units are in arrears (more than thirty days past due) of their
association assessments. 262  An association with more than 15%
delinquent owners can go after those owners personally for the unpaid
amounts and would be wise to do so. 26 3 But if the owners are unable to
260. See Mortgagee Letter 2009-19 from Brian D. Montgomery, Assistant Sec'y for Hous.-
Fed. Hous. Comm'r, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., to All Approved Mortgagees & All FHA
Roster Appraisers 1 (June 12, 2009), available at http://www.bestfhalender.com/wp-content/
uploads/2010/01/09-19ml.pdf [hereinafter Montgomery, Mortgagee Letter 2009-19] (stating that
the FHA "will now allow lenders to determine project eligibility, review project documentation,
and certify to compliance . . .. HUD will continue to maintain a list of Approved Condominium
Projects"); Mortgagee Letter 2009-46A from David H. Stevens, Assistant Sec'y for Hous.-Fed.
Hous. Comm'r, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., to All Approved Mortgagees 1 (Nov. 6,
2009), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/letters/mortgagee/files/09-
46aml.pdf ("This Mortgagee Letter (ML) waives five provisions of that guidance and serves as a
temporary directive to address current housing market conditions."); Mortgagee Letter 2009-46B
from David H. Stevens, Assistant Sec'y for Hous.-Fed. Hous. Comm'r, U.S. Dep't of Hous. &
Urban Dev., to All Approved Mortgagees and All FHA Roster Appraisers 1 (Nov. 6, 2009),
available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/letters/mortgagee/files/09-46bml.pdf
[hereinafter Stevens, Mortgagee Letter 2009-46B] (stating that the FHA will allow lenders to
determine project eligibility, review project documentation, and certify compliance, but FHA will
continue to have a list of approved condominium projects).
261. See supra note 260. Previously, individual loans in a community could earn HUD
approval even if the community as a whole did not get blanket approval from HUD. Such per-
unit approval is no longer an option.
262. Stevens, Mortgagee Letter 2009-46B, supra note 260, at 4.
263. See supra notes 159-77 and accompanying text (discussing association collection
efforts).
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pay, the paying members make up the budgetary shortfall, while they
are simultaneously denied access to financing because of their
neighbors' default. Even if a community earns a coveted spot on
HUD's "Approved" list, that approval expires in two years unless all
requirements are re-certified to the satisfaction of HUD.264
Other requirements for condominium project approval also impact
the resolution of the assessment delinquency issue and have contributed
to a slowdown in condominium unit sales in an already sluggish
market.265 HUD requires that "[n]o more than 10 percent of the units"
be owned by one entity, and states that "[a]t least 50 percent of the units
of a project must be owner-occupied." 266  Such limitations may
practically limit the ability of a condominium association to foreclose
on liens for unpaid assessments and rent out units in the community in
order to attempt to recover some amounts toward the delinquency while
also prohibiting troubled owners from generating income from property
rental to meet obligations. 267  Furthermore, such restrictions make it
more difficult for a unit to be sold, since once a community passes the
15% delinquency tipping point (or the 50% rental tipping point),
financing for would-be purchasers is essentially no longer available.
And most ironically, if a condominium's documents restrict a unit
owner's freedom to rent a unit, which it must do to ensure compliance
with HUD's 50% rental limitation, the FHA has deemed the documents
264. See Montgomery, Mortgagee Letter 2009-19, supra note 260 (explaining that the
recertification deadline for previously approved condominiums, previously set for December 7,
2010, was extended to dates from December 31, 2010 to March 31, 2010, staggered according to
the original project approval date); see also Government Affairs Update: FHA Condominium
Recertification Requirements, NAT'L ASS'N OF REALTORS (Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.realtor.org/
wps/wcm/connect/15f94c8044f67a04b 112f35d6aeab3b5/FHA%2BCondo%2BRecertification%2
BRequirements%2Bl2.8.10.pdfMOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=15f94c8044f67a04bl 12f35d6aea
b3b5 ("Mortgagee Letter 2009-46B states that FHA approved condominium projects must be
recertified every two years").
265. See, e.g., Mandyvilla, Comment to New FHA Condo Guidelines, BROKER OUTPOST
MORTGAGE FORUMS (Dec. 20, 2009, 7:55 AM), http://forum.brokeroutpost.com/loans/forum/2/
283263.htm ("[Realtors should] motivate sellers to slash the price [of condominium units offered
for sale] NOW on their listings before the market does it for them. . . . This is going to be the nail
in the condo market. Values are going to plummet around here due to the number of projects that
are at 51% concentration [of investor owners] and above.").
266. Montgomery, Mortgagee Letter 2009-19, supra note 260, at 4.
267. See DAVID H. STEVENS, ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR HOUS./FED. HOUS. COMM'R, U.S. DEP'T
OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV'T.: CONDO APPROVAL PROCESS (May 2010), available at
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=MAY201 0.pdf (noting that although David
Stevens, Assistant Secretary of HUD, explained in May 2010 that HUD modified this "50%
owner occupancy requirement to allow the exclusion of vacant and tenant-occupied REOs from
the calculation," such exclusions do not apply to real estate owned by associations rather than
lending banks).
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as violating the "free transferability" provisions. 268 The result is that it
is impossible for a condominium to be adequately approved for FHA
insurance, either because it allows rentals or because it does not. Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac require similar owner-occupancy percentages,
and thus, a condominium today cannot simultaneously satisfy the
criteria of the GSEs and the FHA.269
Because nearly half of all mortgage loans are now insured by the
FHA, and almost the entire remainder is sold on the secondary market
to either Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, the policies of the FHA, Fannie
Mae, and Freddie Mac hugely impact resolution of the issue of
assessment recovery.270 The current requirements for loans, however,
work at cross-purposes: while the delinquency rate is used as a proxy
for community fiscal health, the priority limits on association
assessments remove from a community a potentially crucial tool for
ensuring the association's financial well-being. In recognition of the
harm to communities and lenders that can result from a community with
excessive delinquencies, it seems that the FHA, Fannie Mae, and
Freddie Mac should use their market power and definitions of
qualifying mortgages to support community health rather than place
roadblocks to recovery.
c. State Efforts to Add or Enhance Lien Priority
Because capped lien priority typically protects only six months'
worth of assessments, the longer it takes to get a paying owner to take
title to the unit, the less protection the law provides. In early 2010,
Lender Processing Services, Inc. estimated that on average, it took
fifteen months for a home loan to go from being thirty days late to the
property being sold in foreclosure. 27 1 The lengthy foreclosure timeline
is caused in part by the sheer magnitude of the increase in foreclosure
268. 24 C.F.R. § 203.41 (2011).
269. Letter from Loura K. Sanchez, Managing Partner, Hindman Sanchez, to Comm. Ass'ns
Inst. (Nov. 23, 2010) (on file with author).
270. See TREASURY/HUD REPORT, supra note 255, at 12 (explaining that the lack of private
capital in the housing market since 2008 has led government agencies to insure or guarantee the
vast majority of new mortgages); Jody Shenn & John Gittelsohn, FHA Home-Loan Volume Is
Sign of 'Very Sick System,' Agency's Stevens Says, BLOOMBERG (May 24, 2010), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-24/fha-home-loan-volume-is-sign-of-very-sick-system-agency-s-
stevens-says.html (noting that the FHA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been financing more
than 90% of U.S. home lending since the 2008 market collapse); Saskia Scholtes, Fannie and
Freddie Drive Home Loans, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2008, 7:23 PM), http://www.ft.com/
intl/cms/s/0/65e8ab08-OOdd-I1dda0c5000077b07658.html#axzzlTWkKeq6Y (discussing how
government-sponsored mortgage companies have become the "backbone" of the U.S. mortgage
market); see also infra Part II.A. I.c.
271. Viega, supra note 8.
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volume over the past few years-in 2010, there were more foreclosures
commenced each month than were typically commenced in an entire
year prior to 2005.272 The recent foreclosure moratoriums and
government investigations into bank procedures, introduced in all fifty
states in October 2010, significantly lengthened the time needed to
complete foreclosure,2 73 as lenders have (appropriately) responded to
increased procedural scrutiny by slowing the process to ensure validity
of the foreclosure. 274
Some states have responded to the longer foreclosure timeline and the
financial dire straits of associations by increasing the capped amount of
their lien priority statutes. Nevada increased the six-month period to
nine months,2 75 and Florida increased its cap to the lesser of twelve
months' worth of assessments or 1% of the outstanding mortgage loan
amount.276 Although both of these enhanced lien priority measures
increased ultimate recovery by an association, they failed to solve the
underlying problem that still plagues the six-month capped priority
laws: once the designated period has elapsed (be it six or nine or twelve
months), lenders have no further incentive to contribute to property
upkeep or to expeditiously foreclose so that someone new can take title.
The housing crash prompted the Nevada Legislature to swiftly pass
legislation strengthening lien priority protection for assessment liens,
increasing the six-month lien priority to a nine-month priority, effective
October 1, 2009.277 The state legislators were mindful of the FHA and
GSE guidelines, however, so the Nevada statute has an automatic carve-
out for mortgages purchased by the GSEs, limiting the lien priority to
the maximum allowed by such entities' guidelines (namely, six
272. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (reporting 2010 foreclosure statistics).
273. Ariana Eunjung Cha & Dina Elboghdady, 50 State Attorneys General Announce
Foreclosure Probe, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2010, at A13.
274. Ensuring compliance with foreclosure procedure is crucial to protecting borrower rights
and equity. Because the sale price at a foreclosure is not subject to substantive review, strict
adherence to procedural safeguards is the only way that the system can ensure the price obtained
is fair and that the borrower is given all notice and the right to redeem, which statutory law and
equity require. See, e.g., BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 545 (1994) (refusing to
review the adequacy of a foreclosure sale price and instead focusing exclusively on the
foreclosure process, stating, "[w]e deem, as the law has always deemed, that a fair and proper
price, or a 'reasonably equivalent value,' for foreclosed property, is the price in fact received at
the foreclosure sale, so long as all the requirements of the State's foreclosure law have been
complied with").
275. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.3116(2)(c) (2010).
276. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.116 (West 2010 & Supp. 2011), preempted by In re Spa at Sunset
Isles Condo. Ass'n, Inc., No. 10-33758-PGH, 2011 WL 3290239 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. July 13,
2011).
277. NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.3116(2)(c) (2010).
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months). 278  This carve-out undercuts the statute's effectiveness
dramatically, as the vast majority of residential mortgage loans are
originated for resale on the secondary market.2 79 In addition, increasing
the cap to nine months, even when applicable, rapidly became
insufficient recovery as the post-default/pre-foreclosure duration of
mortgages in the state increased.
Florida was the next state to increase the assessment lien priority cap
amount. The Florida Distressed Condominium Relief Act of 2010,
effective July 1, 2010, provides that a first mortgagee taking title to
property through foreclosure is liable for the twelve months of unpaid
common expenses and regular periodic assessments that came due
during the immediately preceding year.280 The total potential exposure
of lenders under this statute, however, is capped at 1% of the
outstanding mortgage debt.28' While the previous change in the law
implementing a six-month cap inspired widespread adherence among
lenders who have not contested its retroactive application, Florida
courts have not yet stated definitively that the Florida amendment
creating a twelve-month cap can be applied retroactively.282  In
addition, although states like Colorado have specified that their
statutory lien priority provisions trump association documents with
provisions to the contrary, it is unclear whether this is true in Florida or
whether Florida associations must amend their documents to take
278. Id.
279. See TREASURY/HUD REPORT, supra note 255, at 2. Secondary resales today are
primarily through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Id.
280. Distressed Condominium Relief Act, 2010 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 36 (codified at Fla. Stat.
Ch. 718.701-08). Previous modifications in the law increased the cap to twelve months for single
family homes in CICs but left the cap at six months for condominium units. The 2010
amendment equalized recovery in both types of CICs. Id.
281. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.116(l)(b)2 (2011). According to some Florida lawyers, the new
law permits unlimited recovery of unpaid assessments from third-party buyers at mortgage
foreclosure (unlimited durability of the association lien) and caps recovery only from lenders.
Telephone interview with Ben Solomon, Attorney, Association Law Group, P.L., North Bay
Village, Fla. (Sept. 28, 2011) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Solomon Interview]. Other
Florida attorneys dispute this reading of the law, noting that the twelve-month cap applies to all
foreclosure sales, regardless of the identity of the buyer, and expressing doubt that the new
twelve-month limit will apply to foreclosures of mortgages originated before 2010. Telephone
interview with Chuck Edgar, Attorney, Cherry, Edgar & Smith, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, Fla.
(Sept. 27, 2010) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Edgar Interview]. Edgar agrees that the
statutory language is ambiguous on this point but notes that there is nothing in the legislative
history to suggest that Florida legislators intended to create a different rule for lender and third-
party foreclosure buyers. Id
282. Edgar notes that "Everyone is collecting the six months of assessments, and lenders
aren't fighting it." Edgar Interview, supra note 281. But Edgar also opines that the twelve-
month cap may not apply to mortgages originated prior to July 2010 and believes that the
legislature in Florida cannot retroactively impose the cap, and only the federal government, not a
state government, could pass a law that effects such an "impairment of contract." Id
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advantage of the enhanced lien priority if the documents reference the
prior (six-month) capped level.283  The flaws of Florida's newly
amended statute are already apparent, and less than a year later, new
legislation has been introduced to "refund and expand upon those
amendments and to clarify other condo association issues."284
Florida has been coping with perhaps the worst volume and quality of
foreclosures in the nation during the past few years, and the large
quantity of foreclosures and many lender missteps have so far
discouraged lenders at foreclosure from challenging the law or its
application. 285  Even if unchallenged, the long delay between
commencing and completing foreclosure proceedings in Florida makes
the twelve-month capped priority still inadequate in many cases
anyway.286  In Florida, as in other states, the best way to ensure
repayment of assessment amounts is to immediately start legal
proceedings when a homeowner has not paid his dues to get a personal
money judgment against the owner in order to compel collection.
Pursuing a money judgment is often the cheaper and easier route for an
association to take to recover unpaid assessments.
The Florida law is so new that the state's mortgage market has not
yet reacted to the change. Interestingly, Florida's twelve-month limit
does not have a GSE limit carve-out like the Nevada provision.287 It is
unclear how this limitation will play out in Florida with respect to
availability of mortgage capital, since Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
specifically exclude debts for which a lender could be liable for more
than six months of assessment charges from pools of qualifying
mortgages. 288 Mortgage originators today almost never originate non-
283. See id. (noting that everyone is taking advantage of the six-month cap, despite the fact
that it is unclear whether or not Florida associations need to amend their documents to take
advantage of the enhanced lien priority); Solomon Interview, supra note 281 (stating that Florida
law permits unlimited recovery of unpaid assessments from third-party buyers at mortgage
foreclosure and caps recovery only from lenders).
284. Joshua Krut, Board of Contributors: After Sweeping Changes in Florida's Condo Law,
Expect New Revisions, DAILY BUS. REv. (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.1aw.com/jsp/article.
jsp?id=1202482933797 (calling this pending legislation the "glitch bill" because it is designed to
clarify unanswered questions relating to the amendments of the prior year).
285. See Edgar Interview, supra note 281 (agreeing that the statutory language is ambiguous
but that the legislature did not intend to create a different rule).
286. See, e.g., supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text (identifying incidents in which
enhanced lien priority statutes failed to protect condominium associations).
287. It does, however, have a dollar-based cap of 1% of the mortgage loan amount. FLA.
STAT. § 718.116(l)(b)2 (2010).
288. Section B4-2.1-06 of Fannie Mae's lending guidelines explicitly states that Fannie Mae
will not purchase debt if the holder of the mortgage could be liable for more than six months of
regular common expenses charged by a community association. See FANNIE MAE, SELLING
GUIDE 575-76 (June 28, 2011).
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FHA loans that they cannot sell on the secondary mortgage market, and
the only truly active secondary residential mortgage market purchasers
are the GSEs.289 It remains to be seen if the Distressed Condominium
Act adversely impacts the availability of mortgage financing in CIC
homes in Florida, or if the GSEs will not enforce these guidelines there
or will change their mandates.
After facing much resistance from lender lobbyists, the Maryland
General Assembly approved a statute to grant CIC assessment liens a
capped priority in mortgage lender foreclosure sales. 290 The new law
requires that $1200 of assessments (or up to four months of
assessments, if less) be paid to an association prior to payment on the
mortgage debt at foreclosure. 291 Since foreclosure in Maryland takes a
minimum of five months to complete, 292 this capped assessment
liability is clearly inadequate to cover all of an association's costs
during the pendency of foreclosure.
Bills specifically aimed at creating six-month limited priority for
association assessment liens are currently pending in Ohio and
Missouri. Each case is strongly supported by individuals who reside in
CICs and community association lobbies, and each case is strongly
opposed by bank lobbies. In Ohio, efforts to pass a UCIOA-based lien
priority for assessments (House Bill 408) failed to achieve legislative
action in the legislature's 2010 session. 293 The efforts are still alive,
and proponents of the measure hope that 2011 will see passage of a law
creating a provision for six months of assessments plus attorney fees,
costs, and expenses to enjoy lien priority superior to all liens but those
for property taxes. National and state lenders in Ohio have strongly
opposed the bill, contending that it will increase lending costs and
complexity and will chill mortgage lending in an already semi-frozen
housing capital market. 294
289. See TREASURY/HUD REPORT, supra note 255, at 2 (discussing how the new plan
developed by the administration will bring private capital into the market and decrease the role of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).
290. H.B. 1246, 428th Gen. Assemb. (Md. 2011). The original bill set the priority cap
higher-six months plus late fees and collection costs-but this proposal met vigorous opposition
by the Maryland Bankers Association. Community Association Law Letter, THOMAS SCHILD
LAw GROUP LLC, 1 (Spring 2011), http://www.schildlaw.com/Spring%202011%20Newsletter
.041811 .pdf. The legislature cut down the cap in an effort to appease the mortgage lender lobby.
Id.
291. Md. H.B. 1246.
292. See Mallory Malesky, How Long Does Foreclosure Take in Maryland, EHOW (Mar. 23,
2011), http://www.ehow.com/info 8098323_long-foreclosure-maryland.html (explaining
Maryland foreclosure procedures).
293. See MALLACH, supra note 29 (discussing the foreclosure crisis in Ohio).
294. See Ann Fisher, Condo Associations Want Plan to Make Owners Pay, THE COLUMBUS
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Banks are also concerned with potential retroactive application of the
priority law with respect to loans that have already been funded.295
While active debates on limited priority statutes remain in Ohio and
Missouri, in many other states, efforts to create a limited lien priority
for association assessments have never gained traction.296
d. Inadequacy of Limited Priority Liens
The priority law for community assessment liens varies among the
states, but this problem has been insufficiently addressed in all of them.
When unpaid upkeep costs are potentially unlimited, capped losses for
the lender necessarily result in unlimited losses allocated to the
members of the community. Thus, even a "super-priority" piece
allocated to assessment liens becomes inadequate once that period has
expired.
When foreclosure takes longer than six months and when foreclosure
proceeds are inadequate to pay off a first mortgage-and both of these
factors are more and more common today-only a fraction of unpaid
assessments are paid, requiring paying members of the association to
fund the remainder. 297 Furthermore, even in some jurisdictions with a
limited association lien priority, proceeds at foreclosure do not
automatically apply to unpaid assessments (the capped portion being
deemed a durability rather than payment priority provision), and thus
the association has to bring a lawsuit-and incur more community
costs-just to recover the amounts that are legally theirs. Miami Beach
Commissioner Jerry Libbin calls this problem an "outrageous loophole"
in the law.298
DISPATCH, July 5, 2009, at 01B.
295. See id. ("Banks and other lenders typically have opposed such laws, contending that they
increase the cost and complexity of lending.").
296. See, e.g., S.B. 411, 2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2010) (stricken Jan. 27, 2010)
(establishing limited lien priority for condominium association assessments).
297. See Coleman, supra note 104, at IA (noting that condominium owners in good standing
are often charged "special assessments" to make up for unpaid fees from delinquents owners).
298. Admin, Comment to Ruling May Help Homeowner Associations, HISTORIC CITY NEWS
(Feb. 6, 2010, 2:31 PM), http://www.historiccity.com/2010/staugustine/news/florida/ruling-may-
help-homeowner-associations-2546. Libbin heralded the reverse foreclosure tactic, see infra Part
II.A.2, as an important step toward protecting owners in condominiums. See id (noting that
Libbin applauded a Miami-Dade Circuit court ruling ordering a "reverse foreclosure"). Florida's
legislature considered a bill that would have required banks to complete foreclosure after a year
of filing or pay all unpaid assessments, but this proposal never came to a vote. See Rob Samouce,
Laws Needed to Get Delinquent Properties Back on Market, NAPLES DAILY NEWS (Jan. 2, 2010),
http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2010/jan/02/laws-needed-get-deliquent-properties-back-
market/ (noting that strong bank lobbying was the cause of legislative inaction on the bill); see
also HOA's Forcing "Reverse Foreclosures," TITLE SEARCH BLOG (Mar. 1, 2010, 10:26 AM),
http://titlesearchblog.com/2010/03/01/hoas-forcing-reverse-fore closures/ (remarking that the bill
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The general problem of unpaid assessments is dramatically
exacerbated in the current market context where lenders (sometimes
deliberately) delay foreclosure on defaulting properties. 299 Lenders
can-and today often do--delay foreclosure. It is true that foreclosure
can take a long time for other reasons: mortgage loan servicers are
currently overwhelmed with the number of defaulting borrowers, and
lenders look hopefully to future market price rebounds to recover under-
collateralized loan amounts. In addition, mortgage servicers' faulty
record-keeping and failure to follow legally-mandated procedures
operate to stretch out the foreclosure timeline as well. 300
But lenders also sometimes strategically delay based on their
calculation that they will be unable to sell the property at foreclosure or
resell the property afterwards because of the sluggish housing
market.30 1  Procrastination can help lenders avoid incurring the
obligations of home ownership, including property taxes and
community association assessments. This is particularly true in cases
where there is a very real risk that the ultimate sale price for the
property will not reimburse such costs. Once the lender owns the real
estate (real estate owned, or "REO" properties), the lender itself is
responsible for assessment charges and, unlike insolvent mortgage
borrowers, can typically be sued successfully for assessment payments
they neglect to make. 302 Because this obligation is assumed upon
taking title, lenders in many cases prefer to postpone foreclosure,
"never saw the light of day for a vote by the legislature").
299. See, e.g., Marshall L. Jones, Condo Associations Battle Deadbeat Owners, Balky Banks
in Collecting Fees, REAL EST. L. & INDUS. REP., Apr. 6, 2010, at 3 ("As lenders institute
foreclosure proceedings against defaulting condominium owners, some condominium
associations are seeing lenders delay in completing the foreclosure process.").
300. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. In addition to servicer and bank moratoriums
on foreclosures, several states, including Connecticut and Texas, froze all foreclosures in October
2010 pending inquiry into faulty and fraudulent loan servicing procedures. Several other states
stopped foreclosures by J.P. Morgan Chase, GMAC and Ally Financial, the institutions tainted
with the "robo-signing" scandal. See Cha, supra note 3, at A9 (noting that the moratoriums have
now been lifted, but the pace of foreclosure remains slow).
301. See Coleman, supra note 104, at IA (noting that some banks deliberately delay taking
back property worth less than the outstanding mortgage); Benny L. Kass, Condo Associations
Saddled with Unpaid Dues Demand that Banks Stop Delaying Foreclosures, WASH. POST, Nov.
20, 2010, at E3 (noting that condo associations are often left with unpaid dues when banks,
wanting to avoid assuming liability on unpaid condominium dues and taxes, delay foreclosure on
a unit).
302. See, e.g., Leigh Katzman, Waiting for the Bank to Foreclose: A Modern Day Story,
KATZMAN GARFINKEL ROSENBAUM, 1-3, http://kgblawfirm.com/pdfs/Waiting for the bank to
foreclose-LCK.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) (detailing all the costs that a lender will incur upon
taking title to real estate at a mortgage foreclosure sale and concluding that "the bank can
comfortably delay completing its foreclosure action knowing the full extent of its liability for past
due assessments").
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hoping that the market will improve and property resale will be more
quickly forthcoming. As Florida attorney Ben Solomon explains, "[t]he
bottom line is the banks don't want to assume the liability associated
with the unit, including the obligation to pay maintenance assessments
to the association." 303 In the meantime, collateral values are preserved
through assessments that lenders neither pay nor reimburse.
Today, the delay between initial mortgage default and actual
foreclosure sale is longer than ever before. Since bank liability for
previously unpaid assessments is capped-or, in many places, non-
existent-mortgage lenders receive an unjust enrichment of collateral
upkeep at the cost of other members of the community. Currently, there
is nothing in the law to prevent such an outcome.
Foreclosure delays increase the ultimate charges borne by the non-
defaulting neighbors but also cause neighboring owners to suffer in
other ways. As unpaid assessments increase, dues increase, units fall
into disrepair, and abandonment increases the likelihood of vandalism
and squatters. When foreclosure finally happens, both property values
and quality of life for the community have declined.304
Focusing on the complete lack of even a capped assessment priority
in a majority of states, Washington, D.C. association law expert and
syndicated columnist Benny Kass has publicly called for nationwide
campaigns to create UCIOA-like provisions in those states that have not
yet passed such a law. 305 But even if the thirty-three states with no
limited priority passed UCIOA-based six-month (or larger) caps, the
underlying problem would persist: lenders can offload a theoretically
unlimited amount of upkeep costs of their collateral onto innocent
members of the community with no adequate recourse at law for the
community and its paying members. And since the limited priority of
assessment liens under UCIOA and similar statutes only takes effect
upon a first mortgage foreclosure, the limited priority lien fails to force
the bank's hand and achieve a more expeditious resolution through
conveying the unit to an owner willing and able to contribute to
community costs. 306
303. Sutta, supra note 6.
304. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 181, at 1-3 (describing the course of foreclosure
proceedings); supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the financial tragedy of the commons associated with
foreclosures in condominium associations).
305. See Kass, infra note 356 (stating that such monthly-based limited priority lien systems
"must be enacted all over the country as soon as possible").
306. Note that some creative litigators have attempted to do just that, with some limited
success in Florida. See infra Part II.A.2.
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State legislatures could close this "loophole" by mandating true
priority for community assessment liens (at least with respect to dues
that are unpaid during a period of mortgage default) or by making CIC
assessment liens non-extinguishable in foreclosure. Capping
community losses rather than lender losses would eliminate the
distortion that the current potential "free ride" creates for lenders
weighing the costs of foreclosure. This would encourage lenders to pay
community assessments during borrower defaults, whether or not it also
encourages the pace of foreclosure to increase. Either way, the
community's losses and contagion effects of the distressed properties is
contained: at some defined point in time, a solvent interest-holder in a
unit will be encouraged to pay the unit's equitable allocation of costs.
This type of limited priority would be vastly more equitable than the
UCIOA-type of total-amount capped lien, both in terms of allocating
upkeep costs and in terms of efficiently motivating housing rollover and
market stability.
2. Creative Litigation Strategies
Florida is perhaps the epicenter of the CIC assessment crisis. 307
Florida was the site of one of the largest housing booms over the past
few decades.308 In particular, condominium development and financing
flourished in Florida through 2007.309 Condominiums in Florida
307. See ElBoghdady, supra note 10, at A14 (noting that nine of the twenty regions with the
worst foreclosure rates were in Florida); Brad Heath, Most Foreclosures Pack into a Few
Counties, USA TODAY, Mar. 6, 2009, at IA (noting that eight counties in Arizona, California,
Florida, and Nevada were responsible for one quarter of all foreclosures in the U.S. in 2008). See
generally Prashant Gopal, Florida Condo Owners Footing Bill for Foreclosures, BLOOMBERG
Bus. WK. (Nov. 29, 2007), http://www.businessweek.com/thethread/hotproperty/archives/
2007/11/florida condo o.html (detailing results of the 2009 Florida Community Association
Mortgage Foreclosure Survey). Florida is also one of the states most impacted by the housing
crisis in general.
308. See MAUREEN F. MAITLAND & DAVID M. BLITZER, S&P/CASE-SHILLER HOME PRICE
INDICES 2009, A YEAR IN REVIEW 5-6 (2010), available at http://www.standardandpoors.com/
indices/index-research/en/us/?type=All&category-Economic (follow "S&P/Case-Shiller Home
Price Indices: 2009 A Year In Review (PDF)" hyperlink) (showing double-digit rise in home
prices in Florida, followed by a precipitous decline as the real estate market went into crisis);
Haya El Nasser, Florida Growth Outpaces National Trend, USA TODAY (Mar. 22, 2011, 3:25:38
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/census/2011-03-17-florida-censusN.htm
(comparing growth rates in Florida to the rest of the country); see also South Florida Absorbs
Growth Across the Board, SE. REAL EST. BUS. (Sept. 2005), http://www.southeastre
business.com/articles/SEPO5/highlight2.html (enthusiastically discussing the robust growth of the
real estate market in Florida-which in hindsight seems ironic and naive).
309. See, e.g., Richard Peep, Condo Culture: How Florida Became Floridistan,
NEWGEOGRAPHY (May 22, 2011), http://www.newgeography.com/content/002245-condo-
culture-how-florida-became-floridastan (telling of the appeal and growth of condominium
developments and investment properties in Florida in the 1990s).
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attracted many real estate investor-buyers, 310 and the demographics of
the state-in particular, the high percentage of retired persons-made
low-maintenance/high amenity housing particularly appealing. But this
same demographic makes the population more vulnerable to escalating
monthly housing costs. Because of these factors, Florida today presents
the most extreme case of foreclosure delay spillovers and community
governance insolvency. This foreclosure delay is rampant: there are
ample news reports of lenders' strategic postponement of public
auctions,311 and the average foreclosure now takes longer than a year
and a half.312 Although the amended Florida law permits a capped
recovery after mortgage foreclosure of an amount equal to the lesser of
twelve months' worth of unpaid association assessments or 1% of the
outstanding mortgage loan amount, 313 in most cases this limited amount
will not cover all of an association's unpaid assessments.
Florida attorneys representing community associations have become
very creative in seeking recovery for their clients. One particularly
interesting tactic has been termed a "reverse foreclosure." 3 14  To
achieve a reverse foreclosure, the association must first foreclose on its
assessment lien and take title to a delinquent unit subject to the first
mortgage lien.3 15 The association, as now-owner of the property, files a
motion for summary judgment in the mortgage lender's own foreclosure
action, seeking judgment in favor of the lender.316 The association
310. A majority of the condominium units in Florida in 2007 were non-owner occupied
(investor properties). See Shimberg Ctr. for Affordable Hous., State of Florida's Housing, 2007
Executive Summary, AFFORDABLE HOUS. ISSUES, Apr. 2008, at 1, 3, available at http://www.
shimberg.ufl.edu/pdf/Newslet-Apr08.pdf (listing statistics for owner-occupied condos in Florida).
311. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 104, at 1A ("[L]enders are in no hurry to take back
delinquent units, only to have to turn around and sell them amid a market that has crashed.").
312. Interview with Kevin Miller, Attorney (Oct. 2010) [hereinafter Miller Interview] (notes
on file with author).
313. S.B. 1196, 2010 Sess. (Fla. 2010) (codified at FLA. STAT. § 718.116 (2010)).
314. See Coleman, supra note 104, at lA (describing reverse foreclosures as a "a tool that can
force banks to pay association maintenance fees when unit owners don't); Susannah Nesmith,
Ruling Could Give Embattled Associations Relief DAILY Bus. REv. (Jan. 27, 2010),
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202466596282 (describing a "reverse foreclosure" ruling
in a Miami-Dade Circuit Court case forcing a bank to take title to a property from a homeowner
association); Paul Brinkman, Miami Judge Grants Reverse Foreclosure, S. FLA. Bus. J. (Jan. 25,
2010, 4:04 PM), http://www.bizjoumals.com/southfloridalstories/2010/01/25/dailylO.html
(quoting attorney Ben Solomon, who notes that reverse foreclosures reverse "will finally help
associations force banks to take title to financially upside down units much faster than ever
before"); "Reverse Foreclosure" Makes Banks Accountable to HOA, FLA. L. J. (Jan. 25, 2010),
http://www.thefloridalawjournal.com/2010/01/reverse-foreclosure-makes-banks-accountable-to-
hoal (noting reverse foreclosure is a legal strategy for condominium and homeowners
associations to prevent banks from stalling foreclosures).
315. See Nesmith, supra note 314 (describing the procedures for enforcing a reverse
foreclosure).
316. Id.
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waives all claims for notice and sale of the property under Florida's
foreclosure laws and moves that the court immediately order the title to
be transferred to the lender. 317
Keys Gate Community Association successfully employed the
reverse foreclosure approach on a home to which it had taken title in
2007 after the owners stopped paying assessments.3 18 The first
mortgage lender on the unit, HSBC Bank USA, filed its own notice to
foreclose two months after the association took title, but the foreclosure
sale never happened. 319 Finding itself stuck with an empty house and
two-and-one-half years worth of unpaid dues (over $5000), the
association attempted the new strategy of moving for summary
judgment in favor of the mortgage lender.320 In January 2010, Miami-
Dade Circuit Judge Jerald Bagley accepted the association's argument
and ordered title immediately transferred to HSBC, making it liable for
all future community assessments. 321 The court also ordered HSBC to
pay the association's legal fees and court costs in connection with the
reverse foreclosure action as well as the capped lien priority amount that
trumped the first mortgage lien. Because this amount was capped, the
association had to write off $3820 in unpaid fees, but at least the long
delay in finding a financially responsible unit owner was finally over.322
As Keys Gate attorney Ben Solomon put it, "[t]he quicker we can move
these distressed properties through the process and into the hands of
somebody who will pay a mortgage and pay taxes and pay their dues,
the quicker we can get the economy back on track."323
In the wake of the Keys Gate success, the reverse foreclosure strategy
gained popularity during early 2010.324 Ben Solomon's firm,
Association Law Group, filed eighty-three foreclosures around the state,
317. Id; Paul Owers & Lisa J. Huriash, Fighting Over Foreclosures-Homeowner
Associations Target Delinquent Tenants, Lax Lenders, SUN SENTINEL, Aug. 10, 2010, at LA.
318. HSBC Bank USA v. Keys Gate Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. No. 07-18411 CA 09 (Fla. Jan. 12,
2010).
319. Id
320. Coleman, supra note 104, at lA.
321. Peter L. Mosca, Florida Court Decision Could Impact Builders and Bank Foreclosure
Processes, REALTY TIMES (Feb. 17, 2010), http://realtytimes.com/rtpages/20100217 florida
court.htm.
322. Id; see also Coleman, supra note 104, at IA (describing Keys Gate Community
Association's use of the reverse foreclosure tactic).
323. Nesmith, supra note 314.
324. See Ruling May Help Homeowner Associations, HIST. CITY NEWS (Feb. 5, 2010),
http://www.historiccity.com/2010/staugustine/news/florida/ruling-may-help-homeowner-
associations-2546 (noting that some firms have been in favor of reverse foreclosure to avoid
paying past due fees).
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with varying success. 325 The reverse foreclosure concept is novel, and
both judges and lenders were confused by the summary judgment
motion.326 Some courts did not realize that the association in such cases
was arguing for judgment for the lender; some lenders did not realize
this either. While the Miami-Dade judges have been receptive to the
idea of a reverse foreclosure, no district court has yet considered and
approved the tactic. 327
In some cases, the exotic nature of the reverse foreclosure claim
caused lenders to just walk away. For example, Citibank responded to a
reverse foreclosure motion by just writing off the entire mortgage debt,
leaving the association owners owning the unit.328 However, the
association had hoped to win a financially competent owner by losing
the foreclosure case, and by winning the case, the association lost access
to the bank's deep pocket for future assessment costs.329
The reverse foreclosure strategy is interesting, but it is legally
cumbersome and unpredictable. In addition, this judicial tactic is
limited to situations where (a) the association has previously foreclosed
on its lien, subject to a first mortgage lien, and (b) the first mortgagee
has already filed a foreclosure action. If a lender has not yet
commenced a court action for foreclosure, no summary judgment
motion can be filed. In addition, the reverse foreclosure requires the un-
reimbursed costs of the association's own foreclosure action.
Furthermore, the entire recovery by the association in Florida is capped
at 1% of the outstanding mortgage loan or twelve months of assessment
costs.330 If the unit in default already has a tenant, there is an even
better option available to the association. Under the 2010 amendment,
the association can collect rents from a defaulting unit without having to
foreclose or file a motion in a lender's proceeding, which may permit a
more immediate and greater recovery for the community. 331
Association lawyers in Florida have made other attempts to find an
avenue for recourse within the existing legal framework. The
Association Law Group pioneered a tactic they call "The Mortgage
Terminator" to wipe out a mortgage lien in cases where an association
has foreclosed on the unit and the mortgage lender has not commenced
325. Solomon Interview, supra note 281.
326. Id.
327. Miller Interview, supra note 312.
328. Sutta, supra note 6.
329. See id. (discussing Citibank's willingness to hand over title).
330. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.116.(1)(b)(1)(a)-(b) (West 2011).
331. Id
118 [Vol. 43
Community Collateral Damage
foreclosure proceedings. 332 The association title-holder of the property
brought its own case against Wells Fargo in a Broward County case in
2010, claiming that the bank lost its equitable claim to its real estate
collateral by deliberately delaying commencement of foreclosure
proceedings.333 The court agreed and wiped out the mortgage lien.334
In another case where the lender strategically delayed foreclosure, the
condominium association sued to force the lender to act. The trial
court, in United States Bank National Ass'n v. Tadmore, found the
association's arguments compelling and ordered the lender to
"diligently proceed with the pending foreclosure action . . . or pay
monthly maintenance fees on the condominium unit in foreclosure."335
The court based its holding on its general equitable powers, concluding
that the association was unreasonably prejudiced by the lender's
deliberate delay in pursuing foreclosure. 336 Thus, the court reasoned
that it was fair and equitable to order the lender to pay monthly
assessments even prior to foreclosure. 337  The trial court decision in
Tadmore at first sparked a flurry of interest in the concept of using
equity to force an expeditious foreclosure, but the holding was short-
lived. The appellate district court in Tadmore reversed, holding that the
lender could not be obliged to pay condominium assessments on a unit
it did not (yet) own. 338 There was no contractual obligation to pay
those fees, and no obligation would arise until the lender acquired
title. 339 Although the association's claim was made in equity, the court
of appeals held that equity could only follow the law, not divert from
it.340
Other associations pin their hopes on provisions in the Florida
foreclosure statute that mandate a foreclosure sale to be scheduled no
sooner than twenty and no later than thirty-five days after court
332. Daniel Vasquez, Broward Case May be First of Many, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 10, 2010),
http://www.algpl.con/news/press/MH-Oct-10-2010.pdf.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Tadmore, 23 So. 3d 822, 822 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
336. Id. at 823.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. The court noted that "equity follows the law" and reasoned that therefore, equity "cannot
be utilized to impose this obligation without limitation before title is passed." Id While the
Tadmore approach was creative, it is unsurprising that the trial decision was reversed. There is a
long-standing view that each lienholder can determine its own foreclosure timing. See NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra note 58, at 612 (stating that a foreclosure on a junior lien cannot affect a senior
mortgagee's interest because the senior should be allowed to choose when to sell).
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filing.341 Although Florida attorney Kevin Miller opines that an
association might be able to claim violation of this provision when
foreclosure is unduly delayed, lenders uniformly have maintained that
the provision creates remedies for the mortgagee alone. 342 In addition,
an association, as a junior lienholder, could ask the court for a
management conference for the foreclosure case according to a
procedural rule designed to move cases along. 343
The Florida statute leaves unanswered the question of how far
association documents can go to enhance the scope and priority of the
assessment lien.344  Citing the statutory provision giving mortgage
lenders priority over association liens, 345 the court in Coral Lakes
Community Ass'n, Inc. v. Busey Bank, N.A., for example, refused to
hold a foreclosing lender jointly and severally liable with its borrower
for unpaid assessments despite language in the declaration to that
effect. 346 In an earlier case with similar declaration language, however,
a Florida district court held that a wholly-owned subsidiary of the
mortgage lender who acquired title at foreclosure would be deemed a
third party not entitled to protection by the assessment priority cap347
and thus, could be sued personally for the entire unpaid assessment
amount.348 The details of which entities could and could not be sued
personally for unpaid assessments, based on language in the
association's declaration, could end up being quite complicated as the
disputes regarding transfer of mortgages muddy the question of which
entity holds what interest in the property. The Florida statute is unclear,
and Florida laws are inconsistent on this point.
341. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 45.031 (1) (a) (West 2011).
342. Miller Interview, supra note 312. Even if courts agreed with the association's arguments
with respect to this provision, there would be no way to use the statute to force lenders to
commence a foreclosure proceeding.
343. Id.
344. A fifteen-year-old Florida case suggests that total super-priority of an association lien
could be created by the association declaration. Holly Lake Ass'n v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n,
660 So. 2d 266, 269 (Fla. 1995). The hope that such precedent would endure has been chilled by
a more recent Florida decision where the association documents provided that any subsequent
parcel owner "regardless of how his or her title has been acquired, including by purchase at a
foreclosure sale" is personally, jointly and severally liable for all unpaid assessments, along with
the prior delinquent owner. Coral Lakes Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v. Busey Bank, N.A., 30 So. 3d 579,
582 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
345. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 720.3085 (6) (West 2010).
346. Coral Lakes Cmty. Ass', Inc., 30 So. 3d at 584.
347. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.116(1) (West 2010).
348. Strangely, the court held that the statutory limitation on post-foreclosure recovery of
assessments applied only to limit a lender-purchaser at foreclosure, leaving a third-party
foreclosure purchaser fully responsible for unpaid assessments. Bay Holdings, Inc. v. 2000
Island Blvd. Condo. Ass'n, 895 So. 2d 1197, 1197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
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3. True Lien Priority: An Analogy to Property Taxes
Community associations function like governments: they perform
public functions and are funded by assessments paid by their citizenry.
In fact, the trend over the past few decades has been for public
governments to assign to private communities more and more
responsibility for services that a municipality would otherwise
provide. 349  Community governance and upkeep costs incurred by
municipalities are funded through property taxes, and unpaid property
taxes are secured by a lien on the subject property that enjoys true
super-priority status. Unpaid taxes are therefore paid first (or remain
burdening the property) at the foreclosure sale. The simplest solution to
the CIC tragedy of the commons posed by unpaid and uncollectable
assessments would be to grant true priority to liens securing such
amounts, analogizing the assessments to property taxes. If association
liens were granted complete and true priority over mortgage liens, then
the association foreclosure would necessarily bring mortgage lenders
"to the table" to pay for their collateral upkeep charges or to participate
in a joint foreclosure proceeding.
On the one hand, an analogy between community assessments and
property taxes is compelling; both governments offer public upkeep to a
community such as paving, snow removal, and open space maintenance.
In these ways, the community functions like a municipality proxy by
providing services to the public. 350 In fact, taxpayers who live in New
Jersey CICs have successfully claimed the right to offset a portion of
their community assessments from property taxes based on a double
taxation complaint.351 However, this analogy can only be taken so far.
Many community-provided amenities are actually a supplement to
municipal services rather than their replacement, and in the vast
majority of states, assessments are not legally considered local
"taxes." 352  To the extent that community services provide private
community benefits (such as amenity upkeep), they represent individual
349. See TREESE ET AL., supra note 16, at 6 (stating that government privatizes its functions,
requiring community associations to fulfill an otherwise municipal obligation).
350. The town of Reston, Virginia was the first CIC and provides many municipal
government services. RESTON ASSOCIATION, http://www.reston.org/default.aspx?qenc=HzT9A
CzZbNs%3d&fqenc=HzT9ACzZbNs%3d (last visited Aug. 1, 2011).
351. See HYATT, supra note 15, at 133 (citing Borough of Englewood Cliffs v. Estate of
Allison, 174 A.2d 631, 640 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1961)) (reasoning that a property's true value does
not include value of public rights transferred to a community).
352. Assessments are not deductible from federal and state tax impositions, for example, even
when the community association services are a proxy for services normally provided by local
municipalities. See HYATT, supra note 14, at 106 (arguing that community associations target
assessments in a manner that local government cannot).
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property-carrying costs rather than funding a benefit to the broader
public, akin to property taxes.
Lenders would likely have strong objections to the idea that
community assessments should be granted true priority by virtue of
their tax-like function and likely will predict the disappearance of home
mortgage credit should such a rule be adopted.353 Nevertheless, having
property taxes prime the mortgage lien has not dissuaded lenders from
making mortgage loans. Lenders routinely protect themselves against
any superior-priority payment obligation of their borrowers through
establishing property tax escrow accounts. Lenders could demand
similar escrow accounts for community assessments.354 In fact, current
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac forms already specifically anticipate
escrow account mandates for such amounts. 355
4. Consent and Control by Community Members
Unlike a mortgage lender, who has the ability to perform a credit
inquiry and refuse to lend money to a financially risky borrower,
homeowners in condominiums and homeowner associations have no
ability to force their neighbors to disclose the details of their finances.
Even if this information were available, owners currently have little
ability to control who buys properties in their community. One
potential solution to the problem of financial interdependence in
privately governed communities, however, would be to permit
communities to perform credit diligence regarding prospective new
members and control entry into the association. Washington, D.C.
lawyer Benny Kass has suggested this type of solution: enable
community boards of directors to approve or disapprove all potential
purchasers of units.356
353. The vigorous opposition mounted by the mortgage banking lobbyists to attempts to
institute even a limited lien priority in states such as Ohio is a case in point. See Fisher, supra
note 294, at 01B.
354. Such escrow accounts, however, might be more administratively expensive than those for
insurance and taxes because many CICs assess monthly rather than yearly or bi-yearly.
355. See EFANNIEMAE.COM, https://www.efanniemae.com/sflformsdocs/documents/sec
instruments/ (last visited July 30, 2011) (providing mortgage documents by state). Associations,
on the other hand, are vastly more limited in their ability to create property-specific escrow
accounts upon, say, resale. Unless community documentation so provides, any efforts would be
struck down as ultra vires.
356. Benny Kass, Foreclosures are Impacting Condominium Projects, REALTY TIMES (Apr.
30, 2007), http://realtytimes.com/rtnews/reu2pages/bennylkass.htm?open&Vol=32&ID=715
realty (posing the question: "If the lenders will not screen their borrowers, why should a
community association have to suffer by having a new owner who will not be able to meet his/her
financial obligations to the association?").
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Cooperatives have long had such ability to control the identity of
their members. 357  New York cases have repeatedly upheld pre-
approval provisions in cooperative documents and even individual
denials of approval for cooperative membership based on criteria as
indirectly relevant as an applicant's fame or legal training.35 8  The
justification for legally permitting such practices in cooperatives is
typically its disparate ownership structure: owners are co-investors in an
entity that holds title to the building in addition to being tenants of their
particular unit. Financing of the building occurs at two levels: through
the entity title holder and at the individual-unit-owner level. Because of
this increased financial interconnectedness, courts have opined that
cooperatives should be able to self-select their members.3 5 9 In the
context of condominiums and homeowner associations, however, power
to disapprove would-be unit purchasers would be more problematic,
opening a Pandora's Box of discrimination. The possible danger posed
by such a solution underscores the importance of finding and enacting a
viable solution through the priority law instead.
Property law is hostile to restraints on alienation, and courts
suspiciously scrutinize restrictive covenants limiting the ability of an
owner to sell his or her property. Economic theory in general argues for
357. Cooperatives must still abide by the Fair Housing Act and may not discriminate based on
membership in a protective class. Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1036 (2d
Cir. 1979).
358. See, e.g., Weisner v. 791 Park Ave. Corp., 160 N.E.2d 720, 724 (N.Y. 1959) ("[Tlhere is
no reason why the owners of the co-operative apartment house could not decide for themselves
with whom they wish to share their [building]."); DeSoignies v. Comasesk House Tenants' Corp.,
800 N.Y.S.2d 679, 682 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (upholding the board's absolute right to control
leasing "for any reason or no reason"); Simpson v. Berkley Owner's Corp., 623 N.Y.S.2d 583,
583 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (the cooperative board "had the right to withhold their approval of
petitioners' purchaser for any reason or no reason"); Bachman v. State Div. of Human Rights,
481 N.Y.S.2d 858, 859-60 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (upholding the denial of a transfer of shares in
an apartment because it was not discriminatory); Goldstone v. Constable, 443 N.Y.S.2d 380,
381-82 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (holding that "directors of this cooperative housing corporation
have the contractual and inherent power to approve or disapprove the transfer of shares and the
assignment of proprietary leases, absent discriminatory practices prohibited by law").
Cooperative boards have refused to permit owners to transfer units to many famous individuals,
including Madonna, Gloria Vanderbilt, Mariah Carey, Calvin Klein, Antonio Banderas, Melanie
Griffith, and former President Richard Nixon. MARRIANE M. JENNINGS, REAL ESTATE LAW 255
(8th ed. 2008) (citing Ellen Wulfhorst, New York Apartment Buyers Face Powerful Co-Op
Boards, EPOCH TIMES, Jan. 27-Feb. 2, 2005, at 13); see also Harvey S. Epstein, Note, Weisner
Revisited: A Reappraisal of a Co-op's Power to Arbitrarily Prohibit a Transfer of its Shares, 14
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 477, 481-85 (1985-1986) (explaining that cooperative boards in New York
arbitrarily prohibit transfer of residences, and applicants are subject to increasing scrutiny). For a
current dispute involving the famous Dakota complex in Manhattan's Upper West Side, see Basil
Katz, Lawsuit Peeks into World of New York City Co-ops, REUTERS, Feb. 3, 2011, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/03/us-housing-newyork-idUSTRE71291R20110203.
359. Subject to anti-discriminatory limitations imposed by the Fair Housing and the Civil
Rights Acts.
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free alienation of property so that society may achieve the property's
highest and best use, as well as maximize its value.360 Although free
alienation increases individual member risks in the context of the
entangled finances of a common interest community, courts typically
strike down consent requirements as incompatible with fee simple
absolute ownership rights.361 Even explicit contract regimes restricting
free transferability in the name of community, harmony, and joint
objectives have been struck down as a restraint on alienation that is
repugnant to the fee simple. 362  Retaining the right to approve
purchasers through a covenant regime impermissibly recalls feudal
controls; courts have consistently refused to enforce such restrictions. 3 63
An association's right of first refusal to purchase a unit has been
upheld, however, because an owner can be made economically whole
by selling to the association in lieu of an objectionable buyer.364 But
such a provision will inadequately protect the financial interests of the
community because it requires the community itself to fund the
purchase and upkeep of a unit as the only way to block a prospective
buyer. This is even more financially burdensome than permitting a
prospective buyer to take title and then incur the costs of enforcing
assessment obligations.
Although it is difficult to force bare approval requirements limiting
an owner's ability to sell his unit in a condominium or homeowner
association, it is very ordinary in a common interest community to
control an owner's ability to rent a unit. Absolute prohibitions on
renting are sometimes claimed to be an unreasonable restriction of fee
title, but courts typically enforce initial limits on renting (an owner must
occupy the unit for the first year, for example); limits on short-term
360. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 450 (4th
ed. 2006).
361. See, e.g., Northwest Real Estate Co. v. Serio, 144 A. 245, 246 (Md. 1929) (holding that
limitations on restraint of alienation are invalid).
362. See, e.g., Riste v. E. Wash. Bible Camp, Inc., 605 P.2d 1294, 1295 (Wash. Ct. App.
1980) (holding that a clause preventing a grantee from transferring title for fee simple without
approval from the grantor is a restraint on alienation and therefore void).
363. See, e.g., Aquarian Found., Inc. v. Sholom House, Inc., 448 So. 2d 1166, 1169 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1984) (holding that an association's right to withhold consent to a unit's transfer was
"obviously an absolute restraint on alienation" because the association was not required to
purchase the unit at fair market value itself upon refusing consent); Northwest Real Estate Co.,
144 A. at 246 (striking down as "clearly repugnant to fee-simple title" a deed covenant providing
that land may not be subsequently sold without consent of the grantor); Riste, 605 P.2d at 1294
(refusing to enforce a restriction for a CIC limiting sale of land to persons approved by the seller
church).
364. See, e.g., Wolinsky v. Kadison, 449 N.E.2d 151, 155 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (holding that an
association may exercise its right of first refusal after considering a prospective buyer's
qualifications).
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leasing (no leases with a term less than six months, for example); and
even limits on the number of units in a community that can be rental-
occupied at any time. 365 Such leasing limitations are typically upheld
even when they are created in non-unanimous amendments to the
governing documents. 366  Not only do courts enforce aggregate
limitations on the percentage of units in a CIC that can be rented at any
one time, but Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHA have issued
guidelines that limit the percentage of a community that can be rented
out, likely as a proxy for financial health of the community.367
Although permitting association boards to exercise approval rights
over sales might be judicially justified as an extension of the broad
enforcement of leasing restrictions boards already can exercise in any
case, it would be bad policy to rely on board diligence and approval as a
way to protect the community's financial health, and this approach
should be avoided. From a legal standpoint, requiring prior approval of
purchasers would create a hardship for owners who are trying to sell,
and indeed the approval right is repugnant to the fee. Such a
requirement would mean that a would-be seller would not only have to
find a willing buyer, but would also have to prove that the candidate
was a credible financial risk. In a tight market, the hardship and delay
caused by this requirement would further freeze out sales of units and
would increase the possibility that an owner would default instead of re-
selling.
In addition, the power to approve buyers is fraught with the potential
for abuse by other members of the association, and to solve one problem
(uncollectable assessments) by creating others (too much board power
limiting freedom to transfer property and the potential for insidious
discrimination) is nonsensical. These problems are already rampant and
difficult to resolve in co-ops. 368  Further, using the CIC structure to
365. Woodside Vill. Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Jahen, 806 So. 2d 452, 462 (Fla. 2002) (holding
that a leasing restriction was reasonable).
366. See Apple II Condo. Ass'n v. Worth Bank & Trust, 659 N.E.2d 93, 97 (111. App. Ct.
1995) (holding that the leasing restrictions were a valid exercise of association authority). Even
disparate impact based on race does not invalidate a leasing restriction. See Villas West II of
Willowridge v. McGlothin, 841 N.E.2d 584, 601 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (refusing to hold that
every discriminatory action is illegal), vacated, 885 N.E.2d 1274 (Ind. 2008).
367. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will not buy loans secured by properties in common
interest communities where more than 49% of the units are occupied by tenants rather than
owners. See FANNIE MAE, CONDOMINIUM PROJECT REVIEW: OPTIONS FOR PROJECT APPROVAL
1-2 (2010), available at https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/refmaterials/approvedprojects/pdfl
condoprojectreview.pdf (outlining the requirements for project approval); FREDDIE MAC,
FREDDIE MAC CONDOMINUM UNIT MORTGAGES 3 (2011), available at http://www.freddiemac
.com/learn/pdfs/uw/condo.pdf (outlining more requirements for project approval).
368. See Matt Chaban, Board to Death: As Co-ops Swagger Back from the Brink, Brooklyn
Pols Plot Their Demise, N.Y. OBSERVER (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.observer.com/20 I1/real-
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create legal limits on a seller's right to transfer to certain types of
borrowers harkens back to the days of racial discrimination because the
perpetuation of racial segregation was the initial motivation for forming
many early suburban CICs.369
The unsavory history of homeowner associations-still obvious from
many first-generation restrictive covenants in the land records-reveals
a dark side of private governments: racially segregated neighborhoods
where restrictive covenants contractually barred would-be sellers from
selling to certain would-be buyers based on pernicious discriminatory
criteria. The U.S. Supreme Court in Shelley v. Kraemer held with
tortured legal reasoning that racially-based restrictive covenants were
unenforceable under the Fourteenth Amendment because the
enforcement of a contract to discriminate would amount to government
action.370  Then, Congress passed the Fair Housing Act, which made
discriminatory sale restrictions illegal and invalid.371 Today, because of
that Act, decisions to rent or sell housing may not lawfully be based on
"race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin."372
estate/board-death-co-ops-swagger-back-brink-brooklyn-pols-plot-their-demise (reporting that
cooperative boards in New York need not disclose the reason for disapproving a prospective
member and that it remains difficult and unpredictable to obtain board approval and sell or buy in
a cooperative in New York); see also Bay Holdings, Inc. v. 2000 Island Blvd. Condo. Ass'n, 895
So. 2d 1197, 1197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. Ap. 2005) (upholding a statutory cap that limits a first
mortgagee's liability for unpaid assessments). A current bill proposes requiring cooperatives to
provide a statement of the reasons for refusing consent to a transfer. A. 8347 § 1, 2011-2012
Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011), available at http://open.nysenate.gov/legislation/api/1.0/lrs-
print/bill/A8347-20 11. Several such bills have been introduced in the past. John Barone,
Limiting the Autonomy of Cooperative Apartment Corporation Governing Boards, 2 CARDOZO
PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 179, 179 (2004).
369. In fact, many community association documents on the land records still contain racial
occupancy clauses. Even though such clauses have no legal force today, their continuing
existence in the chain of title serve as an unfortunate reminder of one of the initial motives of
community ownership structures. It is well near impossible to strike such language from the
record. See Stephen Magagnini, Reminders of Racism, Old Covenants Linger on Records,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 17, 2005, at Al (reporting on the difficulty of removing a restrictive
racial occupancy clause from a Sacramento community association's property records).
370. 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948) (holding that state action existed when a court enforced racial
restrictions). The holding of Shelley has continually perplexed legal theorists because it was
decided in the 1940s. See, e.g., Francis A. Allen, Remembering Shelley v. Kraemer: Of Public
and Private Worlds, 67 WASH. U. L. Q. 709, 710-12 (1989) (arguing that the significance of
Shelley changes over time); Lino Graglia, State Action: Constitutional Phoenix, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 777, 787 (1989) (stating that of the Supreme Court cases regarding state action, the Shelley
holding is the most criticized); Mark Tushnet, Shelley v. Kraemer and Theories of Equality, 33
N.Y. L. SCH. L. REv. 383, 384-85 (1988) (arguing that the substantive holding in Shelley was
identical to the state action holding).
371. Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006).
372. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006).
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On the one hand, it is perhaps too soon in our history to give blanket
membership approval power to community associations because the
original raison d'etre of homeowner associations was to keep certain
people out of them. 37 3 If such power existed, courts would necessarily
need to exercise some sort of oversight scrutiny to assess the
reasonableness of any approval or denial to make sure it did not violate
the provisions of the Fair Housing Act or otherwise impermissibly bar
alienability of property. The benefits of any self-protecting membership
approval empowerment, therefore, must be balanced against the costs of
potential discrimination and the cost of judicial efforts needed to police
appropriate disapprovals of neighbor sales.
Mortgage lenders (theoretically) already do credit diligence on
would-be buyers in communities as part of their underwriting.374  It
would be costly and difficult to force an association to inquire as to
credit scores, employment, and salary. Such inquires would also be
unnecessary in cases where another entity is already assessing these
exact same criteria for a would-be buyer-namely, his or her mortgage
lender. It would be wasteful and inefficient to require the non-expert
volunteer directors to try to replicate this effort.
Because neighbors do not (and probably should not) have the ability
to do financial investigations of would-be buyers in their community,
association members cannot manage their own risks in this regard.
Mortgage lenders, on the other hand, are best able to do such
investigations at the lowest cost because they specifically assess the
financial health of potential borrowers and can set the terms or limit the
availability of mortgage loans accordingly.375
373. See supra note 370 and accompanying text.
374. From 2000 to 2007, many mortgage originators neglected to do any credit diligence or at
least did a terrible job. See Yuliya Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime
Mortgage Crisis, 24 REv. FIN. STUD. 1848, 1873-75 (2011) (showing a decrease in the spread
between prime and subprime mortgages, which is typically used to compensate lenders for the
increased risk of subprime mortgages, concluding that the decrease in this spread was not
sustainable, and indicating that loosening underwriting standards was one of the factors). In
2006, Steven Krystofiak, president of the Mortgage Brokers Association for Responsible
Lending, submitted a written statement into the record of a Federal Reserve public hearing on
mortgage regulation, reporting that his organization had compared a sample of 100 stated income
mortgage applications to IRS records and found almost 60% of the sampled loans had overstated
their income by more than 50%. Inside the Liar Loan: How the Mortgage Industry Nurtured
Deceit, SLATE MAG. (Apr. 24, 2008, 11:25 AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2189576 (citing
Written Statement of Krystofiak, President, Mortgage Bankers Association for Responsible
Lending, Building Sustainable Homeownership: Public Hearing on the Home Equity Lending
Market Before the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (June 16, 2006),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/secrs/2006/august/20060801/op-1253/op-1253_3 1.pdf).
375. Mortgage lenders also perform collateral due diligence (property appraisals) and are
therefore well-situated to prevent a property from being so over-burdened with debt that a
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B. Eroding Mortgage Priority
1. Equitable Reallocation of Payment Default Costs
Capped recoveries and limited priority liens are ineffective in a
climate of underwater loans and long foreclosure timelines. Reverse
foreclosures and other creative litigation strategies may obtain relief in
certain situations but are inadequate to generally protect communities
from the fallout of foreclosure freezes. Although there is some appeal
to analogizing assessments to property taxes and granting a true priority
status to assessment liens, it would be almost impossible for such a
proposal to garner sufficient political support to pass. Allowing
community members more extensive approval rights over property
transfers within their community raises property and liberty rights
concerns that vastly outweigh the benefits of permitting self-policing
due diligence in sales. The best party to perform credit diligence of new
(or refinancing) members in a CIC is the party already performing this
role: the mortgage lender.376 The best party to control for unrealistic
loans, sloppy foreclosure proceedings, and unwarranted delays is also
the mortgage lender. Thus, the mortgage lender should bear costs
occasioned by its failure to diligently protect against the foreseeable
externalities of its lending activities. In a situation where the property is
underwater, the only party with a valuable interest in the property is the
mortgage lender. The lender, as the sole property interest holder in this
case, should bear the upkeep costs that protect and enhance the value of
its security pending foreclosure.
Statutes should be passed in each state to create proper incentives for
lenders to monitor or pay assessment delinquencies. Rather than relying
on limited-priority liens, this proposal-an eroding first priority for first
mortgage liens-would treat the priority position of a lender's first lien
as conditioned upon foreclosure within a certain amount of time after
mortgage default (e.g., six months). Thereafter, every month of unpaid
assessments would become secured by a lien superior in payment
priority to the first mortgage. Importantly, such a lien would have no
upside cap, meaning recovery by the association would theoretically be
unlimited, while the maximum paid by the neighbors would be limited.
Such an eroding mortgage approach would cap the loss to the
association rather than the loss to the lender, which is appropriate
because it is the lender who controls the timing of the foreclosure sale.
foreclosure sale will not net sufficient proceeds to cover obligations secured by the property.
376. See supra note 375 and accompanying text (noting that mortgage lenders perform
collateral due diligence).
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Under this proposal, the priority of the assessment lien would
effectively erode the first priority of the mortgagee. This would likely
incentivize lenders to pay assessments on behalf of their borrowers who
are delinquent and add such costs to the debt. Most mortgage
instruments already permit lenders to do this. Increased lender
responsibility for its share of community upkeep might also motivate
more expeditious foreclosure proceedings. Either way, the costs borne
by an association would be minimized.377 This better cost allocation
regime would make sure that lenders are no longer distorted in their
foreclosure timing analyses, which would ensure that delays in
foreclosure result from relevant loan and market factors, not from a
lender's mere desire to free-ride by avoiding collateral upkeep costs.
Lenders would reasonably respond to such a law by making a better
credit evaluation prior to advancing funds regarding a borrower's ability
to pay not only the mortgage loan but also the applicable assessments.
Lenders would also have even more reason to ensure an accurate
appraisal of collateral value. Any change in the legal framework of
home lending that achieves this outcome is likely beneficial to
individuals and the economy as a whole.378 Also, such an evaluation
currently cannot be done by the association itself, but it can be easily
and cheaply achieved by lenders.379 Lenders might respond to such a
law by establishing an escrow account for association assessments,
similar to accounts lenders already require for property tax and
insurance amounts (and as already anticipated by Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac form instruments). 380  Finally, this law would motivate
lenders during foreclosure to pay outstanding assessments to avoid
incurring additional costs and fees. Having an assessment back-up
source would benefit all property values in the community and keep
other owners from being penalized for having delinquent neighbors.
Lender-funded upkeep also avoids the situation of unjust enrichment
that currently exists when neighbors end up paying for the upkeep on
mortgaged properties for which they hold no interest.
Allowing a first mortgage lender's priority to erode over time as
foreclosure is delayed is therefore both equitable and efficient.
377. Reasonable collection costs should be included in the priority lien amount; however, this
proposal does raise the important question of collection cost and late fee abuses, discussed infra
Part II.B.4.
378. See generally supra Part L.A.2 (discussing the negative externalities of constructive
abandonment).
379. Lenders today are evaluating not only their borrowers' ability to pay assessment
obligations, but also the ability of all other owners in the community to pay their assessments.
380. See supra note 354 and accompanying text (noting that lenders routinely establish
property tax escrow accounts to protect themselves against superior priority payment obligations).
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Uncapping lender liability for assessments will lead to assessment
obligations being met more frequently by someone. This approach will
also create a disincentive for irresponsible delays in foreclosure and,
unlike the six-month limited-priority regime, will continue to be
effective even if foreclosure does take a long time to complete. A
system of eroding mortgage priority could allocate some limited portion
of unpaid assessments to a community or could allocate all unpaid
amounts to the lender, depending on when the lien erosion "clock"
would start.381
Unlike the limited lien priority system, an eroding first priority
system will not merely reduce association losses-it will tangibly
improve community stability. Because responsible neighbors will be
insulated from default spillover, recovery can occur; investors can
purchase units secure in the knowledge that their investment is not
subject to the unforeseeable and uncontrollable default rates of
neighboring property loans. Lenders can lend on units in CICs knowing
that the community will continue to be maintained and property values
will be preserved, all at a cost allocation that is fair and equitable.
Ultimately, this system even benefits the first mortgage lenders who
bear priority erosion losses as well because the value of their collateral
will be preserved. Eroding lien priority should lead to a better recovery
in foreclosure sales, which should offset the priority losses the system
entails. For this reason, the GSEs should revise their policies and
permit uncapped lender responsibility for collateral upkeep. Although a
six-month limit is easier for a lender to prospectively quantify (because
the maximum amount of foreclosure proceeds paid to an association is
pre-determined), this approach depresses the property's value and limits
capital availability to the entire community. Allowing a fairer
allocation of community costs justifiably supports values and stability in
the community-an outcome beneficial for the community's lenders as
well as its owners.
2. Promoting Foreclosure as Policy
One effect of the eroding mortgage priority solution is that lenders
will be discouraged from delaying foreclosure just to avoid payment of
community assessments. A possible result is that foreclosures of
community association properties may proceed more expeditiously,
381. In lieu of having a front-end delay before erosion of alien begins, a state could choose a
shared-liability approach to assessments, mandating that a certain percentage of all unpaid
assessments at foreclosure enjoy a payment priority. Under this system, the cost to a
neighborhood would continue to grow as foreclosure is delayed, but so would the cost to a lender.
This approach, however, would at least somewhat curtail the lender's collateral upkeep free-ride.
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which is arguably harder on defaulting homeowners who face losing
their homes more quickly. Although it is politically difficult for
governments to push for quicker foreclosures (which is seen as making
the poor owners lose vis-a-vis the banks), providing an incentive for
banks to foreclose promptly is actually good in terms of the neighbors
and the community as a whole.382
In some ways, both defaulting borrowers and mortgage lenders
benefit from foreclosure delays, all at the expense of the community.383
Delinquent owners can stay in their homes, cost-free,3 84 and lenders can
wait out a bad market while avoiding the carrying costs on a
property. 8 The people who really lose from this delay are those least
able to control for it: the innocent neighbors who fund the unpaid
assessment bills.
Undue foreclosure delays adversely affect the wider market as well.
Without lower-priced sales to pull down comparable sale values of
homes, housing prices remain propped up at unsustainable levels.
Delaying foreclosure sales, therefore, also delays the housing market
382. Politicians frequently balk at this approach of "getting it over with," and economists
disagree about whether it is better to allow borrowers rent-free possession during a general
market downturn or not. See, e.g., Brady Dennis & Ariana Eunjung Cha, Pelosi Calls for Federal
Inquiry on Mortgage Lenders, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2010, at A15 (discussing political reasons to
push for foreclosure moratoriums while quoting Guy Cecala, the publisher of Inside Mortgage
Finance, as warning that further slowdown in foreclosure sales would "delay significantly any
recovery of the housing market"); Dina ElBoghdady, Anxiously Waiting for the Sale to Go
Through, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2010, at Al l (discussing why foreclosure delays increase market
uncertainty and the problems that result); Pearlstein, supra note 121, at A09 (explaining that "the
longer the foreclosure process goes on, the longer it will take for the excess supply of houses to
be absorbed, for prices to stabilize and for the real estate market to return to something closer to a
normal equilibrium").
383. At the least, the parties benefit from delays where there is not a third party to buy the
property from the lender at foreclosure or soon thereafter.
384. News stories tell of increasing numbers of homeowners who stop paying their mortgages,
betting that it will take the lender a very long time to foreclose and explain that the threat of
foreclosure is so temporally remote that it becomes merely "theoretical." E.g., David Streitfeld,
Owners Stop Paying Mortgages ... and Stop Fretting About It, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2010, at Al
("A growing number . . . are fashioning a sort of homemade mortgage modification, one that
brings their payments all the way down to zero.").
385. See Ruger, supra note 2, at Al ("[Blanks put off the foreclosure sales in many cases
because once they take the property, they become liable for taxes, fees and maintenance."). Some
banks even delay after acquiring the property at a foreclosure sale, waiting as long as possible to
record the deed in order to procrastinate the day they are legally required to contribute to property
upkeep. In the past year, some states legislatures have proposed laws to address this trend,
requiring that deeds be filed within thirty or ninety days of a foreclosure sale. See, e.g., S.B. 141,
150th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009) (requiring foreclosure deeds to be recorded within
ninety days); S.B. 128, 75th Sess. (Nev. 2009) (requiring foreclosure deeds to be recorded within
thirty days).
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from reaching equilibrium.386 Only when prices reflect fundamental
values will the market start recovering in earnest.
Undue foreclosure delays also discourage home buyers and investors
who face uncertain timing and title.387 Lenders avoid financing because
of the uncertainty posed by community properties left in limbo. 388 In
addition, delaying foreclosures also keeps the capital markets from
establishing accurate pricing for mortgage-backed securities products,
slowing the recovery in that market as well.389
During the limbo of threatened foreclosure, properties are generally
not maintained at the optimal level.390 This threat to quality of our
housing stock is nowhere greater than in CICs, where a few delinquent
properties can actually cause a decrease in the upkeep of the entire
community. Our housing stock is at risk of deterioration if responsible
"gatekeepers" are not funding its upkeep. The longer the limbo is
drawn out, the more extreme upkeep problems will be.
It sounds draconian, but the best thing for the community in the case
of a nonpaying unit owner facing foreclosure is to have the foreclosure
sale take place as swiftly as possible. Unnecessary delay costs the
entire community money and increases uncertainty. Any benefits
accruing to the lender (or borrower) from such delay are purchased with
other people's money. Plus, perceived lender benefits may be illusory
because decline in collateral upkeep and increase in community
assessment deficiencies will significantly drive down the value of the
property and the lender's ultimate recovery at foreclosure.
3. Lender Disorganization and Misbehavior
Blame for the financial troubles of associations-like blame for the
housing crisis-targets the mortgage lenders, 39 1 but the eroding lien
386. In 2006, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight ("OFHEO") calculated the
ratio of equivalent rents to home prices (comparing the amount for which a given home would
rent to the home's purchase price) and found that nationwide, the average rental value of homes
was only 70% of the purchase price. Stewart & Brannon, supra note 40, at 16 fig. 1.
387. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing how the uncertainty of
assessments affects would-be buyers and new investors).
388. See supra notes 260-64 and accompanying text (describing the obstacles to financing
faced by condominiums that are in limbo).
389. See supra notes 4 and 10 and accompanying text (discussing how many foreclosure sales
do not even cover the amount owed on the mortgages and how the amount of mortgages in
default force a fewer number of individuals to cover the burden of upkeep costs).
390. See supra Part I.A.2 (noting that a defaulting homeowner facing foreclosure has little
incentive to make improvements on the home).
391. Miami Beach City Commissioner Jerry Libbin, for example, blames "greedy banks" that
"refuse to take financial responsibility for their reckless lending" for causing the mass of
association delinquencies that end up saddling the remaining owners of condominium units with
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proposal is not punitive. Rather, proper upkeep allocation is a
prerequisite to market recovery. Thus far, mortgage lenders have
strongly objected to being forced to pay assessments on behalf of
properties they are unable to sell quickly,392 although their own self-
interest leads banks to take on maintenance obligations for collateral not
located in privately-governed communities. Governments and
consumer protection groups have begged lenders to cut homeowners a
break, yet homeowners face being sued by Florida associations for not
foreclosing quickly enough.393 The volume of defaulted properties is
itself a barrier to expeditious foreclosure. 394 Servicers are overwhelmed
with as many new mortgage defaults each month as previously occurred
in an entire year. 395
In the case of homes not located in CICs, lenders cannot avoid
maintenance of constructively (or literally) abandoned properties prior
to foreclosure. To prevent the ravages of permissive waste, lenders hire
a manager to maintain such properties, buy insurance on the properties,
and even pay to have necessary repairs done. Such collateral
preservation steps are merely prudent business decisions and do not
necessarily force lenders to foreclose at a time other than their choosing.
Alternately, lenders can decide to modify loan obligations to free up
borrower capital to meet needed upkeep costs. Lenders outside of CICs
regularly act upon the clear understanding that maintenance of collateral
value is in their own best interest. The only reason lenders do not incur
such costs in CIC properties is that someone else is already doing the
maintenance and picking up the tab.
"huge special assessments." Miami Beach Commissioner Jerry Libbin Applauds 'Reverse
Foreclosure' Ruling, Renews Call for State Lawmakers to Enact Comprehensive Foreclosure
Reforms, PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.historiccity.com/2010/staugustine/
news/florida/ruling-may-help-homeowner-associations-2546. Libbin has been "spearheading a
state-wide campaign to protect condominium unit owners from unfair assessments levied on
them" because of the housing meltdown, claiming that "loopholes in laws have allowed banks to
escape from paying their fair share-forcing tens of thousands of Florida condo unit owners in
good standing to pick up the tab." Id.
392. Alex Sanchez, president and CEO of the Florida Bankers Association, explains the lender
perspective: "We get hit from every side. Some people say we're foreclosing too fast; others say
we're foreclosing too slow [sic]. Bankers want to keep Florida families in their homes.
Foreclosure is a last remedy." Coleman, supra note 104, at IA.
393. See supra Part II.A.1.c (discussing government efforts to extend foreclosure timelines).
394. See Eunjung Cha & Dennis, supra note 3, at A9 (warning that uncertainty in foreclosure
procedures scares away buyers and creates an even more "traumatic market" situation, where
foreclosure buyers are even more scarce); Gretchen Morgenson & Geraldine Fabrikant, Florida's
High Speed Answer to a Foreclosure Mess, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2010, at BU I (explaining that
the huge backlog of foreclosure cases in Florida has led to some corner-cutting by the judicial
department as well as lenders and that the backlog continues to increase anyway).
395. Viega, supra note 9.
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Foreclosures cannot proceed when it is unclear who owns what
loans. 396  Because a mortgage follows the note, only ownership (and,
typically, possession) of the note evidencing the debt can permit an
entity to foreclose on the mortgage. Before the advent of the secondary
mortgage market and securitization, note ownership was easy to track
because in most cases loan originators remained holders of the
instrument. But with the growth of the secondary market and the
innovation of mortgage-backed securitization and its related products,
ownership of mortgage debt was passed on post-closing and became
segmented through pools of loans.3 97 By the mid-1990s, most mortgage
396. On October 13, 2010, all fifty states began a joint investigation into mortgage
foreclosures. This investigation was sparked by the "robo-signing" scandal. Robo-signing refers
to the practice of having employees sign off on thousands of foreclosure affidavits, stating that
they had reviewed the underlying paperwork when, in fact, they had not. See Eunjung Cha &
Dennis, supra note 382, at Al5 (discussing House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's call for the Justice
Department to investigate mortgage lenders and how Maryland joined other states that sought to
halt foreclosure sales while lender forgery and fraud claims were fully explored). The robo-
signing scandal and associated moratoriums slowed down the foreclosure process significantly
and left millions of homes "in limbo." Id.; see also Congressional Oversight Panel: Hearing on
TARP Foreclosure Mitigation Programs, 111th Cong. 3 (2010) (testimony of Julia Gordon,
Center for Responsible Lending) (stating that servicers engaged in "shoddy, abusive, and even
illegal practices related to the foreclosure process" cause a lack of confidence in the process
among buyers, which slows the absorption of real estate-owned inventory and an overall recovery
of the housing market); Eunjung Cha, Mufson & Yang, supra note 3, at All (discussing the
political pressure for the federal government to impose a full moratorium on foreclosures due to
concerns over banks' foreclosure procedures); supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing
the moratoriums on mortgage foreclosures announced by large lenders due to sloppy or
fraudulent servicer foreclosure procedures, describing the political reaction to the moratoriums,
and stating that the procedural concerns prompting the moratoriums still linger despite the fact
that the moratoriums have since been lifted). Although the moratoriums have now been lifted,
the pace of foreclosure has significantly slowed in the wake of such scandals, resulting in a
renewed focus on foreclosure procedure and mortgage ownership. For a more detailed discussion
of some of the problems of note ownership and chain of title for mortgage notes in the secondary
market and a proposal regarding possible future systemic solutions, see Dale A. Whitman, How
Negotiability has Fouled up the Secondary Mortgage Market, and What to Do About It, 37 PEPP.
L. REv. 737, 757-69 (2010).
397. The securitization concept basically holds that by splitting a group (pool) of mortgage
loans into multiple classes (tranches) with a hierarchy of repayment rights (the top tranche has the
least risky position in terms of credit and repayment risk), the mere grouping and tranching of the
pool will dramatically reduce risks for investors holding the top tier position because the lower-
positioned investors provide a buffer by bearing the first loss. Theoretically, this is true even if
the entire pool is made up of risky mortgage loans: the lower tranches act as a risk shock
absorber. Wall Street opined that pooling and tranching can be done several times, supposedly
reducing risk of top-tiered securities with each re-tranching. This theory, widely accepted in the
dawn of the twenty-first century, seems to work less well under real market stress-as seen in the
meltdown of the subprime market. The structure of securitization in the abstract was not the
problem, it was rather the valuation model for securitized products that was inadequate. For an
overview comparison of securitization and traditional bank lending, see Gerald Hanweck,
Anthony Sanders & Robert Van Order, Securitization Versus Traditional Banks: An Agnostic
View of the Future of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Banks, FINREG21 (Sept. 28, 2009),
http://www.finreg21.com/lombard-street/securitization-versus-traditional-banks-an-agnostic-
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banks no longer intended to originate mortgages for their own portfolios
but rather acted as intermediaries-originating mortgages in order to
sell them on the secondary market in turn. 398
Loan ownership changes, through secondary market sales of
mortgage loans, pooling, tranching, and securitization sales of pieces of
those loans, were supposedly all tracked through the Mortgage
Electronic Registration System ("MERS"). 399 Although MERS records
of loans often do permit ownership to be tracked, the individual notes
have in many cases become lost along the way. 400 Because the lien (the
mortgage) follows the payment obligation (the note), production of the
note or a court-allowed substitute is a prerequisite to commencing a
foreclosure proceeding. 40 1
The delay is unfortunate but unavoidable: foreclosure as a process
requires strict adherence in order to assure the fairness of the result.402
If foreclosures must slow down to ensure procedural due process, then a
slower timeline is essential.403 The costs of these foreclosure delays,
however, should be borne by the entities who could have avoided the
problems causing the delays-namely, the lenders or servicers.
Hopefully, foreclosures will not be delayed more than necessary as a
result of political posturing because foreclosure delay causes far more
problems than it solves.404
Many of the problems plaguing the housing market today-from the
robo-signing scandal to the poorly-underwritten loans in the first
place-are products of lender sloppiness, disorganization, and
(sometimes) misbehavior. The structure of the market itself encouraged
view-future-fannie-mae-freddie-ma (providing a concise description of the development of
mortgage-backed securitization); see also Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory
Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503,
535-51 (2002) (providing a summary of the basics of loan securitization).
398. ROBIN PAUL MALLOY & JAMES CHARLES SMITH, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS:
PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 381-82 (3d ed. 2007). See generally ANDREW DAVIDSON,
ANTHONY B. SANDERS & LAN-LING WOLFF, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURING AND INVESTMENT
ANALYSIS (2003).
399. See Whitman, supra note 396, at 765 n. 157 (describing MERS, which was "created by
the major participants in the secondary mortgage market to maintain an electronic, on-line
registry of mortgage assignments").
400. Id at 757.
401. Id.at 757-59.
402. This is very similar to how election law procedures assure fair election results and how
trial procedures assure viable findings of fact.
403. It is paramount to ensure that foreclosure sales are valid because flawed foreclosures
raise three problems that threaten housing markets and the broader economy: the foreclosure
itself may not be warranted or conducted correctly (with proper parties); buyers at foreclosure are
not assured of good title; and lack of confidence in titles to land slows housing market recovery.
404. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing the negative impact of constructive abandonment).
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risk-taking at the originating lender level. Because borrower credit risk
was assumed by the secondary market purchaser and securitizer of the
loans, often with insurance companies providing credit enhancement to
the mortgage pool, and was then passed on (in whole or in part) to
investors in the pool that provided the actual funds through purchasing
mortgage-backed securities,405 there was very little incentive for
mortgage lenders to perform sufficient due diligence before advancing
funds. The New York Times decries sloppy lending, property appraisals,
and securities ratings, pointing out that "[s]ince we trust, why verify?"
seems to have been the industry motto. 406
Again, there were many guilty parties in sloppy lending and loan
transfers. But as between the mortgage lenders and the borrower's
neighbors, the lenders clearly emerge as more culpable. Thus, between
these two categories of parties, the choice for cost allocation is likewise
clear: the mortgage lender is the only party who can avoid similar
problems in the future. As the least-cost avoider, economic theory
supports the equitable judgment here: lenders should bear costs caused
by their failure to carefully underwrite their lending, properly document
their mortgage sales and securitizations, and promptly and correctly
foreclose.407
Lenders uniformly lobby to keep the system as-is, particularly in
states with no limited lien priority for assessments. But in reality,
bankers' associations that decry a viable solution to private governance
failure are acting against their own long-term interest. Although lenders
may see themselves as paying the price of revisions in the lien priority
scheme, they very well could also be lenders on non-defaulting units
currently being burdened with increasing assessments or, at the very
least, facing the uncertainty of assessment increases in the future. A
lender may desire to make a loan on a unit in a community where a
large percentage of owners could stop paying assessments at any time.
This uncertainty hurts owners and their lenders. 408
Alternatively, if the community could ensure the expected revenue
stream, the risk to all lenders decreases even though their exposure in
405. See supra note 397 (describing the securitization concept involving pools and tranches).
406. Floyd Norris, Banks Stuck with Bill for Bad Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2010, at Bl.
407. This is not to say that uncertain foreclosures should be permitted. Strict procedural
protections and requirements must be maintained. But any additional community costs incurred
by lender missteps must be borne by lenders alone-not by the neighborhoods in which their
collateral is located.
408. This is why Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, FHA, and other lenders impose a limit on the
percentage of delinquencies before they will purchase or insure (or originate) loans in a
community association. It is also why the GSEs want to approve community reserves levels. See
supra Part II.A. 1.b (discussing how lender policies affect assessment recovery).
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terms of their non-paying borrowers goes up. The downside, however,
should not pose a problem; lenders can manage this risk much more
easily than the uncertainty risk related to potentially unrecoverable
assessments. Lenders already take measures to protect themselves
against property tax amounts that can accrue and are payable prior to
their mortgage loan out of foreclosure proceeds. Lenders need only to
set up reserve accounts and affirmatively require payment of association
assessments to control for borrower misbehavior and their own loss
exposure from the loss of lien priority.
Lenders also benefit from legislation empowering associations to
ultimately recover their upkeep costs because, by keeping the
community association solvent and active, lenders reap the benefits of
supported property values and well-maintained communities. Even
when lenders "save" money by delaying foreclosure to avoid paying
assessments, they drive down the property value of their own collateral
by causing community assessments to increase while services decline.
In essence, lenders commit their own waste when they fail to ensure
payment of association assessments.
4. Association Assessment Abuses
Some commentators target association expenditures in general as
wasteful spending, but statutory oversight of association budgeting and
amenities is not a good idea. Rather than pass laws requiring
communities to tighten their belts, this is best left to the governance
system in place. There is nothing preventing members from voting to
cut back services and save community funds. Furthermore, if a lender
begins paying assessments after foreclosure, the lender will be able to
assert the unit's voting rights and have some input into community costs
and fees.
Associations are typically empowered to charge late fees and
collection costs in addition to delinquent assessments.4 09  Clearly,
associations must be able to recoup the costs of collecting delinquent
assessments. Some assert, however, that late fees and collection costs
are out of control.410 Allegations abound that community associations
hire lawyers who abuse the system by charging outrageous fees. 4 11
409. HYATT, supra note 15, at 121-22 (describing two methods of imposing late fees in CIC
associations: flat rate and monthly interest fees).
410. See, e.g., Ngoc Nguyen, Hard-Pressed Homeowners Facing Another Financial Threat,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2011, at A19A (depicting cases where association debts were "turned over"
to collection agencies and the tenfold increase in the amount owing due to fees and interest).
411. Id; see also Shirley Wise, Reverse Foreclosures-Are the Associations the Victims
Here?, EZINEARTICLES (Aug. 30, 2010), http://ezinearticles.com/?Reverse-Foreclosures---Are-
the-Associations-the-Victims-Here?&id=4879390 (reporting that "the association attorneys add
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Some California lawmakers, for example, have highlighted the danger
of so-called "foreclosure factories"-law firms and collection agencies
that charge an association $1500 to $2000 for taking over a foreclosure
proceeding against a delinquent owner.412  The associations tack the
amount paid to assessment collectors onto the delinquent charges, and
the collection cost amounts can be "shockingly high." 4 13
Current government oversight of collection cost charges is minimal:
only the California State Legislature has considered specifically limiting
debt collection practices of CIC associations. 414 Recent attention to the
plight of both association residents and nonpaying owners facing
foreclosure suggests that additional state regulation of assessment
collection may be on the horizon. 415
Concern over unconscionably high late fees and collection costs may
be warranted, as there are few legal limits on what a CIC association
can impose on its members as long as it follows the procedures set forth
in its governing documents. 4 16 If mortgage lenders are on the hook for
outrageous fees for their services," are "unwilling to discount the amount not even by a dollar"
and that these unfair practices "need to be questioned"). See generally EVAN MCKENZIE,
PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE
GOVERNMENT (1996) (criticizing the entire governance system of CICs as prone to abuse).
412. Id; see also Wasserman, supra note 12 (describing the problems related to associations
that can easily foreclose on homes and describing recent legislative efforts to make foreclosure
more difficult).
413. Ngai Pindell, Tensions Between HOA Super Liens and Purchasers at Foreclosure, LAND
USE PROF BLOG (Jan. 29, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/land use/201 0/01/tensions-
between-hoa-super-liens-and-purchasers-at-foreclosure.html. Collection costs charged by
associations are much maligned. Professor Pindell opines that "the only entities capable of
engendering more ill will than over-zealous lenders are HOAs" and notes that "many see these
perceived, excessive HOA charges as yet another manifestation of unchecked and intrusive power
over homes and communities." Id
414. See S.B. 561, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011) (providing that "an association shall not
voluntarily assign or pledge the association's right to collect payment or assessments to a third
party ... [unless] the third party agrees in writing to collect payments or assessments on behalf of
the association in the manner set forth in this chapter" and prohibiting "a third party that has
contracted with an association to collect assessments, fees, or payments . . . [from] act[ing] as
trustee in foreclosure proceedings"); see also Nguyen, supra note 411, at Al9A (reporting that
"the California Senate Judiciary Committee passed a bill to curtail predatory practices by
collection agencies" for homeowner association debt). The federal Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act may also apply to limit the tactics an association may employ to collect unpaid assessments.
See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-169 2p (2006); supra note 162 and
accompanying text (discussing the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act).
415. Pending bills in Utah and Arizona bar the use of debt collectors to obtain unpaid
assessments. Conlin & Lush, supra note 5.
416. See, e.g., O'Buck v. Cottonwood Vill. Condo. Ass'n, 750 P.2d 813, 818 (Alaska 1988)
(upholding association rule banning television antennae in spite of no showing of adverse effect
on the value of units and holding that owners of units in CICs "consciously sacrifice some
freedom of choice in their decision to live in this type of housing"); Villa de las Palmas
Homeowners Ass'n v. Terifaj, 90 P.3d 1223, 1234-35 (Cal. 2004) (upholding amendment to
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unpaid assessments plus fees, such lenders might validly complain that
an association might manipulate costs in order to obtain coverage of
community expense from lenders' deep pockets. There may therefore
be compelling reasons to have statutory limits on late fees and charges
that an association can impose in order to prohibit a paying majority
from unfairly allocating association costs. Some statutory oversight
would be particularly warranted in cases where such charges are
ultimately recoverable in full from a first mortgage lender in its
foreclosure sale. Just as the current inequitable allocation of costs
among members is unfair, it would be equally unfair to pass on a lion's
share of community costs to lenders.
CONCLUSION
Today's unprecedented delay in foreclosures of vast numbers of
financially underwater property harms non-defaulting owners in
privately governed communities. The financial "commons" of
entangled fiscal fortunes in such neighborhoods illustrates a
fundamental flaw in the common interest community system of
ownership that must be remedied to prevent the potential failure of such
governance forms during periods of great economic stress. The adverse
external impact of community assessment delinquencies is an important
but often overlooked problem, which under the current housing crisis is
reaching critical levels in some localities. Certain government and
market actions, including current foreclosure moratoriums and delays,
exacerbate the problem, spreading financial distress to innocent
homeowners and bringing property values down in a tangible and
significant way. Leaving community associations effectively bankrupt
is a lose-lose scenario and we need prompt legislative action to prevent
this result.
Current lien priority laws fail to protect the interests of such
communities and their paying members. Even in the handful of states
that have enacted protective limited lien priority provisions with respect
to community association assessments, assessment lien priority is
almost always capped at six months' worth of delinquent assessments.
Because foreclosures take months or years longer than the time period
representing the recoverable assessment amounts, such laws provide no
real incentive for lender responsibility or expeditious foreclosure sales.
As foreclosure is delayed, costs continue to mount while neighbors pay
the costs left unpaid by delinquent owners.
condominium declaration banning pets despite statute providing that no declaration can prohibit
all pets).
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To effectively preserve property values and protect blameless
homeowners in planned communities, states across the nation must
adopt measures to enable private governments to perform their roles.
Allowing delayed foreclosures to erode the lien priority of a first
mortgage achieves the needed result with the most contained and best-
allocated costs. Although creating incentives for prompt foreclosures
may at first glance seem perverse in a difficult economy, it is the only
answer to the insolvency contagion threatened by assessment
delinquencies and foreclosure delays. Finding solvent owners to
replace those who hold title to houses they can ill afford-both in terms
of financing and upkeep costs-is paramount. Continuing to mandate
that paying members of a community association provide private
financial support to the defaulting homeowners is unfair, inefficient, and
poor policy indeed.
